A Global Network of Jihad: Al-Qaeda

A GLOBAL NETWORK OF JIHAD:
MAPPING INSIDE AL-QAEDA

This is the second out of three parts of a study on why Bin Laden became
The target of the US retaliation in the War against Terrorism

By:

RIDWAN ROSDIAWAN
Master graduate of Leiden Universiteit The Netherlands
living in Bekasi indonesia
ros_di_awan@yahoo.com



After the September 11 attacks, the US officials referred to Al-Qaeda as the nominal
name of the terrorist organization led by Osama bin laden. In fact, the word originally referred to
the name of journey documentation of the Jihad volunteers and the visitors who came to
guesthouses and camps in Peshawar and Afghanistan at the time of Soviet-Afghan war.1 “Al-
Qaeda” was also used as a name of the complex where the volunteers and the visitors stayed in
and headed to.2 In 1988 Osama noticed that he was backward in his documentation and was not
able to give answers to families asking about their loved ones who had gone missing in
Afghanistan. He decided to make the matter more organized and arranged for proper
documentation. He asked some of his colleagues to start documenting the movement of every
Arab coming under his umbrella and making a record of the visitors, be they Mujahiddin or
charity officers or simple visitors. Their movement between the guesthouse and the camps had to
be recorded as well as their first arrival and final departure.3 This was the basic purpose of “Al-
Qaeda”. The number of those who are documented in “al-Qaeda” are estimated to be as high as
twenty to thirty thousands people.4
However, this is not to say that the organization does not exist. It seems that the US
official version of the term al-Qaeda encompasses both characteristics of this organization.
Firstly, al-Qaeda, in specific, refers to a faction of Maktaba al-Khidamat (MAK) led by Osama
bin Laden, which intended to enlarge the scope of Jihad beyond the borders of Afghanistan.
According to several sources, there was a split between Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam
about their jihad orientation after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988. Azzam
wanted the organization to support the Afghan causes exclusively but Bin Laden embraced the

1 Frontline, “Interview…”, loc.cit., and Kompas, “al-Qaeda..” loc.cit.
2 Frontline, “a Bioghraphy..”, loc.cit.
3 Ibid.
4 Frontline, “Interview…”, loc.cit.

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wider idea of Jihad that is to liberate all the oppressed Muslims around the globe.1 The extremist
factions of the MAK soon joined Bin Laden's organization, and the estimated numbers of his
followers in the group are approximately 600 to 700 people.2 Secondly, al-Qaeda is seen as a
network or a conglomerate of many different hard line Muslim organizations in several countries.
The common characteristics, shared by all these groups, are the use of violence for the
attainment of their political ends, and the proliferation of the agenda to overthrow of the
“apostate” governments in their respective countries and to replace them by the new Islamic
governments that are based on the rule of Shari‟a.3
Osama‟s experience with multi national voluntary Mujahiddin in the Afghan-Soviet war
might have been influential in the crystallization of his thoughts on the purposes of the al-Qaeda
establishment. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan gave him the impression that Muslim can
overcome whatever threats imposed even by the “infidel” super power but only if they are
united. The idea to “unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of
the Caliphs” then became the main goal of the al-Qaeda.4 Bin Laden also emphasized the needs
for armed struggle preceded by Da'wa in order to repel the apostates in the Muslim countries. He
called for cooperation between Muslims communities all around the world in order to unite their
word under the banner of monotheism, and to set aside their divisions and differences.5 From his
released statements and speeches, it can be concluded that the major goal of his organization is
influenced by Pan-Islamic ideas about the liberation of Muslim societies from occupation and
oppression and about rebuilding their dignity as one community which follows one rule. The only
way to reach these aims is to fight against the occupiers and oppressors, using any means
possible, including violence and mass destruction. The oppressor in al-Qaeda‟s view is the
“infidel” West led by United States. Since the local regimes in the Muslim world supported the
West in maintaining oppression, they too deserved to be fought and toppled and then to be
replaced by an Islamic ruler.
Osama founded al-Qaeda in 1989. He was not alone in initiating the formation of the
group. Several men reportedly assisted him and were actively involved in co-founding the
organization. They were Abu Ayyub Al Iraqi, Abu Ubaidah Al Banshiri, Abu Faraj Al Yamani,
Ayman Al Zawahiri, Abu Burhan Al Kabir, Abu Hafs Al Misri, known as Muhammad Atef, and

