Framing the frame: How task goals determine the likelihood and direction of framing effects

Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007, pp. 251-256
Framing the frame: How task goals determine the likelihood and
direction of framing effects
Todd McElroy?
John J. Seta
Department of Psychology
Department of Psychology
Appalachian State University
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Abstract
We examined how the goal of a decision task in?uences the perceived positive, negative valence of the alternatives
and thereby the likelihood and direction of framing effects. In Study 1 we manipulated the goal to increase, decrease or
maintain the commodity in question and found that when the goal of the task was to increase the commodity, a framing
effect consistent with those typically observed in the literature was found. When the goal was to decrease, a framing
effect opposite to the typical ?ndings was observed whereas when the goal was to maintain, no framing effect was
found. When we examined the decisions of the entire population, we did not observe a framing effect. In Study 2, we
provided participants with a similar decision task except in this situation the goal was ambiguous, allowing us to observe
participants’ self-imposed goals and how they in?uenced choice preferences. The ?ndings from Study 2 demonstrated
individual variability in imposed goal and provided a conceptual replication of Study 1.
Keywords: goals, framing, Prospect Theory.
1 Introduction
The content and mental representation that it generates,
in turn, determines the decoding rules that lead to a de-
According to economic accounts, such as the dominant
cision. Different decoding processes are ordered along
discounted utility model, the way in which a problem
a continuum from most deliberate/analytic to most auto-
is stated should not in?uence individuals’ preferences.
matic/intuitive. The encoding rules described by prospect
Rather, when deciding between options, the individual
theory lie in the middle of the continuum, intuitive but in-
should choose the option with the greatest overall util-
volving some analytical processing, as framing problems
ity, regardless of the way in which the problem is stated
typically involve numbers. Similar research has shown
(or framed). These accounts (e.g., Edwards, 1954; Von
that framing effects, like those predicted by prospect the-
Newmann & Morgenstern, 1953) consider the value and
ory, are more likely for individuals who are induced or
probability of the outcome, independent of the context —
predisposed to process holistically, using contextual ref-
independent of the way the decision is framed. Counter to
erencing (e.g., McElroy & Seta, 2003; 2004) and when
economic accounts, prospect theory (Kahneman &Tver-
more “gist like” memory retrieval is utilized (e.g., Reyna
sky, 1979) predicts that the way a decision problem is
& Brainerd, 1991; Reyna, Lloyd & Brainerd, 2003). This
framed does in?uence individuals’ preferences.
work highlights the importance of considering both per-
While this holds great importance for furthering the
son and contextual variables in understanding how indi-
understanding of rational choice, prospect theory has
viduals encode (edit) information in a decision-problem.
failed to consider person and contextual factors in their
Goals.
The consideration of person factors, such
editing or encoding rules (e.g., Lopes, 1983; McElroy &
as personal goals is important for understanding the
Seta, 2003; Rettinger & Hastie, 2003; Reyna & Braired,
decision-making process (e.g., Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-
1991; Schneider, 1992). For example, according to Ret-
Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Krantz & Kun-
tinger and Hastie the strategies that guide decisions are
reuther, 2007; Stapel & Koomen, 2006). It may not only
an interactive product of person and contextual variables.
provide insight into the encoding process and the likeli-
From this view, information contained in the decision
hood of framing effects, but it also may provide infor-
problem is encoded and represented as a mental model.
mation about the direction of framing effects. Two stud-
ies were designed to test this possibility. In the typical
?Direct correspondence to Todd McElroy, Department of Psy-
framing problem used in the literature it is implicitly as-
chology, College of Arts and Sciences, P.O. Box 32109, 265
sumed that decision-makers view an increase in the out-
College St., Boone NC. 28608; phone: (828) 262–2720; email:
mcelroygt@appstate.edu. Special thanks to Cathy Seta for her
come or commodity as desirable and positive. For exam-
insightful comments.
ple, in risky-choice studies utilizing the classic Asian dis-
251

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007
Framing goals
252
ease approach, decision-makers typically make a choice
that people can impose different goals onto a decision
about a situation where increasing the commodity (e.g.,
which will then affect their processing of the task.
