Cognitive Dissonance Theory After 50 Years of Development

Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 38 (1), 2007, 7–16
E. Harmon-Jones
Z. and
Soz. C.
ps Harmon-Jones:
ychol. 38 (1) ©
50 Years of
2007 by Ve
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
rlag Hans Huber, Hogrefe AG , Bern
Brennpunkt
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
After 50 Years of Development
Eddie Harmon-Jones and Cindy Harmon-Jones
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Abstract. Research and theoretical developments on the theory of cognitive dissonance are reviewed. After considering the self-consis-
tency, self-affirmation, and aversive consequences revisions, the authors review research that has challenged each of the revisions and
that supports the original version of the theory. Then, the authors review the action-based model of dissonance, which accepts the original
theory’s proposal that a sufficient cognitive inconsistency causes dissonance and extends the original theory by proposing why cognitive
inconsistency prompts dissonance. Finally, the authors present results from experiments examining predictions derived from the action-
based model and neural processes involved in dissonance reduction.
Keywords: cognitive dissonance, attitude change, motivation, social cognition
Die Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz nach 50 Jahren der Entwicklung
Zusammenfassung. Forschung und theoretische Entwicklungen zur Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz werden im Überblick dargestellt.
Nach der Betrachtung dreier Weiterentwicklungen, die jeweils Selbstkonsistenz, “self-affirmation” bzw. aversive Verhaltenskonsequenzen
betonen, besprechen die AutorInnen Forschungsergebnisse, welche jede dieser Weiterentwicklungen in Frage stellen und die Original-
version der Theorie stützen. Dann präsentieren sie das handlungsbasierte Dissonanzmodell. In diesem Modell wird die Annahme der
ursprünglichen Theorie aufgegriffen, dass hinreichende kognitive Inkonsistenz Dissonanz verursacht, und es wird erklärt, warum dies
der Fall ist. Abschließend werden Ergebnisse von Experimenten dargestellt, in denen Vorhersagen des handlungsbasierten Dissonanz-
modells getestet und neuronale Prozesse, die bei der Dissonanzreduktion auftreten, untersucht wurden.
Schlüsselwörter: kognitive Dissonanz, Einstellungsänderung, Motivation, soziale Kognition
Cognitive dissonance theory and research dominated social
ments of knowledge that are relevant to each other but in-
psychology from the 1950s until the 1970s. The theory rev-
consistent with one another, a state of discomfort is created.
olutionized thinking about psychological processes, partic-
He called this unpleasant state “dissonance.” Festinger
ularly regarding how rewards affect attitudes and behavior
theorized that the degree of dissonance in relation to a cog-
and how behavior and motivation affect perception and
nition = D / (D + C), where D is the sum of cognitions
cognition. In recent years, there has been renewed interest
dissonant with a particular cognition and C is the sum of
in this theory (e.g., Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Harmon-Jones
cognitions consonant with that same particular cognition,
& Mills, 1999). In addition to explicit, renewed interest in
with each cognition weighted for importance (see Sakai,
dissonance theory itself, the theory has implicitly influ-
1999, and Shultz & Lepper, 1999, for more precise math-
enced much contemporary theorizing (Aronson, 1992).
ematical models). Frey, Irle, Möntmann, Kumpf, Ochs-
mann, and Sauer (1982) proposed that the dissonance be-
tween cognitions could be determined by assessing wheth-
er a person expects one event to follow from another.
Festinger (1957) theorized that persons are motivated by
The Original Version of the Theory
the unpleasant state of dissonance to engage in “psycho-
logical work” so as to reduce the inconsistency, and this
work will typically support the cognition most resistant to
Leon Festinger formulated the original theory of cognitive
change. Frey et al. (1982) suggested that the resistance to
dissonance in the mid-1950s, and the first formal and com-
change should be analyzed “in terms of the degree of dis-
plete presentation of the theory appeared in 1957. Festinger
sonance over the entire cognitive system, a particular cog-
theorized that, when an individual holds two or more ele-
nition being more resistant, the greater the number of rela-
DOI 10.1024/0044-3514.38.1.7
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8
E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
tions that enters into it” (p. 302). To reduce the dissonance,
Induced Compliance
individuals could add consonant cognitions, subtract disso-
nant cognitions, increase the importance of consonant cog-
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) hypothesized that dissonance
nitions, or decrease the importance of dissonant cognitions.