1 See: Federation of American Scientists, loc.cit, Kompas, “Al-Qaeda..”, loc.cit, and Robert McFadden,
“Bin Laden’s Journey..”, loc.cit.
2 Frontline, “Interview…”, loc.cit.
3 Institute of Counter Terrorism, “ Al-Qaeda (The Base): Ideology and Strategy “, on
http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=74. See also Jane’s Review, “ Blowback”, on http://www.janes.
com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010726_1_n.shtml
4 Federation of American Scientists, loc.cit.
5 Nidaul Islam, loc.cit.

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Abu Mus‟ab.1 Some of these men had already been recorded in intelligence‟s watch lists because
of their political activities as they were formerly senior leaders in other militant organizations. As
they joined Osama in al-Qaeda, they sat on the top ranks in the structure of the organization.
Ayman Al Zawahiri and Abu Hafs Al Misri, for instance, were two leading figures of Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, the organization assumed to be behind the 1981 assassination of Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat. In al-Qaeda, they both served as Osama‟s lieutenants and ideological
advisors.
Based on the testimony of a defected member, Al-Qaeda is a well-constructed
organization. It has a hierarchical structure that remains unchanged along its development
history. Osama acted as the Amir, the general leader, the highest command in the structure.
Below him is a council called Majlis al Shura, a consultative council. The purpose of this council is
to discuss and to approve major decision and undertakings that will be the foundation for further
actions of the group. Osama and other senior leaders of Al-Qaeda sat on this council. Among
them are Abu Hafs Al Misri, Abu Faraj Al Yamani, Dr. Fadhl, Abu Ibrahim al-Iraqi, Abu Fadhl
al-Makki, Sheikh Sayyid al-Misri, Qaricept al-Jazairi, Abu Ayyub al-Iraqi, Khalifa al-Muscat
Omani, Saif al-Liby, Abu Muhammad al-Mishri, Abu Burhan al-Iraqi, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.2
Under the Majlis Al Shura, al-Qaeda has four committees: the Military, Religio-legal,
Finance and Media-report committee. The military committee organizes matters that relate to
military action, such as buying arms and explosives, conducting military training, sending troops,
and executing attacks on specified targets. This committee was led by Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri
and then by Abu Hafs al-Misri after the former was killed in a 1996 mission in Victoria Lake,
Tanzania.3 There were also two other names who sat in this committee; Saif al-Islam al-Misri and
Abu Khaleed al-Madani. The religio-legal committee of al-Qaeda deals with Islamic study and
producing Fatawa that provide legal justification for every action taken by the organization. The
members of this committee were Abu Saad al-Sharif, Abu Farraj, Abu Qatada, Abu Ibrahim al-
Iraqi, Dr. Fadl al-Misri, and Dr. Abdul Omez. The finance committee has the duty to collect
funds for al-Qaeda, as well as to distribute them to the group‟s operatives. This committee also
deals with setting up new businesses and companies. Among those who were in charge of this
committee were Abu Fadl al-Makki and Abu Hammam al-Saudi. The fourth committee is the
media committee which serves as the transmitter of al-Qaeda‟s official view and statements and
as collector of information for report to the group. This committee also published daily and

1 Jamal Al Fadl testimony in an American court in February 2001, see http://news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/binladen/binladen20601tt.pdf
2 Ibid.
3 Kompas, “Al-Qaeda… “, loc.cit

