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UPDATE `aff_pdf_cache` SET `cache` = 'a:10:{i:0;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"11234\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:48:\"Juries and the political economy of legal origin\";s:11:\"description\";s:2154:\"Legal origin has been brought forward as a key influence on modern finance, because common law institutions protect investors better than do civil law institutions, it is claimed. These institutional differences are said, in the legal origin explanation, to have been hard-wired intonations centuries ago. Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney challenge the legal origin description of the jury as emerging and achieving prominence in 12th-and13th-century England while remaining unimportant in France. That contrast has been offered as a key difference between common and civil law, one dependent on the differences in relative power between the English monarch and the French one in the 13thcentury. But the investigation of the jury here should give pause to those promoting the overall legal origin thesis. The first reason to hesitate is that the jury is not central to protecting outside investors in common law nations. Indeed America\'spremier corporate court—the Delaware Chancery court—sits without a jury, and the usual view in legal circles is that the jury\'sabsence (and the resulting decision-making by expert judges, not juries) is a strength of the court, nota weakness. The second reason is that Britain did not generally transfer the jury system toits colonies, because to have done so would have conflicted with its colonial goals. That is nota secondary point: political economy issues regularly trump issues like legal origin—colonial policy was just one example of how political goals displace secondary institutions. The third reason is that analysis for the jury differences between civil and common law nations depends on political economy differences centuries ago. But if political economy differences determined institutional differences in the earlier centuries, it is plausible that political economy differences in the intervening centuries would also have affected financial outcomes. Indeed modern political economy differences that lead some nations to support capital markets and others to denigrate them could explain modern financial differences as much as, or more than, 13thcentury political differences.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:65:\"images/t/113/juries-and-the-political-economy-of-legal-origin.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:66:\"images/t2/113/juries-and-the-political-economy-of-legal-origin.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:48:\"juries-and-the-political-economy-of-legal-origin\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"15\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"5\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"1\";}i:1;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:6:\"128880\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:4:\"noah\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:1:\"0\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:151:\"NYC-3360 General Corporation Tax Report of Change in Tax Base Made by Internal Revenue Service and/or New York State Department of Taxation and Finance\";s:11:\"description\";s:735:\"\n

  1. GENERAL CORPORATION TAX REPORT OF CHANGE IN\n\n 3360\n NYC\n TAX BASE MADE BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND/OR\n NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE\n\n\n\n\n NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND…\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:191:\"data/thumb/NYC-3360-General-Corporation-Tax-Report-of-Change-in-Tax-Base-Made-by-Internal-Revenue-Service-andor-New-York-State-Department-of-Taxation-and-Finance-Document-Transcript-43257.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:192:\"data/thumb2/NYC-3360-General-Corporation-Tax-Report-of-Change-in-Tax-Base-Made-by-Internal-Revenue-Service-andor-New-York-State-Department-of-Taxation-and-Finance-Document-Transcript-43257.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:100:\"nyc-3360-general-corporation-tax-report-of-change-in-tax-base-made-by-internal-revenue-service-and-o\";s:5:\"pages\";s:1:\"2\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:2;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"14809\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:124:\"The political economy of comprehensive social policy reform and emergence of a social policy paradigm: the case of Slovakia\";s:11:\"description\";s:1093:\"In many European countries, significant changes in social policy are needed to ensure successful policy outcomes in employment, social inclusion and overall prosperity. However, many governments have been unable to implement the changes due to resistance by special interests as well as broader sections of population. The paper uses the example of Slovakia, which has been able to introduce a comprehensive social policy reform (including pension reform, labour market reform and tax and benefit reform), to study the political economy of such changes and what has enabled the Slovak government to successfully introduce them. The paper first looks at reasons underlying the need for comprehensive changes in social policy in many European countries. It then describes the reform package adopted in Slovakia and analyses political and other factors that made it possible to design, implement, and sustain a radical change of this sort. In the conclusion, it looks at whether a broader new social policy paradigm can be identified as emerging among the new member states of the European Union.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:117:\"images/t/149/the-political-economy-of-comprehensive-social-policy-reform-and-emergence-of-a-social-policy-paradig.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:118:\"images/t2/149/the-political-economy-of-comprehensive-social-policy-reform-and-emergence-of-a-social-policy-paradig.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:100:\"the-political-economy-of-comprehensive-social-policy-reform-and-emergence-of-a-social-policy-paradig\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"13\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:3;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:4:\"8192\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:6:\"shinta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:3:\"377\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:90:\"Human Development Research Paper 2009/03 : The Political Economy of Immigration Policy\";s:11:\"description\";s:1339:\"We analyze a newly available dataset of migration policy decisions reported by governments to