should be aroused when a person acts in a way that is contrary
One of the most often assessed ways of reducing disso-
to his or her attitudes. To test this prediction, they brought
nance is change in attitudes. Attitude change is expected to
participants into the laboratory and asked them to perform a
be in the direction of the cognition that is most resistant to
boring task. Then, participants were paid either $1 or $20 to
change. In tests of the theory, it is often assumed that the
tell “another participant” that the task was interesting. Ac-
knowledge about recent behavior is usually most resistant
cording to dissonance theory, lying for a payment of $20
to change, because if a person behaved in a certain way, it
should not arouse much dissonance, because $20 provides
is often very difficult to undo that behavior. Thus, attitude
sufficient justification for the counterattitudinal behavior
change would be consistent with the recent behavior.
(i.e., it adds 20 cognitions consonant with the behavior).
Festinger presented dissonance theory during the hey-
However, being paid $1 for performing the same behavior
day of cognitive consistency theories, and he discussed dis-
should arouse much dissonance, because $1 was just enough
sonance as a cognitive consistency theory. However, as
justification for the behavior (i.e., it adds only one consonant
several subsequent theorists noted, dissonance theory con-
cognition). As expected, participants in the $1 (low-justifica-
tained an important element not present in other consisten-
tion) condition changed their attitudes to be more positive
cy theories (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Wicklund & Frey,
toward the task, whereas participants in the $20 (high-justi-
1981). That is, dissonant and consonant cognitions are de-
fication) condition did not change their attitudes.
fined in relation to a particular focal or generative cognition
(Beauvois & Joule, 1996, 1999; Mills, 1999). Moreover,
this focal cognition is usually related to a behavior, a point
Effort Justification
to which we return later.
Dissonance is aroused whenever a person engages in an
unpleasant activity to obtain some desirable outcome.
From the cognition that the activity is unpleasant, it follows
Experimental Paradigms Used to Test
that one would not engage in the activity; the cognition that
the activity is unpleasant is dissonant with engaging in the
the Theory
activity. Dissonance should be greater, the greater the un-
pleasant effort required to obtain the outcome. Dissonance
Free Choice
can be reduced by exaggerating the desirability of the out-
come, which would add consonant cognitions.
In 1956, Brehm examined dissonance theory’s predictions
In the first experiment designed to test these ideas, Aron-
for post-decision processing. According to the theory, after
son and Mills (1959) had women undergo a severe or mild
a decision, all of the cognitions that favor the chosen alter-
“initiation” to become a member of a group. In the severe
native are consonant with the decision, while all the cog-
initiation condition, the women engaged in an embarrassing
nitions that favor the rejected alternative are dissonant. The
activity to join the group, whereas in the mild initiation con-
greater the number and importance of dissonant cognitions
dition, the women engaged in an activity that was not very
and the lesser the number and importance of consonant
embarrassing to join the group. The group turned out to be
cognitions, the greater the degree of dissonance experi-
dull and boring. The women in the severe initiation condition
enced by the individual. In a decision-situation, dissonance
evaluated the group more favorably than the women in the
is typically greater the closer the alternatives are in attrac-
mild initiation condition. This paradigm continues to be used
tiveness, as long as each alternative has several distinguish-
fruitfully in research (e.g., Beauvois & Joule, 1996), and it
ing characteristics. Dissonance caused by a decision can be
has been usefully applied in psychotherapy (e.g., Axsom &
reduced by viewing the chosen alternative as more attrac-
Cooper, 1985; Draycott & Dabbs, 1998).
tive and/or viewing the rejected alternative as less attrac-
Other experimental paradigms have been used to test the
tive. Brehm conducted an experiment in which participants
theory but they are used less frequently and because of space
made either an easy or a difficult decision between two
limitations are not described here (Wicklund & Brehm,
alternatives. The difficult decision was one in which the
1976).
alternatives were close in attractiveness, whereas the easy
decision was one in which one alternative was much more
attractive than the other. Participants were asked to evalu-
Challenges to the Research and
ate the decision options before and after the decision.