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weekly publication entitled Nashrat Al Akhbar. The man who runs this committee was named
Abu Mus‟ab “Reuters”, after a well-known News bureau, because of his skills in media
operation.1
From 1989 until 1991, al-Qaeda was stationed in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. Its
headquarters were the guesthouses which became the centre of the group‟s activities, including
military training. In about 1991, the leadership of al-Qaeda relocated to the Sudan. This
relocation was based on several reasons. Firstly, its leaders found that there was little to do in
Afghanistan to achieve the goals of the organization after the Soviet withdrawal and the country
was torn by civil war. Secondly, Osama had political problems with the Saudi government that
made him leave his native country. Finally, Sudan is geographically adjacent to other Arab
countries and its ruling regime warmly welcomed al-Qaeda‟s members and was willing to further
cooperate with the group. The al-Qaeda leaderships eventually found that Sudan could be helpful
for implementing their political agenda.
In Sudan, al-Qaeda grew up steadily until it developed as a worldwide Jihad corporation.
While maintaining bases inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda built new camps in Khartoum
and made contacts and collaborated with various international Jihad organizations. At the same
time al-Qaeda also set up international businesses that have double functions: funding the group,
as well as covering its Jihad activities. Because of international pressures sponsored by the US and
Egypt governments on Sudanese government for sheltering the group, in 1996 al-Qaeda was
forced out from Sudan and moved back again to Afghanistan where it remained until it became
the target of American retaliation in the war against terrorism.
In the early period of the group‟s formation, the followers of al-Qaeda were mainly
composed of the “Afghan Arabs”, namely Muslims coming from outside Afghanistan for
fighting against the Soviet Union in Soviet-Afghan war. They came from all over the Muslim
world and most of them were Arabs. Their exact figure was unknown,2 but it was estimated that
the total number of the Afghan Arabs who participated in the jihad over the course of the entire
war was between ten to thirty thousands. When the Soviet-Afghan war was about to finish, the
Afghan Arabs were offered to continue their jihad by joining al-Qaeda, and some of them were
recruited.
The recruitment process to become a part of al-Qaeda is interesting. Each candidate was
supplied with three pages of papers containing the goals of al-Qaeda‟s jihad agenda, the rights
and obligations for all layers of al-Qaeda membesr, and the obligation to perform bay’at, an oath

1 Jamal Al Fadl’s testimony, loc.cit.
2 Some say the number reached 50.000, but according to the others, including Milt Bearden who ran
CIA’s Afghan operation between 1986-1989, the number was 25.000. See, Peter L. Bergen, op.cit., p. 62

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of fealty, to the Amir. Once the candidate approved the content of the papers, signed the papers,
and performed the bay’at, he had become an al-Qaeda member and must be ready all the time for
receiving and executing the Amir‟s orders.1
The number of al-Qaeda members was increased as several Islamic militant organizations
from different countries, which share a common goal, forged alliances with al-Qaeda. Many of
these groups affiliated with al-Qaeda when it was still stationed in Sudan. Among them were
some organizations whose names had already appeared in America‟s list of terrorist groups such
as Egypt‟s Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Gamaat al-Islamiya presumably led by Dr.
Omar Abdurrahman, Algeria‟s Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and
Combat, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Islamic Army of Aden, Saif Islamic Jannubi, Kashmiri
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Abu Sayyaf
Group in the Philippines and the Syrian organization Jamaat e-Jihad al-Suri.2 The members of
these groups automatically became parts of al-Qaeda because they had also performed bay’at to
follow their leaders, whilst the groups‟ leaders became senior members in al-Qaeda‟s structure.
Apart from being represented by the different nationalities of its members, al-Qaeda‟s
international scope is strengthened by the presence of other members in countries such as
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya,
Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, in
the West Bank and Gaza, European countries, and also in the United States and Canada.3 In each
of these countries, al-Qaeda‟s followers live a double life. They stay as ordinary people while
establishing a home ground for the group‟s operations, including recruiting and training new
members, cooperating with local organizations, attacking targets in the region as well as in
neighbouring countries, and setting up companies and business centres. Al-Qaeda‟s relocation to
Sudan is the best example of this. At least a year before Osama permanently stayed in Sudan,
some members of al-Qaeda travelled to Egypt and Sudan for the preparation of groups‟
relocation. To avoid detection as Muslim militants, they concealed their identity by, for example,
shaving their beard and packed cigarette and cologne. Arriving in Sudan, they rented several
houses and bought a farm north of Khartoum and a salt farm on the coast near Port of Sudan.
Both farms would be used by the group for military training. Several other members also
successfully contacted Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, and their negotiation resulted in a cooperation

1 Ibid,. p. 65. See also Jamal Al Fadl’s testimony, loc.cit.
2 Ibid., p. 95-96, and see also www.terrorismanswers.com/groups/alqaeda.html
3 Jane’s Review, loc.cit.