    \nthe United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007. We
    \nfind evidence indicating that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the
    \nstatus quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also document variation in migration policy
    \nover time and across countries of different regions and income levels. Finally, we examine
    \npatterns in various aspects of destination countries’ migration policies (policies towards family
    \nreunification, temporary vs. permanent migration, high-skilled migration). This analysis leads us
    \nto investigate the determinants of migration policy in a destination country. We develop a
    \npolitical economy framework in which voter attitudes represent a key component. We survey the
    \nliterature on the determinants of public opinion towards immigrants and examine the link
    \nbetween these attitudes and governments’ policy decisions. While we find evidence broadly
    \nconsistent with the median voter model, we conclude that this framework is not sufficient to
    \nunderstand actual migration policies. We discuss evidence which suggests that interest-groups
    \ndynamics may play a very important role.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:100:\"images/t/82/human-development-research-paper-2009-03-the-political-economy-of-immigration-policy.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:101:\"images/t2/82/human-development-research-paper-2009-03-the-political-economy-of-immigration-policy.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:84:\"human-development-research-paper-2009-03-the-political-economy-of-immigration-policy\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"61\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:4;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"15051\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:104:\"POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANGLO- FRENCH TRADE, 1689-1899: AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES, ALCOHOL TAXES, AND WAR\";s:11:\"description\";s:1545:\"Britain - contrary to received wisdom - was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis XIV from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad (notably in the form of British merchants, and investors in Portuguese wine) led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports -- notably on wine and spirits -- when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite almost no increases in the taxes on land and income in Britain. The state ensured compliance not simply through the threat of lower tariffs on foreign substitutes but also through the encouragement of a trend towards monopoly production in brewing and restricted retail sales of beer (which began around 1700 and continued throughout the eighteenth century). This history is analyzed in terms of its effects on British fiscal and commercial policy from the early 1700s to the end of the nineteenth century. The result is a fuller, albeit revisionist account of the rise of the modern state that calls into question a variety of theses in economics and political science that draw on the naive view of a liberal Britain unilaterally moving to free trade in the nineteenth century.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:116:\"images/t/151/political-economy-of-anglo-french-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:117:\"images/t2/151/political-economy-of-anglo-french-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:99:\"political-economy-of-anglo-french-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"19\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:5;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:4:\"8190\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:6:\"shinta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:3:\"377\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:51:\"The Political Economy of Trade Policy in Indonesia\";s:11:\"description\";s:363:\"This paper focuses on Indonesia’s trade policies after the economic crisis. It examines the trend
    \ntowards protection and addresses the issues of competitiveness. The concluding part briefly
    \ndiscusses Indonesia’s policies on and involvement in free trade agreements (FTAs), which have
    \nrecently proliferated in the Asia Pacific region.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:66:\"images/t/82/the-political-economy-of-trade-policy-in-indonesia.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:67:\"images/t2/82/the-political-economy-of-trade-policy-in-indonesia.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:50:\"the-political-economy-of-trade-policy-in-indonesia\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"29\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:6;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"13327\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:63:\"\"The Price of Peace: The Political Economy of Peace Operations\"\";s:11:\"description\";s:1228:\"The principal objective of the conference was to explore the many ways in which interests, broadly understood, underlie the functioning of the global peace and security regime. Peace operations are typically framed as disinterested endeavours. As responses to humanitarian emergencies, they are perceived as being driven by values such as solidarity and respect for universal human rights. While one must acknowledge that such values motivate peace operations, the starting point of the conference is that interests are also at play, and that they might hold the key to understanding some of the problems plaguing peace operations and to devising ways to address them. Daudelin argues that the regime that effectively governs peace operations is not a robust system of institutions and rules, but instead a flexible arrangement structured around interests. Modifying the formal structure without also altering the system of interests underlying the actors\' participation in the regime is unlikely to bring about lasting improvements. Daudelin proposes that it is thus crucial to understand how peace operations are embedded in four universes of interest: the global system, nation-states, non-state actors, and the host country.