human lives) is the goal. So whether the problem is
Goal ambiguity. Framing tasks, such as the Asian dis-
framed positively as gains or negatively as losses, the
ease problem that involve the loss of human lives typi-
goal of increasing lives remains constant and desirable to
cally generate uniform goals. Because of intergroup pres-
decision-makers. Studies, such as the Asian disease prob-
sures, most if not all Americans desire to increase and
lem that have the inherent goal of increasing the com-
not decrease the life of another American (i.e., ingroup
modity (lives), generally demonstrate ?ndings consistent
member). Consequently, decision-makers tend to be risk-
with prospect theory predictions; risk-aversion when the
averse when the problem is framed as a gain and risk-
problem is framed as a gain and risk-seeking when it is
seeking when it is framed as a loss. It is not the case,
framed as a loss.
however, that all framing tasks produce uniform goals.
All tasks, however, are not oriented in the direction of
Just as there is variability in the frame that individuals can
increasing the commodity in question; with some tasks,
impose on ambiguous situations (e.g., Elliot & Archibald,
the goal is to decrease it. One example is when individu-
1989; McElroy, Seta & Warring, 2007; Wang, 2004) the
als are overweight and seek to lose undesirable body fat.
question of whether to increase, decrease or maintain the
In this situation, because a gain in body weight is incon-
commodity in question also may be ambiguous and thus
sistent with a decision-maker’s goal, each gained unit of
open to interpretation. In this case, there might be con-
body weight is undesirable; conversely, because a loss is
siderable variation among decision-makers in the goals
consistent with the decision-maker’s goal, each lost unit
that they impose; some might impose a goal to increase
is desirable.
the commodity (an incremental goal), others to decrease
In a situation such as this, prospect theory (e.g., Kah-
the commodity (a decremental goal), and still others to
neman & Tversky, 1979) would not predict individuals to
maintain it (a maintenance goal).
be risk-averse when the decision problem is framed as a
Further, if an approximately equal number of individ-
gain and risk-seeking when it is framed as a loss. Rather,
uals impose each of the three goals then it will appear
because decreasing the commodity is desirable, a pref-
as though the decision frame is having little or no effect
erence reversal would be expected; individuals should be
when we consider the decisions of an entire population
risk-seeking (not risk-averse) when the problem is framed
of decision-makers; the choices of individuals who im-
in terms of gains and risk-averse (not risk-seeking) when
pose a maintenance goal will not be affected by the frame
framed in terms of losses. One reason why preference re-
whereas the choices of individuals who impose an incre-
versals are rarely seen in the literature (see Levin & Chap-
mental goal will be counterbalanced by those imposing a
man, 1990 for an exception) may be because the vast ma-
decremental goal. The gain condition for individuals im-
jority of framing studies have used problems that clearly
posing an incremental goal will be relatively risk-averse
involve the goal of increasing the supply of the commod-
whereas those imposing a decremental goal will be rela-
ity. Nevertheless, there are many decisions in life where
tively risk-seeking. Conversely, in the losses condition,
individuals have the inherent goal of decreasing a com-
individuals imposing an incremental goal will be rela-
modity’s supply.
tively risk-seeking whereas those imposing a decremental
Individuals, however, not only have goals of increasing
goal will be relatively risk-averse.
or decreasing a commodity but at times the goal also may
Thus, it may be the case that although the frame is
be to maintain the current status of a commodity. In this
having a signi?cant in?uence on the choices of each in-
situation, either a gain or a loss in the commodity is con-
dividual, the framing effect for the entire population of
trary to the individual’s goal. Thus, either type of change
decision-makers is masked by individual differences in
is undesirable, leading decision-makers to make equiva-
goal imposition. And failures to demonstrate framing ef-
lent responses when the problem is framed as a gain or as
fects may in fact be failures to consider the goals of the
a loss
decision-makers. When person factors, such as decision-
It may not always be the case, however, that the goal
makers’ goals, are not taken into consideration, it may
of the task is clear. For example, McCaffery and Baron
appear as though the decision-frame is having very little
(2004) examined how attribute framing in?uenced opin-
or no effect on individual choice preference, when in fact
ions about taxation. They found that contextual cues,
it is having considerable in?uence.