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agreement between al-Qaeda and the Sudanese Government. The group helped the Sudanese in
the development of the country, while the government gave al-Qaeda members a safe haven.
From Sudan, the group was able to enlarge its scope and to execute attacks on targets in
neighbouring countries such as Somalia. Another example is in 1995, when al-Qaeda sought to
forge alliances with Iranian-backed Hezbollah, based in southern Lebanon. Despite their disputes
over religious doctrine – Hezbollah is Shi‟a, while Osama espouses a conservative Sunni Islam –
the two groups buried their differences to fight against their common enemy, the United States.
Al-Qaeda members travelled to Lebanon, where the group maintained a guest house, and, with
Hezbollah, learned how to bomb large buildings.1 Al-Qaeda members also operated inside
Europe, but it seems that their major operations were mainly for business purposes. They bought
trucks from Russia and tractors from Slovakia to be used for the group‟s companies. They also
went on other business trips to Cyprus, Vienna, London, Hungary and Croatia.2
The followers of Osama bin Laden in al-Qaeda can be distinguished in two groups. First
are the close core followers who are connected to Bin Laden by a direct chain of command and
take his orders like a secret organization. Most of those followers were probably staying in
Afghanistan. There were also some of them who lived inside Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia and
probably Gulf countries. Like any secret group, those followers would not disclose their
involvement with al-Qaeda. Inside Saudi Arabia many of them would appear like any average
citizens. The number of this first group is probably in hundreds.
The second group is larger and its number is probably in thousands or tens thousands
spread over many countries. Saad al-Faqih describes them as follows:
“…And then you have the [wider group]. In thousands, maybe tens of thousands, who are sympathetic
to bin Laden and who look at him as their father, and arrange themselves in small groups here and there.
[they have] A very loose network with that hierarchy [of the close followers]. You can never eradicate
them. ... Each small group has its own chain of command, its own logistics. Now they wait for
somebody like bin Laden to give them moral support and give them directions. They might try to
contact him to get advice from him. But they do not belong to him like a special organization with a
pyramidal structure or anything like that…”3
So, it can be assumed that this circle of followers would look at Osama as their godfather but it
does not have a proper chain of command or secret links with him. They would regard
themselves obliged to perform some of his general orders. Most of those followers are not
organized and get trapped by the security authority fairly easily. But some are intelligent and make
use of the loose nature of their structure to function without attracting attention. Some of them

1 Jamal Al Fadl’s testimony, loc.cit.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

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have their own goals in their operation and also have a perception that the operation they held is
something that Osama will approve.1
Al-Qaeda is reported to havie several sources of funds for its operation. The primary
source is taken from Osama‟s financial assets. Although forced to leave his native Saudi Arabia,
Osama is related to one of the country‟s richest families and is believed to have inherited a
considerable amount of money.2 George Tenet, Director of the CIA, stated in August 2001 that
tracing and figuring Osama‟s money and his company networks is not a simple and easy job, but
he estimated that Osama‟s wealth reach approximately $ 1 billion, which produces an income of
around $ 200 million from the profit of his various companies and its deposit interests.3
In an indictment issued by the US Government in November 1998, which is then quoted in
the text of evidence against Bin Laden released by the British government on October 4, Bin
Laden was thought to have multiplied his fortune and built a group that combined business and
holy war under the umbrella of al-Qaeda. Since 1989, he has established a series of businesses
which included a holding company known as Wadi al Aqiq, a construction business known as al-
Hijra, an agricultural business known as Al-Thamar al-Mubaraka, and investment companies
known as Ladin International and Taba Investments. The profit coming from these companies is
served to provide income for al-Qaeda and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives,
weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of al-Qaeda operatives who are scattered in more than
fifty countries including England, Germany, Canada, and United states.4
The other sources of funds which keep Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda survive are the
profit of inheritance and private donations. Osama is a member of a big family. His father's
financial inheritance has not been sorted, and his brothers agreed to keep many assets of the
father and distribute the profits only. Most of Bin Laden‟s brothers and sisters are observing
Muslims and very keen not to "spoil" their income with money which is not theirs. They believe
it is their duty to let the owner of any riyal to have it, so that Osama's shares are still safe in their
hands and eventually reach him. In the mean time he has made excellent relations with many
wealthy Saudis and Arabs and collected donations from them for his Jihad. It is true that most of