Brehm found that, after persons made a difficult decision,
Original Theory
they changed their attitudes to become more negative to-
ward the rejected alternative. After an easy decision, par-
After these and other dissonance results appeared in the
ticipants did not change their attitudes.
literature, some theorists began to question whether the re-
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E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
9
sults were due to motivation. Some theorists hypothesized
nitions. Instead, he posited that dissonance occurs when a
that the effects were due to non-motivational, cognitive
person acts in a way that violates his or her self-concept,
processes (e.g., Bem, 1972) or impression management
that is, when a person performs a behavior inconsistent
concerns (Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971). Howev-
with his or her sense of self. Since most persons have a
er, subsequent research confirmed that dissonance is a mo-
positive self-concept, dissonance is most often experienced
tivated process (for reviews, Harmon-Jones, 2000a,
when a person behaves negatively, behaving in an incom-
2000b). That is, research revealed that during the state of
petent, irrational, or immoral manner. One of the primary
dissonance, individuals evidence heightened electrodermal
predictions derived from this revision is that low and high
activity (which is associated with activation of the sympa-
self-esteem individuals should respond with less and more
thetic nervous system; Elkin & Leippe, 1983; Harmon-
dissonance reduction (e.g., attitude change), respectively,
Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996) and re-
because in dissonance experiments high self-esteem indi-
port increased negative affect (e.g., Elliot & Devine, 1994;
viduals are induced to act in ways that are more discrepant
Harmon-Jones, 2000d; Russell & Jones, 1980; Shaffer,
from their positive self-views. Experiments testing this pre-
1975; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). After discrepancy is re-
diction have produced mixed results. Also, Beauvois and
duced (attitude change occurs), self-reported negative af-
Joule (1996, 1999) obtained results that are difficult to ex-
fect is reduced (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones,
plain with this revision.
2000d). However, electrodermal activity does not decrease
at this point (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) unless individuals
are distracted from the cognitive discrepancy (Elkin &
Self-Affirmation
Leippe, 1986). It is possible that the arousal following at-
titude change is the result of a motivation to follow through
Steele (1988) proposed a different alternative to Festinger’s
with the commitment.
dissonance theory. He proposed that persons possess a mo-
Moreover, research using the misattribution paradigm
tive to maintain an overall self-image of moral and adaptive
has revealed that discrepancy reduction is motivated by the
adequacy. He stated that dissonance-induced attitude
need to reduce negative affect (Zanna & Cooper, 1974). In
change occurs because dissonance threatens this positive
the misattribution paradigm, participants are provided a
self-image. While Festinger’s dissonance theory posited
stimulus (e.g., a placebo) that is said to cause specific side
that individuals are motivated to reconcile inconsistent
effects. It is assumed, following Schachter and Singer
cognitions, Steele proposed that, instead, individuals are
(1962), that individuals may mistakenly attribute their dis-
merely motivated to affirm the integrity of the self. In sup-
sonance arousal to this other source, but only when the ex-
port of this idea, Steele presented experiments, where, fol-
pected side effects of the other source are similar to the state
lowing a dissonance induction, participants either were, or
produced by dissonance. The nature of the internal state can
were not, presented with an opportunity to affirm an im-
then be inferred indirectly by determining the type of stim-
portant value. When participants were allowed to affirm an
uli to which individuals misattribute the state aroused by
important value, dissonance-related attitude change did not
dissonance. In this paradigm, participants are exposed to
occur.
treatments that will or will not arouse dissonance, and then
However, Simon, Greenberg and Brehm (1995) present-
they are either provided or not provided a possible external
ed evidence supporting an alternative explanation for
cause for their experienced state. Research has indicated
Steele’s findings that was in line with the original theory
that participants in the dissonance arousing conditions will
of dissonance. Festinger’s original theory proposed that the
misattribute their arousal to stimuli that are said to cause
degree of dissonance experienced depended upon the im-
negative affective side effects and that once this misattri-
portance of the dissonant and consonant cognitions. Simon
bution is made, dissonance reduction (attitude change)
et al. hypothesized that making an important value salient
does not occur.
could reduce dissonance by reducing the individual’s per-
Beginning in the late 1960s, researchers began to pro-
ception of the importance of the dissonant act. They con-
pose motivational explanations for dissonance effects that
ducted an experiment in which participants who opposed a
differed from Festinger’s originally proposed theory. Three
tuition increase were given high choice to write essays in
revisions of dissonance theory have been proposed, and
support of a tuition increase (a counter-attitudinal state-
their originators have provided evidence to support these
ment). After writing the essay, participants either were giv-
conceptions. These include Aronson’s (1968, 1999) self-
en an opportunity to affirm an important value (self-affir-
consistency theory, Steele’s (1988) self-affirmation theory,
mation condition), were asked to write about a value that
and Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) new look at dissonance.
was not important to them personally but was of general
importance (value salient condition, e.g., world hunger), or
neither (control condition). Participants were then asked to
Self-Consistency
rate the degree to which they supported a tuition increase.