such as the attribute frame, evoke internalized principles
Overview of studies. Our experiments were designed
that are used for problem analysis. Further, these differ-
to determine whether decision-makers’ goals interacted
ent principles could determine the goal, which has sub-
with the way in which the problem was framed. In the
stantial in?uence on decision processing, even leading to
?rst experiment we made the goal of the risky-choice de-
directional shifts in preference. Although this research
cision problem explicit by informing our participants that
did not focus on risky choice, it nonetheless demonstrated
the goal was to either increase, decrease or maintain the

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007
Framing goals
253
commodity in question. We capitalized on an everyday
observation in which some individuals are underweight
Table 1: Average choice preference as a function of prob-
and their goal is to gain weight, some are overweight
lem goal and positive/negative frame.
and their goal is to lose weight, and some are “just right”
Positive frame
Negative frame
and their goal is to maintain weight. Thus, we were able
to use the same commodity (weight) but shift decision-
Problem goal:
N
Mean
N
Mean
makers’ goals.
Increase
25
2.6
25
3.9
In Experiment 2 we did not manipulate the direction of
Decrease
25
3.9
25
2.4
the goal that participants imposed onto the task; rather,
Maintain
25
3.9
25
3.6
we allowed them to self-impose a goal. To accomplish
this, we used the same commodity as in Experiment 1 but
did not make explicit the goal of the decision problem;
rather, we purposefully made the goal of the decision-
Imagine that you are an athlete with the goal of (de-
maker ambiguous so that individuals would impose their
creasing, increasing, maintaining) your weight as much
own idiosyncratic goals on the decision problem; some
as possible. Because of your sport, at this juncture in
individuals imposing an incremental goal, others a decre-
the season, (the lower your weight the better you can
mental goal and still others a maintenance goal. Framing
perform, the higher your weight the better you can per-
effects should not be observed for those imposing a main-
form, your current weight is where you can perform best).
tenance goal but should be observed for individuals who
You have to begin a specialized training program and you
impose either an incremental or decremental goal. How-
must choose between the following two programs. As-
ever, because we expected the pattern of these framing
sume that the following alternatives represent the exact
effects to be in opposite directions, if an approximately
estimates for each training program.
equal number of participants chose each goal, then we
Participants were then presented with the following al-
should not ?nd framing effects (or ?nd especially weak
ternatives framed as either gains or losses:
ones) when we examine the decisions of our entire popu-
If program A is adopted, 20 pounds will be gained.
lation of participants.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probabil-
ity that 60 pounds will be gained and a two-thirds proba-
bility that no pounds will be gained.
2 Experiment 1
Or:
In this study we made explicit the goal of increasing, de-
If program A is adopted, 40 pounds will be lost.
creasing or maintaining weight. We expected a typical
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probabil-
risky-choice framing effect when the goal was to gain
ity that no pounds will be lost and a two-thirds probability
weight; a reversal of the typical effect when the goal was
that 60 pounds will be lost.
to lose weight and no framing effect when the goal was
to maintain weight.
Afterward, all participants were asked to rate their
opinion of the two options on a 7-point scale ranging
2.1 Method
from 1 (De?nitely would recommend A) to 7 (De?nitely
would recommend B).
2.1.1 Participants and design
Participants were 150 Appalachian State University un-
3 Results
dergraduate students who received class credit for their
participation. The design of our study was a 3 Task Goal
To determine whether goals in?uenced participants
(increase, decrease, maintain) X 2 Frame (gain, loss) be-
choice preferences for the different frames, we performed
tween factors design.
an analysis of variance on the data; the goal (incremental,
Materials and Procedure. After consenting to take
decremental, maintain) and decision frame (gain, loss)
part in the study, participants were presented with our vi-
acted as our independent variables and preferences as
gnette. We created a decision scenario involving weight
our dependent variables. As expected, this analysis did
control where all three goals as well as the frame were
not reveal a decision frame main effect, F (1, 144) = .3,
reasonable. Participants were provided with a situation
p>.5. It did, however, reveal our predicted decision frame
involving an athlete who had the goal of weight control.