1 HardCopy, op.cit., p. 43
2 Robert McFadden, “Bin Laden’s Journey…”, loc.cit., also, Richard Beeston, loc. Cit., and Kompas,
“Jejak…”, loc. Cit. It is unclear how much he inherited. Reports vary from $20 million or $80 million to as high
as $300 million.
3 HardCopy, op.cit., p. 48
4 Text of Evidence,.. loc.cit. Also see Frontline, “Al-Qaeda: The US’s Indictment Issued in November
1998”, on www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/binladen/who/alqaede.html ,. and Kompas, “Sudan Pijakan Jihad
Osama Bin Laden” and, “Al-Qaeda: Pijakan Jaringan Jihad Osama bin Laden (Al-Qaeda: The Jihad Network of
Osama bin Laden)” , Dec 13, 2001 on www.kompas.com

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those would not support him now because of the Saudi government position, but some of them
do take the risk.1
Al-Qaeda is also suspected to have received funds that are funnelled through Islamic
charitable and relief organizations. These institutions were centred in the Middle East and Asia,
and some of them even active in western countries. Yael Shahar, a researcher in Institute of
Counter Terrorism, analyzed that a number of international charities that collect money for
refugees and other relief works in the Middle East are known to be funnelling money for Muslim
militants‟ activities. Much of this money came from the Gulf States, which since 1991 had
stopped all financial aid to the PLO because of its position in the Gulf war. The money then goes
to a wide range of Islamic charity organizations and institutions all over the world, which many of
them serve as front organizations for groups that engage in Jihad activities. Although the funds
are reportedly used for social, educational and humanitarian purposes, American officials believe
that at least some of this money finds its way into bin Laden‟s coffers.2
In addition, the US officials also suspected al-Qaeda of having benefited financially from
drug trafficking. U.S. Senator John Kerry, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said that there are strong indications that bin Laden‟s al-Qaeda network has profited handsomely
from the opium trade. Al-Qaida militants have frequently been deployed as smugglers. Opium
trafficking had an added attraction for al-Qaeda, since such drugs could create social problems
such as addiction and crime in the western countries.3
As a part of combating terrorism, on September 23, 2001, President George W. Bush
released an executive order #13224 which purpose is to block and freeze assets and U.S.
transactions of persons or institutions associated with terrorists or terrorist organizations. The
annex attached to this executive order obviously shows that the main target of the executive
order is the financial assets that are connected to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Besides
naming 12 individuals whose assets to be blocked, the annex also mentioned by name 11
organizations, 3 relief foundations and one import-export company.4 The executive order‟s
demand that other countries were asked to cooperate with the US in freezing the terrorist assets
was positively responded. 196 nations have expressed their supports to disrupt the terrorist
finances and 144 nations have put the blocking orders into work. As the result, until January 29,
2002 the US Government has named 168 organizations and individuals as financiers of terrorism,

1 Frontline, “Biography…”, loc.cit.
2 Yael Shahar, “Tracing Bin Laden’s Money: Easier Said than Done”, on http://www.ict.org.il/
3 Ibid.
4 See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-1.html