Participants in the control condition changed their attitudes
In his self-consistency theory, Aronson proposed that dis-
to be more favorable toward a tuition increase, as expected.
sonance is not due merely to an inconsistency between cog-
Participants in both the self-affirmation and value salient
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10
E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
conditions did not change their attitudes. They had trivial-
because an aversive consequence may be an important dis-
ized, or reduced the importance of, the tuition increase is-
sonant cognition (see Harmon-Jones, 1999). However, the
sue by thinking about other important values, even when
original theory would deny that an aversive consequence
these values were not personally important and thus not
is necessary to produce dissonance. In the induced-compli-
self-affirming. Other evidence has been presented that is
ance experiments testing the necessity of aversive conse-
difficult to interpret in self-affirmation theory terms (for
quences, attitude change may have occurred only when
review, Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999).
participants caused aversive consequences for a number of
reasons. First, the lack of attitude change in the no-aver-
sive-consequences conditions is a null effect. Null effects
New Look
are difficult to explain and subject to multiple alternatives.
Second, attitude change may have been produced, but may
Cooper and Fazio (1984) proposed the idea that the discom-
have been too slight to be detected with the small sample
fort experienced in dissonance experiments was not due to
size of these experiments. Third, not enough dissonance
an inconsistency between the individual’s cognitions, but
may have been aroused in these experiments to produce
rather to feeling personally responsible for producing an
attitude change without the additional help of an aversive
aversive consequence. They stated, “Dissonance has pre-
consequence. For example, too much justification for the
cious little to do with the inconsistency among cognitions
counter-attitudinal behavior may have been provided.
per se, but rather with the production of a consequence that
Fourth, in these experiments, dissonance may have been
is unwanted” (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). In support of this
produced in the no-aversive consequences conditions, but
idea, Cooper and Worchel (1970) replicated and extended
may have been reduced by a route other than attitude
Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) classic experiment. In ad-
change.
dition to the conditions of the original experiment, Cooper
To examine whether attitude change could occur in an
and Worchel added conditions in which, when the partici-
induced compliance setting in which aversive consequenc-
pant tells the confederate that the boring task is interesting,
es were not produced, Harmon-Jones and colleagues (Har-
the confederate is not convinced by the lie. They found that
mon-Jones, 2000d; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) conducted
attitude change occurred only in the low-justification con-
several experiments. Under the guise of an experiment on
dition where the confederate believed the lie. This result
memory, participants were exposed to an attitudinal object.
and others have been interpreted as indicating that disso-
Participants were assured of privacy and anonymity, and
nance-related attitude change only occurs when individuals
then given high or low choice to write a counter-attitudinal
feel personally responsible for producing an aversive con-
statement about the object (to manipulate justification).
sequence. The new look, or aversive consequences, revi-
They were asked to discard the statement in the trash after
sion of cognitive dissonance theory was widely accepted
writing it, so that there was no chance of the statement
(but see Berkowitz & Devine, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken,
causing an aversive consequence. This manipulation was
1993).
based on Cooper and Fazio’s (1984) statement, “making a
However, the results obtained in paradigms other than
statement contrary to one’s attitude while in solitude does
the counter-attitudinal action paradigm are not consistent
not have the potential for bringing about an aversive event”
with the aversive consequences model. Dissonance re-
(p. 232).
search using a selective-exposure paradigm has demon-
In one experiment (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), partici-
strated that persons are more willing to examine materials
pants were asked to read a boring passage. They were then
that confirm their beliefs than materials that dispute their
given high or low choice to write that they found the boring
beliefs (Brock & Balloun, 1967; Frey, 1986). Research us-
passage interesting. Non-specific skin conductance re-
ing a belief disconfirmation paradigm has shown that,
sponses (NS-SCRs) were assessed during the 3 minutes be-
when persons are exposed to information that challenges
tween the writing of the statement and the assessment of
their beliefs, they often strengthen their original belief
the participants’ attitudes toward the passage. Although no
(Batson, 1975; Burris, Harmon-Jones, & Tarpley, 1997).
aversive consequences were produced, persons in the high-
Research using a hypocrisy paradigm has shown that per-
choice condition changed their attitudes to be more favor-
sons change their behavior to be more in line with their
able toward the passage. In addition, NS-SCRs indicated
beliefs when they are reminded of times when they did not
that participants in this condition experienced more arous-
live up to their beliefs (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991;
al.