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:77:\"images/t/134/the-price-of-peace-the-political-economy-of-peace-operations.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:78:\"images/t2/134/the-price-of-peace-the-political-economy-of-peace-operations.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:60:\"the-price-of-peace-the-political-economy-of-peace-operations\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"10\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:7;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"11250\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:107:\"Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War\";s:11:\"description\";s:715:\"Neoclassical economic theories of violent conflict have proliferated in recent years and, with their application to contemporary wars, have influenced donors and policy makers. This paper reviews the intellectual foundations and empirical substance of such theories and offersa critique drawing on apolitical economy perspective. There are strong grounds for arguing that orthodox economic theories of war are reductionist, speculative, and misleading. Theories that are driven by methodological individualism are compelled somehow to model\'\'the social\'\'as it affects contemporarywarfor example, by appeal to indices of ethno-linguisticfragmentationbut do so in ways that fail to capture reality and its variations.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:117:\"images/t/113/homo-economicus-goes-to-war-methodological-individualism-rational-choice-and-the-political-economy-o.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:118:\"images/t2/113/homo-economicus-goes-to-war-methodological-individualism-rational-choice-and-the-political-economy-o.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:100:\"homo-economicus-goes-to-war-methodological-individualism-rational-choice-and-the-political-economy-o\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"20\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:8;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"13323\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:82:\"Paying for privilege: the political economy of Bank of England charters, 1694-1844\";s:11:\"description\";s:707:\"The Bank of England was established by Parliament in 1694 as an explicitly temporary institution, which could be dissolved upon one years notice after the 11-year life guaranteed by its initial charter had passed. Renewed nine times between 1694 and 1844, we argue that the element of renegotiation inherent in the Banks existence reflected uncertainty, by both Parliament and the Bank, and we test this hypothesis by analyzing the timing of the renewals of the Banks charter. We find renegotiation of the charter was initiated by Parliament when the Crowns budgetary circumstances, shaped by unforeseen military expenditures, required additional funds and when the monopoly value of the Banks charter rose.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:97:\"images/t/134/paying-for-privilege-the-political-economy-of-bank-of-england-charters-1694-1844.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:98:\"images/t2/134/paying-for-privilege-the-political-economy-of-bank-of-england-charters-1694-1844.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:80:\"paying-for-privilege-the-political-economy-of-bank-of-england-charters-1694-1844\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"25\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}i:9;O:8:\"stdClass\":13:{s:2:\"id\";s:5:\"14891\";s:6:\"status\";s:8:\"verified\";s:11:\"author_name\";s:7:\"samanta\";s:9:\"author_id\";s:4:\"1916\";s:14:\"author_website\";s:0:\"\";s:5:\"title\";s:56:\"The Political Economy of Recent Economic Growth in India\";s:11:\"description\";s:1369:\"The political economy of India\'s economic growth is an issue of abiding interest. Higher and sustained economic growth has, all over the world, been the surest and most time tested means of raising living standards and reducing poverty. Further, given that it is a functioning democracy, economic policy in India can often be dictated by political expediency as political parties indulge in competitive populism in the face of improvements in social indicators such as literacy, infant mortality and the like lagging behind rises in the rate of economic growth. Thus the political economy of policy formulation is an important area of concern. Finally, an analysis of what policies can be undertaken given these constraints is an important indicator of potential welfare implications of policies for such a large section of humanity. Several recent reviews of India\'s recent growth experience exist (Rodrik and Subrahmanian, 2004, Kelkar, 2004, and Thirlwell, 2004 are three examples). The value added of the present paper is to place India\'s growth experience within a broader political economy perspective. It documents the broad contours of economic growth in India; it then analyzes some emerging obstacles to higher economic growth and finally the prospects for accelerating the economic reforms program to place India on a sustained higher economic growth path.\";s:5:\"thumb\";s:73:\"images/t/149/the-political-economy-of-recent-economic-growth-in-india.jpg\";s:6:\"thumb2\";s:74:\"images/t2/149/the-political-economy-of-recent-economic-growth-in-india.jpg\";s:9:\"permalink\";s:56:\"the-political-economy-of-recent-economic-growth-in-india\";s:5:\"pages\";s:2:\"22\";s:6:\"rating\";s:1:\"0\";s:5:\"voter\";s:1:\"0\";}}', `cache_on` = '2015-02-28 19:36:22' WHERE `aff_id` = '1322086'