X goal interaction, F (2, 144) = 7.5, p < .01. To explore
Each of the weight-goal conditions are presented in itali-
the interaction we performed contrasts for gain/loss fram-
cizes.
ing within each of our three goal conditions (See Table 1).

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007
Framing goals
254
In the increasing-goal condition we found a signi?-
4.1 Method
cant main effect for problem framing F (1, 48) = 6.6,
p < .01. As may be seen in Table 1, this effect is con-
4.1.1 Participants and design
sistent with typical ?ndings in risky-choice framing tasks
Two hundred twenty-eight1 undergraduates participated
with participants demonstrating a relatively stronger risk-
in this study. The design of our study included the be-
averse tendency in the gains condition than in the losses
tween factors of participants’ self-imposed goal for the
condition. In the decreasing-goal condition we also found
decision task (increase, decrease, maintain) and the prob-
a signi?cant framing effect F (1, 48) = 8.33, p < .01.
lem frame (gain, loss).
However, and consistent with our predictions, the typical
framing effect was reversed; participants demonstrated
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure
a relatively stronger risk-seeking tendency in the gains
condition than in the losses condition. Finally, in the
Participants were run in groups of approximately 10 in-
maintaining-goal condition, we found no effect for the
dividuals. After providing informed consent, they were
frame F (1, 48) = .36, p > .5. This ?nding ?ts with
provided with a weight management task similar to Study
our proposition that when the goal is to maintain the cur-
1 except the task did not contain a de?ned goal.2 The sit-
rent status, both increases (gains) and decreases (losses)
uation read as follows:
are perceived as a loss. In fact, the preferences of par-
Imagine that you are an athlete and you have to begin a
ticipants in this condition did not differ from those in the
specialized weight training program and you must choose
increase-loss or decrease-gain conditions F ’s < 1.
between the following two programs. Assume that the
The results of Study 1 demonstrate that the goal of the
following alternatives represent the exact estimates for
decision maker has profound effects on how individuals
each training program.
respond to the framing of alternatives. These ?ndings fur-
Directly afterward, participants were asked to indicate
ther extend our knowledge of framing effects, providing
what they believed the goal of the athlete in the task was
a fuller understanding of how goals in?uence the likeli-
(increase, decrease or maintain weight). After determin-
hood and direction of framing effects.
ing the goal that they had imposed onto the task, we
then provided participants with the risk-seeking and risk-
averse alternatives framed either positively or negatively
4 Experiment 2
(the same as in Study 1). Finally, participants were asked
to rate their preference for the two alternatives on a 7-
The purpose of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we
point scale ranging from 1, de?nitely would recommend
sought to determine whether participants would im-
A to 7, de?nitely would recommend B.
pose different goals on an ambiguous decision problem.
Speci?cally, would there be individual differences in the
4.2 Results and discussion
goal (increase, decrease, maintain) that participants set
for the task? Second, did participants’ “imposed goal”
As expected, participants imposed different goals for the
in?uence their decision in the same way as it did in Ex-
athlete in the decision problem. To determine whether the
periment 1? Although we expected a framing effect for
imposed goal in?uenced participants choice preference
individuals who imposed an incremental or decremental
for the different decision frames, we performed an analy-
goal, we expected these effects to be in opposite direc-
sis of variance on the data with imposed goal (incremen-
tions. Further, we did not expect to observe framing ef-
tal, decremental, maintenance) and decision frame (gain,
fects for individuals who imposed a maintenance goal.
loss) acting as our independent variables and risky choice
Thus, if roughly equal numbers of individuals imposed
preferences as our dependent variable. The analysis re-
each goal we should either not ?nd a framing effect or
vealed a main effect for imposed goal F (2, 220) = 3.71,
?nd a weak one for our entire population of participants.