Stone et al., 1994). It is difficult to reconcile any of these
In another experiment, participants who liked chocolate
lines of dissonance research with a conception of disso-
were asked to eat a piece of chocolate and then given high
nance theory in which the production of an aversive con-
or low choice to write a statement that they disliked the
sequence is the only motivator of dissonance-related atti-
chocolate (Harmon-Jones, 2000d). Participants in the high-
tude change.
choice condition changed their attitudes to dislike the choc-
According to the original theory of cognitive disso-
olate. In addition, self-reported negative affect was in-
nance, the production of aversive consequences would be
creased following dissonance-producing behavior and was
expected to increase the amount of dissonance produced
reduced following the attitude change.
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E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
11
The results obtained in these and other experiments
with their recent behavior. After making difficult deci-
demonstrate that dissonance affect and dissonance-related
sions, individuals value the chosen alternative and de-
attitude change can occur in situations in which a cognitive
value the rejected alternative more than they did prior to
inconsistency is present but the production of aversive con-
the decision (for reviews, see Beauvois & Joule, 1996;
sequences is not present. They also demonstrate that the
Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). In
experience of cognitive dissonance evokes an unpleasant
both of these dissonance-evoking situations, dissonance
motivational state that motivates dissonance reduction.
occurs because there are cognitions that are inconsistent
These experiments have supported the original conception
with a chosen course of action. That is, in the former sit-
of dissonance theory over the revisions. But why does dis-
uation, the past attitude is inconsistent with the current
sonance evoke this negative motivational state? Why is in-
behavior. In the latter situation, the positive aspects of the
consistency aversive? Festinger proposed no answer to the
rejected alternative and the negative aspects of the chosen
question of what underlies dissonance processes.
alternative are inconsistent with the decision. The disso-
nance thus has the potential of interfering with the trans-
lation of the decision into effective action. According to
the action-based model, attitude change produced by dis-
Action-Based Model of Dissonance
sonance is the result of following through with the com-
mitment to the behavior. The attitude change is posited to
To address these questions, Harmon-Jones (1999, 2000c)
be one of a number of processes that would assist with the
proposed an action-based model of dissonance. The model
translation of the commitment into effective and uncon-
concurs with other areas of psychological research in pro-
flicted action. Thus, according to the action-based model,
posing that perceptions and cognitions can serve as action
dissonance evokes a negative affective state that signals
tendencies. The model further proposes that dissonance be-
the organism that something is wrong and motivates the
tween “cognitions” evokes an aversive state because it has
organism to engage in behavior to correct the problem.
the potential to interfere with effective and unconflicted
The correction of the problem often involves following
action. Dissonance reduction, by bringing “cognitions” in-
through with the commitment to the behavior or decision.
to consonance, serves the function of facilitating the exe-
This view of dissonance is consistent with past as well as
cution of effective and unconflicted action. In describing
present theorizing on the function of dissonance and dis-
the model, we use the term “cognitions” to use the language
sonance reduction (e.g., Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984; Jones
of the original theory. However, we believe that the more
& Gerard, 1967; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer,
accurate term for the psychological construct involved in
2001; Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002).
dissonance is action tendency. That is, it is the inconsisten-
Other scientists have advanced similar but not identical
cy between important action tendencies that causes disso-
conceptions (see Harmon-Jones, 2000d). For instance,
nance. This line of thinking is consistent with the thinking
Lewin (1951) discussed the organism’s capacity to
of past dissonance theorists who emphasized behavior as
“freeze” upon an action tendency following a decision.
the focal or generative cognition (Brehm & Cohen, 1962;
Later, Jones and Gerard (1967) discussed the concept of
Beauvois & Joule, 1996, 1999; Mills, 1999; Wicklund &
an unequivocal behavior orientation that was described as
Frey, 1981). The action-based model extends these past
an adaptive strategy that forced the individuals to bring
views by suggesting that the other (non-generative) cogni-
their relevant cognitions into harmony with each other.
