An Introduction To Critical Legal Theory

In recent years, it has become very obvious that the boundaries of legal theory have moved far beyond those which have tended to define the more narrowly construed province of jurisprudence, as John Austin described it a century and a half ago. As we will see at various times in this book, classical modernist jurisprudence, that which has enjoyed a considerable dominion in university law schools for decades, even centuries, is only a part of legal theory properly understood, only one theory amongst many. To an extent, this dominion was founded on the assumption that Austinian jurisprudence is somehow our jurisprudence. To teach classical English jurisprudence is to engage in an overtly nationalistic act and, for far too many teachers and students, for far too long, this has seemed to be justification enough. This book is part of a growing determination, shared by critical legal theorists, that such a constrained and constraining approach must now be abandoned. Classical jurisprudence is as inadequate as it is debilitating. Quite simply, legal theory is not a science. At least, it is not just a science. Indeed, there is no such thing as legal theory; merely legal theories. Law is not any one particular thing, and cannot be understood, analysed, described or whatever, in terms of one particular discipline or methodology.