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and has blocked $34.2 million. The US coalition partners too have blocked another $33.9
million.1
This executive order is not the first financial blocking effort ever taken by the US
government against Osama and al-Qaeda. The former US president Bill Clinton had previously
done the same thing in 1998. Clinton‟s steps were proven ineffective, as Osama and al-Qaeda
were still able to finance themselves and then executed more massive attacks against the US‟
interests. Based on this experience, Bush‟s executive order raised the same basic question; will it
be effective in curbing al-Qaeda and the threats of global terrorism?
According to Dr. Saad al-Faqih, a Saudi exile living in London who heads the Movement
for Islamic Reform in Arabia and knows a lot about Bin Laden and his view, reports about the
amount ofBbin Laden's financial assets and the ways by which the US government trace his
accounts are questionable. Bin Laden would never use banks for his activity because he had
preoccupied by the idea that banks produce some interests (riba) and are controlled by the Jews.2
Moreover, Bin Laden is supposed to be bankrupt since he has experienced three massive
setbacks in his financial story. The first was the blockage of his assets in Saudi Arabia by the
Saudi government. The second setback was the loss he experienced in his business in Sudan. The
Sudanese government was too weak financially to pay him for the construction projects and he
ended up hardly with 10% of the payment. He lost not less than 150 million dollars in Sudan.
The third setback occurred when one of his close aids defected to the Saudi government. The
defector Sidi Tayyib Al-Madani had some financial information about him until early 1995.3
There are also some advantages for Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in running their operation in
which money is no longer a matter. Weapons and explosives are very cheap in some parts of the
world. Training also does not cost a lot of money and, the most important is that, Bin Laden‟s
followers are volunteers. They are not mercenaries that need to be paid. Instead, they are willing
to die for what they believe.
The financial blockade against suspected terrorist assets led by the US government on the
other hand also raised protests and dissatisfactions. Many people think suspiciously on the
presence of US vested interests in this financial action. An example is the closure of al-Barakaat,
one of the biggest money transfers in Somalia and also the only source of income for many of
destitute Somalis. Tens of thousands of expatriate Somalis use the al-Barakaat money transfer
system every month as the only means of sending remittances to family members living in

1 www.ustreas.gov/terrorism.html
2 Frontline, “Interview…”, loc.cit., and Frontline, “Biography…”, loc.cit.
3 Ibid.

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Somalia, many of whom are entirely dependent on these remittances for their survival.1 The US
government decided to shut down al-Barakaat company on November 7, 2001 because it was
believed to have raised, managed, invested, and distributed funds for al-Qaida; provided terrorist
supporters with Internet service and secure telephone communications; and arranged for the
shipment of weapons. The founder, Sheikh Ahmed Nur Jim'ale according to US government, is
closely linked to Osama bin Laden and has used Al Barakaat's 60 offices in Somalia and 127
offices abroad to transmit funds, intelligence and instructions to terrorist cells.2 Somalis from
every walk of life have been reacting with dismay, anger and fear to this decision. Scores of
people reportedly took to the streets in protest, while the interim president, Abdiqassim Salad
Hassan, reflecting a commonly held belief that the US decision to shut down Al-Barakaat was
taken with insufficient evidence.3 Representatives and the management of Al-Barakaat have also
vigorously denied the claims, arguing that their books are open to scrutiny, and that any
investigation would vindicate them. Ahmed Nur Ali Jim'ale, the founder and the chairman of al-
Barakaat, stated that neither he nor his company had contact with any of terrorist organizations,
political or religious, and it is his enemies in business who had stirred up the US decision. He has
filed a lawsuit to clear the group's name.4
Another institution that shares the same experience with al-Barakaat is the Global Relief
Foundation (GRF), an Islamic faith based charity stationed in Illinois, United States. Two months
before its assets was blocked by the US Department of Treasury, the GRF had been listed by
ABC News‟ Good Morning America during a live nationwide broadcast as a charity which has
been closed by the US government for alleged terrorist support. The accusation was later
retracted by ABC in an inconspicuous website announcement. Then on October 4, 2001 the
Chicago Tribune published an article that closure of GRF and other Muslim charities by the US
government is imminent due to alleged terrorist fundraising. The New York Times, Boston
Globe, Associated Press and New York Daily News also published similarly defamatory articles.
These accusations were considered injustice so that the GRF on November 15, 2001 sued those
media and affiliated reporters for each of these publications in federal court in Chicago seeking
$20 million in damages. On December 14, 2001 the US Department of Treasury eventually
blocked GRF‟s assets and its records, and the FBI raided its office. The Immigration &
Naturalization Service (INS) also detained GRF Chairman Rabih Haddad on alleged immigration

1 Irin. “Somalia – Widespread Dismay Over Barakaat Closure”, Nov 12, 2001, on www.africaonline.com
/site/Articles/1,3,43077.jsp
2 See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011107-6.html
3 Irin, “Somalia…”, loc.cit.
4 Osman Hassan. “Al-Barakaat Chairman Dismisses Bush Administration’s Terror Charge”, Associated
Press, Nov 7, 2001

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