tions most likely to arouse dissonance are those that have
Another perspective consistent with the present model is
action tendencies inconsistent with the generative cogni-
Kuhl’s (1984, 2000) theory of action control. He proposed
tion.
that to insure that the intended action rather than a com-
The action-based model proposes that inconsistency be-
peting action tendency will be executed, the intended ac-
tween cognitions makes persons uncomfortable because in-
tion tendency has to be selectively strengthened and pro-
consistency has the potential to interfere with effective ac-
tected against interference until the action is executed.
tion. From the viewpoint of the action-based model, cog-
The post-decisional spreading of decision alternatives
nitions are important because they guide the actions of an
may serve the function of putting the decision into action
organism. When an individual holds two relatively impor-
(Beckmann & Irle, 1985). The efficiency of action control
tant cognitions that are inconsistent, the potential to act in
is predicted to be determined by whether the individual is
accord with them is undermined. To reduce the inconsis-
in an action-oriented or state-oriented frame of mind. An
tency and resulting negative affect, individuals engage in a
individual in a state-orientation focuses excessively on the
variety of cognitive strategies.
past, present, or future without attending to plans that
For example, dissonance results when one “freely
would implement the action. In contrast, an individual in
chooses” to engage in behavior that is inconsistent with
an action-orientation would seek to implement a plan of
an attitude or belief. The “free choice” is subtly induced
action and would focus simultaneously on the present
by the experimenter in experimental research. Experi-
state, the intended future state, the discrepancy between
ments have shown that when individuals engage in such
the present and future state, and the alternative plans that
behavior, they often change their attitudes to be consistent
may transform the present state into the future state (see
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12
E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
also Heckhausen [1986] and Gollwitzer [1990]). When
Neural Processes Involved in Dissonance
one considers that dissonance is primarily a theory about
post-decisional processing (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Fes-
To assist in translating the behavioral commitment or in-
tinger, 1964), it is easy to see how these theories fit with
tention into effective action, approach motivational pro-
the present conception of the function of the dissonance
cesses should be activated, as the individual works to suc-
process.
cessfully implement the new commitment. Thus, the in-
crease in approach motivation should activate the left
frontal cortex, as much past research has found this cortical
region to be involved in approach motivational processes
Experimental Tests of the
(e.g., Coan & Allen, 2004; Harmon-Jones, 2003). Interest-
ingly, past research findings are consistent with the idea
Action-Based Model
that the left frontal cortical region may be involved in ap-
proach motivational processes aimed at resolving inconsis-
Action Orientations
tency. For example, event-related functional magnetic res-
onance imaging research has found that the left dorsolateral
An action-oriented state is a state that often occurs follow-
prefrontal cortex is more active during preparation for col-
ing a decision (Beckmann & Irle, 1985; Gollwitzer, 1990;
or naming than during preparation for word naming in a
Heckhausen, 1986; Kuhl, 1984). When a person is in an
Stroop task (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).
action-oriented state, implementation of decisions is en-
Moreover, more activity in this brain region was associated
hanced. Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) integrat-
with less conflict (i.e., smaller reaction time interference
ed these ideas with dissonance theory to propose that this
effects). MacDonald et al. suggested that these findings
action-oriented state that follows decision-making is equiv-
support the hypothesis that the left dorsolateral prefrontal
alent to the state in which dissonance motivation operates
cortex is involved “in the implementation of control, by
and dissonance reduction occurs. They hypothesized that
representing and actively maintaining the attentional de-
experimentally manipulating the degree of action-orienta-
mands of the task” (p. 1837). They also suggested that
tion experienced following a decision should affect the de-
greater activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
gree of dissonance reduction.
which implements control, should cause less conflict.
Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) conducted an
Other research has suggested that activity in the anterior
experiment to test these ideas. Participants were asked to
cingulate cortex is involved in monitoring the occurrence
make either an easy decision or a difficult decision, choos-
of errors or the presence of response conflict (e.g., Carter,
ing to perform one of two physical exercises that the par-
Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; Gehring,
ticipant rated attractive and unattractive or rated as very
Gross, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Importantly, re-
similar in attractiveness. Participants were asked to fill out
cent research has found increased anterior cingulate cortex
a mindset questionnaire after the decision. The neutral
activity, as measured by the event-related potential known
mindset questionnaire asked participants to list 7 things
as the error-related negativity, when behavior conflicts
they did in a typical day, while the action-oriented mindset
with the self-concept (Amodio et al., 2004). This finding
questionnaire asked participants to list 7 things they could
suggests that even higher level conflicts, the type with
do to perform well on the exercise they had chosen. Partic-
which dissonance theory has been most concerned, also
ipants were then asked to re-evaluate the exercises. Results
activate the anterior cingulate cortex.
