Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention

The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:


Document Title:
Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory,
Research and Prevention

Author(s):
Mark S. Hamm

Document No.:
211203

Date Received:
September 2005

Award Number:
2003-DT-CX-0002


This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-
funded grant final report available electronically in addition to
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Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect

the official position or policies of the U.S.


Department of Justice.

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Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups:
Theory, Research, and Prevention
Award #2003 DT CX 0002
Mark S. Hamm
Criminology Department
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809
Final Final Report
Submitted: June 1, 2005
This project was supported by Grant No. 2003-DT-CX-0002 awarded by the National Institute of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Terrorism and Crime: The Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
What Can Policy Makers Learn From This Research? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Part I: Empirical Baseline
Distinguishing Features of Terrorist-Oriented Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Part II: Case Studies
Case One: Aircraft and Motor Vehicle Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Countdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Criminal Stupidity and the Age of Sacred Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Cases Two and Three: Explosives and Firearms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
The Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
i
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Countdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Criminal Skills, Al-Qaeda, and U.S. Counter-Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Case Four: Machine Guns and Destructive Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
The Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
The Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
The Siege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Terrorism, Feminism, and Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Case Five: Racketeering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
The Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
The Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Evidence as Totem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
The Martyrdom of Robert Jay Mathews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Case Six: Robbery and Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
The Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
The Defining Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Commodity Fetish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
ii
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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Final Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Part III: Content Analysis
Criminal Skills and Routine Activities: The Closing Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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ABSTRACT
Statement of Purpose: A decline in state-sponsored terrorism has caused many terrorist
organizations to resort to criminal activity as an alternative means of support. This study
examines terrorists’ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations,
immigration fraud, and manufacturing illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and
smuggling weapons of mass destruction. Special attention is given to transnational organized
crime. Crimes are analyzed through the routine activity perspective and social learning theory.
These theories draw our attention to the opportunities to commit crime and the criminal skills
necessary to turn opportunity into criminality. Through these lenses, the research appraises the
“successes” and “failures” of terrorists’ engagement in crime. Because “failures” can result from
law enforcement efforts to (1) interrupt criminal skill development, and/or (2) remove criminal
opportunities via technologies and transportation systems, the research represents a best practices
approach to the study and control of terrorism.
Methods: The study is organized into three parts:
I) A secondary analysis of the American Terrorism Study (ATS) database, comparing the
criminality of international jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. This comparison
represents an original use of the ATS.
II) Six case studies of crimes committed by international jihad groups and domestic right-
wing groups, selected from the ATS based on frequency distributions of criminal counts filed
against the groups. Trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with
law enforcement officials and former terrorists are used to explore opportunities and skills that
iv
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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made crimes possible (“successes”); or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes
(“failures”). These crimes do not occur in a social vacuum, therefore the research includes brief
biographies of the terrorists along with descriptions of their organizations, strategies, and terrorist
plots. The actualities of daily criminality inside terrorist cells are also considered through an
analysis of such factors as religion, charismatic leadership, intra-group conflict, terrorism’s
cultural codes and mythologies, as well as the role of women in terrorist groups.

III) Content analysis of the pervasive themes presented in closing arguments of the
transcripts used in Part II. Variables include crimes committed by terrorist groups, criminal
opportunities, criminal skills, and controls. This method has also never before been used in
terrorism research.


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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This research systematically examines the major terrorism trials of our times. Those trials
involve a number of terrorism cases both foreign and domestic in nature. In summarizing
concisely both the varieties and the specific techniques of criminal activity within various
terrorist organizations, the study shows that terrorist-oriented criminality does, indeed, have
distinguishing features.
International jihad groups are statistically more likely than domestic right-wing groups to
commit aircraft and motor vehicle-related crimes; violations of explosive materials; and firearms
violations. Right-wing domestic groups are more likely to commit mail fraud; racketeering;
robbery/burglary; and violations involving machine guns and destructive devices.
The main finding of the study is that the most successful method of both detecting and
prosecuting cases of terrorism is through the pursuit of conventional criminal investigations. By
analyzing past successful prosecutions and the evidence accumulated from studying them, the
research strongly suggests that the best practices of investigators should be directed to crimes that
facilitate the operation of complex organizations. A clear pattern of precursor activity across
diverse terrorist organizations is discovered. The study shows that all terrorist organizations
require money, material, transportation, identity documents, communication systems, and safe
havens to accomplish their aims. Crimes that finance these operations should be the top priority
for investigators.
These crimes reflect the natural history and culture of each organization. The study
indicates that bank robbery, credit card theft, document counterfeiting, motor vehicle violations,
vi
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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and money laundering are the types of crimes that those charged with combating terrorism should
focus on. As such, this research reduces the problem of terrorism to its simple common
denominators, thereby removing the mystery that shrouds these groups. Once the hype
surrounding terrorism is removed, we are able to see the vulnerabilities of such organizations.
The case studies and content analysis indicate that the opportunities and skills associated
with criminal successes and failures are contingent upon historical and cultural factors as well.
Jihad groups rely on low-level operatives to perform menial criminal acts necessary for a terrorist
attack. They are recruited less for their criminal skills than for their connections to local
communities and attendant opportunities to exploit routine activities. Jihad leaders with
specialized training are responsible for successes in the areas of surveillance, financing,
communications, breaching airline security, smuggling explosives, and bomb-building.
Unlike the jihadists, domestic right-wing groups recruit individuals specifically for their
criminal skills. Typically headed by charismatic leaders, domestic groups are most successful at
acquiring false identity documents, manufacturing illegal firearms, armored truck and bank
robbery, and murder. They are surveillance experts, often spending weeks taking into account
every moment in the taken-for-granted order of daily routines in and around their targets.
Yet none of these terrorists are the “criminal masterminds” we have been led to believe
they are. The greatest failures of jihad groups involve cultural conflicts that manifest themselves
in such seemingly innocuous crimes as passport fraud, immigration infractions, and traffic
violations. Yet their Achilles heel is an inability to cross international borders without attracting
attention. Jihadists are inexperienced criminals who often fail to conceal incriminating evidence.
Likewise, often they do not display the criminal skills necessary to transform opportunity into
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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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terrorism, nor do they setup contingencies in the event that their terrorist plots go awry.
Domestic terrorists fail in different ways. They are failures when it comes to
counterfeiting, theft, arson, constructing weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining internal
security. Yet their greatest failure has been the showcasing of imagery and style. While jihad
groups do not use appearances or panache to make ironic statements about their violence,
domestic terrorists present themselves as entertainers, thereby turning terrorism into
performance. And this is their Achilles heel.
Yet the research also demonstrates that there are some important similarities among these
organizations. One of the most compelling findings of the research is the discovery of attempts
made by domestic terrorists to forge alliances with international jihad groups. Similarly, both
domestic and international terrorists have financed their operations through counterfeiting. Both
domestic and international groups have stolen arms, explosives, and equipment from military
installations. Both have exploited military training for terrorist purposes. And both have engaged
in assassination.
If criminal activity is the lifeblood of terrorist groups, then choking off the blood supply
begins with identifying these sorts of similarities and differences. This research does so by
couching the distinguishing features of terrorist-oriented criminality in the social learning and
routine activity perspectives. For in the end, history shows that the FBI’s most successful
terrorism investigations have recognized these criminological implications.



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This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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