p < .03, as well as the expected overall interaction
We provided participants with a weight control situa-
between frame and imposed goal F (2, 220) = 12.09,
tion similar to Study 1. Different from Study 1 however,
p < .0001. As may be seen in Table 2, contrasts re-
we did not include an explicit “weight-control” goal for
vealed that when participants imposed an incremental
the hypothetical decision task. Rather, we constructed
goal, they demonstrated framing effects consistent with
the task so that the goal of the actor was purposefully
1Two participants were not included in our analysis because they
ambiguous; allowing participants to impose their own
failed to indicate a goal for the decision task.
weight-control goal for the task. After assessing the goal
2It is reasonable for individuals to impose different goals onto this
that individuals imposed, we next observed how the self-
task. For example, many athletes such as football players need to either
gain w eight or loose weight for their optimal performance. Further,
imposed goal in?uenced the framing effect by measuring
if they are already at the desirable weight, maintenance of weight is
participants’ risky-choice preferences.
crucial for best performance.

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 2007
Framing goals
255
Several reasons have been offered for when and why
Table 2: Average choice preference as a function of self-
framing effects are not always obtained. For example,
imposed goal and positive/negative frame.
research has shown that processing style (e.g., Igou &
Positive frame
Negative frame
Bless, 2007; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Reyna & Brainerd,
1991) elaboration (e.g., Sieck & Yates, 1997; Simon, Fa-
Problem goal:
N
Mean
N
Mean
gley & Halleran 2004) and numeric predisposition (e.g.,
Increase
47
2.8
25
3.9
Peters, Vastfjall, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert
Decrease
29
4.4
58
2.9
2006) can all in?uence the strength of framing. The re-
sults of the current study provide an additional reason.
Maintain
37
4.2
30
3.9
When the goal of the decision-maker is not to increase or
decrease supply of the outcome in question, then fram-
ing effects would not be expected from prospect theory.
those typically found in risky-choice type framing tasks
In this situation, either a gain or a loss in the supply of
F (1, 70) = 8.3, p < .005. However, when participants
the outcome would be undesirable from the perspective
imposed a decremental goal, the results revealed framing
of the decision-maker. For example, a decision-maker
effects that were opposite to those of participants who im-
who has a personal goal of maintaining the supply of
posed an incremental goal and opposite to those typically
an outcome such as weight, may project this goal onto
found in the literature F (1, 85) = 17.1, p < .00006. Fi-
a decision problem involving a gain or loss in weight. If
nally, when participants imposed a maintenance goal, a
so, from the decision-makers own perspective, a gain or
framing effect was not obtained F (1, 65) = .84, p > .35.
loss would be equivalently undesirable. In this case, both
An additional point of interest for us was to exam-
would be perceived as losses and framing effects would
ine whether a framing effect would be found across
not be expected. Situations like this highlight the impor-
the imposed goal conditions.
Because there was an
tance of decision-makers’ goals in determining the va-
approximately equal division of the goals that partici-
lence of an outcome and thereby the likelihood and di-
pants imposed: increase (72), decrease (87) and main-
rection of framing effects.
tain (67), we did not observe a decision frame main ef-
We believe that in most situations where risk is in-
fect, F (2, 220) = 1.19, p > .27. The direction of the
volved individuals are considering taking a chance be-
framing effect obtained by those imposing an incremental
cause they desire to increase some commodity. Although
goal was counterbalanced by the reverse direction of the
this goal may be common, it is not inherent in all situa-
framing effect obtained by those imposing a decremental
tions. A variety of circumstances exist where decreasing
goal. The results of this study are conceptually consis-
or maintaining a commodity is desirable. Thus, it is im-
tent with those obtained in Experiment 1 and demonstrate
portant to consider decision-makers’ goals in predicting
how goals can in?uence the likelihood and direction of
the likelihood and direction of framing.
framing effects.
5 General discussion
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