indicated that participants in the difficult-decision, action-
Based on this past research, it seems plausible that dis-
oriented condition changed their attitudes to prefer the cho-
sonance (or potential response conflict) activates the ante-
sen exercise more than participants in the other conditions.
rior cingulate cortex, and then activates left dorsolateral
In a second experiment testing the action-based model,
prefrontal cortex, which assists in resolving the conflict. To
Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) replicated the re-
test the prediction that dissonance is associated with in-
sults of the first experiment using a different manipulation
creased left frontal cortical activity, university students
of action-orientation. In this experiment, action-orientation
who were opposed to a tuition increase participated in a
was induced by asking participants to think of an important
study ostensibly concerned with attitudes and personality
decision that they had made and to list the steps they in-
(Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & Harmon-Jones, in press).
tended to use to successfully follow through with their de-
They were randomly assigned to one of two choice condi-
cision (Gollwitzer, 1990). The participants in the action-
tions. In the low-choice condition, participants were told
orientation condition engaged in more attitude change fol-
they were to write an essay supporting a 10% tuition in-
lowing a difficult decision than did participants in the
crease at their university. In the high-choice condition, par-
comparison conditions. This study replicated the results of
ticipants were told that writing the essay in favor of the
the previous study, but provided stronger support for the
tuition increase was their choice and completely voluntary.
model because it used an action-orientation induction un-
However, the instructions subtly encouraged them to write
related to the decision at hand.
such an essay. EEG was assessed for one min following the
Z. Soz. psychol. 38 (1) © 2007 by Verlag Hans Huber, Hogrefe AG, Bern

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E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
13
beginning of the writing of the counterattitudinal essay, as
a difficult decision and following the decision their attitu-
past research has revealed that dissonance is greatest at this
dinal spreading of alternatives was measured.
point in time (Beauvois & Joule, 1996). Moreover, the
To manipulate relative left frontal cortical activity, we
commitment alone (and not the complete essay writing) is
used neurofeedback training of EEG alpha power. Past re-
sufficient to evoke dissonance (e.g., Beauvois & Joule,
search used similar neurofeedback training to increase rel-
1996; Rabbie, Brehm, & Cohen, 1959). Then, participants
ative left frontal activity in clinically depressed individuals;
completed an attitude measure. Replicating past research,
the increase in left frontal activity led to less depression
results revealed that high-choice participants changed their
after approximately 27 training sessions (Baehr, Rosenfeld,
attitudes more than low-choice participants. Supporting the
& Baehr, 2001). Other research with non-depressed indi-
primary prediction, results also revealed that high-choice
viduals revealed that neurofeedback was effective in de-
participants evidenced greater relative left frontal activity
creasing but not increasing relative left frontal activity after
than low-choice participants.
only three days of training; this neurofeedback-induced de-
We recently completed another experiment that was de-
crease in relative left frontal activity caused less approach-
signed to extend our past research by testing the hypothesis
related emotional responses (Allen, Harmon-Jones, & Ca-
that an action-oriented mindset would not only facilitate
vender, 2001). Therefore, we predicted that brief neuro-
discrepancy reduction following a decision, but would also
feedback training of asymmetrical frontal brain activity
increase relative left frontal cortical activity. Because our
would decrease relative left frontal activity. Moreover, we
past research found effects of action orientation on spread-
predicted that this decrease in relative left frontal activity
ing of alternatives only after difficult decisions, the present
would lead to a decrease in spreading of alternatives. Our
research included only difficult decisions. To further ex-
results supported these predictions. The last two experi-
tend past research, we included a condition to manipulate
ments are described in Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Johnson, Si-
positive affect that was low in approach motivation. This
gelman, and Harmon-Jones (2006).
was done to distinguish between the effects of positive af-
fect and approach motivation on spreading of alternatives.
Past research suggested that action-oriented mindsets in-
Conclusion
crease positive affect, but we do not predict that positive
affect, itself, is causing the effects on spreading of alterna-
tives.
Several experiments have challenged the revisions of dis-
sonance theory and have provided support for Festinger’s
Replicating our past results, the current experiment dem-
original conception of dissonance. Clearly, dissonance has
onstrated that the action-oriented mindset caused greater
much to do with inconsistency and is not due to such lim-
spreading of alternatives than the neutral and positive-non-
iting conditions as a self-threat or the production of an aver-
action-oriented mindset conditions. Moreover, the action-
sive consequence. As Aronson (1992) noted, a number of
oriented mindset caused greater relative left frontal activa-
social psychological theories, such as self affirmation the-
tion than the other conditions. These results supported our
ory, could be thought of as dissonance in other guises. In
predictions and suggest that the dissonance reduction in-
addition to the theories noted by Aronson (1992), much
volves activation of the left frontal cortex and approach
research and theory concerned with guilt (Baumeister,
motivational processes.
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994) and self-regulation over
In the previous experiment, the psychological process
prejudiced and other impulses (Amodio et al., 2004) may
(action-orientation) was manipulated and the proposed
be understood from the perspective of dissonance. Incor-
physiological substrate was measured (left frontal cortical
poration of the key variables and past research of disso-
activation). Studies of this type are limited in the causal
nance theory into these and other research enterprises will
inferences that can be drawn. Because the measured phys-
likely benefit those enterprises and lead to a more cumula-
iological activation may be only one of a number of phys-
tive psychological theory.
iological activations that occur in response to the psycho-
Festinger did not propose why cognitive inconsistency
logical manipulation, it is possible that one of the other
produces discomfort and motivates perceptual, cognitive
unmeasured physiological activations is more responsible
and behavioral changes. However, the action-based model
for the psychological process. To provide stronger causal
of dissonance does propose an underlying motivation. Re-
inferences regarding the role of a particular neural struc-
search on the action-based model suggests that dissonance
ture’s involvement in a particular psychological process, it
reduction may serve the function of assisting in the suc-
is important to reverse the direction and manipulate the
cessful execution of a commitment, which may facilitate
physiology and measure the psychology. Such also pro-
effective and unconflicted action. Incorporation of these
vides stronger causal evidence than simply correlating the
ideas derived from action control thinking may assist in
proposed mediator with the outcome (Sigall & Mills,
stimulating new research on dissonance theory and assist
1998). Thus, we conducted an experiment in which neuro-
in connecting the large body of dissonance theory evidence
feedback was used to manipulate left frontal cortical activ-
with other research literatures concerned with action orien-
ity. After neurofeedback training, participants were given
tation, behavioral regulation, emotion regulation, and the
Z. Soz. psychol. 38 (1) © 2007 by Verlag Hans Huber, Hogrefe AG, Bern

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14
E. Harmon-Jones and C. Harmon-Jones: 50 Years of Cognitive Dissonance Theory
neural processes that underlie these important psychologi-
mood disorders: Follow-up study one to five years post thera-
cal processes.
py. Journal of Neurotherapy, 4, 11–18.
As dissonance theory celebrates its 50th birthday, it is
Batson, C.D. (1975). Rational processing or rationalization? The
clear that this middle-aged theory has weathered many
effect of disconfirming information on a stated religious belief.
challenges but still provides much explanatory, integrative,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 176–184.
Baumeister, R.F., Stillwell, A.M.& Heatherton, T.F. (1994). Guilt:
and generative power. It is hoped that recent empirical and
An interpersonal approach. Psychological Bulletin, 115,
theoretical developments within dissonance theory will as-
243–267.
sist in keeping one of our major theories alive and fertile.
Beauvois, J.L., & Joule, R.V. (1996). A radical dissonance theory.
London: Taylor and Francis.
Beauvois, J.L., & Joule, R.V. (1999). A radical point of view on
Acknowledgments
dissonance theory. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cog-
nitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psy-
This article and portions of the research described herein
chology (pp. 43–70). Washington, DC: American Psychologi-
were supported by funds from the University of Wisconsin
cal Association.
Graduate School, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Founda-
Beckmann, J., & Irle, M. (1985). Dissonance and action control.
tion, a Wisconsin/Hilldale Undergraduate/Faculty Re-
In J. Kuhl, & J. Beckmann (Ed.), Action control: From cogni-
search Fellowship, and the National Science Foundation
tion to behavior (pp. 129–150). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
(BCS-9910702).
Beckmann, J., & Kuhl, J. (1984). Altering information to gain
action control: Functional aspects of human information pro-
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