"If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and genocide

Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007, pp. 79–95
“If I look at the mass I will never act”:
Psychic numbing and genocide
Paul Slovic?
Decision Research and University of Oregon
Abstract
Most people are caring and will exert great effort to rescue individual victims whose needy plight comes to their
attention. These same good people, however, often become numbly indifferent to the plight of individuals who are “one
of many” in a much greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this question will help us answer a related
question that is the topic of this paper: Why, over the past century, have good people repeatedly ignored mass murder and
genocide? Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises unique obstacles to intervention. But the repetitiveness of
such atrocities, ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the general public, calls for explanations that may re?ect
some fundamental de?ciency in our humanity — a de?ciency that, once identi?ed, might possibly be overcome. One
fundamental mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder neglect involves the capacity
to experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments,
decisions, and actions. I shall draw from psychological research to show how the statistics of mass murder or genocide,
no matter how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atrocities. The reported numbers of deaths
represent dry statistics, “human beings with the tears dried off,” that fail to spark emotion or feeling and thus fail
to motivate action. Recognizing that we cannot rely only upon our moral feelings to motivate proper action against
genocide, we must look to moral argument and international law. The 1948 Genocide Convention was supposed to
meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time to examine this failure in light of the psychological de?ciencies
described here and design legal and institutional mechanisms that will enforce proper response to genocide and other
forms of mass murder.
Keywords: genocide; psychic numbing; dual process theories, affect, compassion.
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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
80
To avoid further disasters, we need political restraint
vow “never again,” once again, but the world
on a world scale. But politics is not the whole story. We
being as it is, there will be another genocide
have experienced the results of technology in the service
under way even as we engage in the ritual of
of the destructive side of human psychology. Something
mild self-?agellation for Darfur.
needs to be done about this fatal combination. The means
Again and again.
for expressing cruelty and carrying out mass killing have
been fully developed. It is too late to stop the technology.
Why do we ignore mass murder and genocide? There
It is to the psychology that we should now turn.
is no simple answer. It is not because we are insensitive
Jonathan Glover, Humanity, 2001, p. 144
to the suffering of our fellow human beings — witness
the extraordinary efforts we expend to rescue someone in
1 Introduction
distress. It is not because we only care about identi?able
victims, of similar skin color, who live near us: witness
My title is taken from a statement by Mother Teresa: “If
the outpouring of aid to victims of the December 2004
I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I
tsunami in South Asia. We cannot simply blame our po-
will.”
litical leaders. Although President Bush has been quite
These two observations capture a powerful and deeply
unresponsive to the murder of hundreds of thousands of
unsettling insight into human nature. Most people are
people in Darfur, it was Clinton who ignored Rwanda,
caring and will exert great effort to rescue “the one”
and Roosevelt who did little to stop the Holocaust. Be-
whose needy plight comes to their attention. These same
hind every president who ignored mass murder were mil-
good people, however, often become numbly indifferent
lions of citizens whose indifference allowed them to get
to the plight of “the one” who is “one of many” in a much
away with it. It’s not fear of losing American lives in bat-
greater problem. Why does this occur? The answer to this
tle that necessarily deters us from acting. We have not
question will help us answer a related question: Why do
even taken quite safe steps that could save many lives,
good people ignore mass murder and genocide?
such as bombing the radio stations in Rwanda that were
An internet columnist (Reynolds, 2005, p. 1) frames
coordinating the slaughter by machete of 800,000 people
this question and the topic of my paper:
in 100 days, or supporting the forces of the African Union
in Darfur, or just raising our powerful American voices in
For sixty plus years, since the liberation of the
a threatening shout — Stop that killing! — as opposed to
Nazi death camps, we’ve said “never again.”
turning away in silence.
Since then we’ve had mass exterminations of
Every episode of mass murder is unique and raises
human beings, whether by deliberate malice or
unique social, economic, military, and political obstacles
sheer, bloody-minded ideological stupidity, in
to intervention. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities,
China, Cambodia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kosovo,
ignored by powerful people and nations, and by the gen-
and Rwanda. Each time we tut tut, but . . . we
eral public, calls for explanations that may re?ect some
do nothing. “Never again” has become “again
fundamental de?ciency in our humanity — a de?ciency
and again.”
that, once identi?ed, might possibly be overcome.
This paper examines one fundamental mechanism that
And now there’s Darfur, a region of Sudan,
may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-
where the Janjaweed gangs, with the support
murder neglect. This mechanism involves the capacity to
of the corrupt national government, are carry-
experience affect, the positive and negative feelings that
ing out yet another genocide. In a few years
combine with reasoned analysis to guide our judgments,
there’ll be an HBO movie on Darfur. We’ll
decisions, and actions. Many researchers have begun to
?I wish to thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and its
study the “dance of affect and reason” as it applies to de-
president, Paul Brest, for support and encouragement in the writing of
cision making. I shall draw from this research to show
this paper. Additional support was provided by the National Science
Foundation through grant SES-0241313.
how the statistics of mass murder or genocide, no matter
Many individuals have provided constructive criticism and helpful sug-
how large the numbers, fail to convey the true meaning
gestions on earlier drafts as well as other valuable intellectual and lo-
of such atrocities. The numbers fail to spark emotion or
gistical support. A partial list includes Dan Ariely, Peter Ayton, Jon
feeling and thus fail to motivate action. Genocide in Dar-
Baron, Jon Haidt, Derek Jinks, Tehila Kogut, George Loewenstein,
Ruth Marom, Ellen Peters, Ilana Ritov, Nils Eric Sahlin, Peter Singer,
fur is real, but we do not “feel” that reality. I shall con-
Scott Slovic, Deborah Small, Ola Svenson, Daniel Västfjäll, Leisha
clude with suggestions about how we might make geno-
Whar?eld, and an anonymous reviewer.
cide “feel real” and motivate appropriate interventions. I
Address: Decision Research, 1201 Oak St., Suite 200, Eugene, OR,
shall also argue that we cannot only depend on our feel-
97401, USA. Email: pslovic@uoregon.edu
Photos from Darfur: Khaled El Fiqi/EPA/Corbis, reprinted with permis-
ings about these atrocities but, in addition, we must cre-
sion.
ate and commit ourselves to institutional and political re-

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
81
sponses based upon reasoned analysis of our moral obli-
Despite its morally unambiguous heinousness,
gations to stop the mass annihilation of innocent people.
despite overwhelming evidence of its occur-
Although I have attempted to fashion a compelling ex-
rence (for example, two days into the Rwandan
planation for genocide neglect that has implications for
carnage, the US Defense Intelligence Agency
action, the story is not complete. The psychological ac-
possessed satellite photos showing sprawling
count, while based on theory and recent empirical stud-
massacre sites), and despite the relative ease
ies, clearly needs further testing and development, partic-
with which it could have been abated (the UN
ularly to examine more directly the relationship between
commander in Rwanda felt a modest 5,500 re-
imagery, affect, and sensitivity to numbers. The action
inforcements, had they arrived promptly, could
implications remain to be elaborated by legal scholars and
have saved tens of thousands of lives) — de-
others.
spite all this, the world ignored genocide.
Unfortunately, Rwanda is not an isolated incident of
2 The lessons of genocide
indifference to mass murder and genocide. In a deeply
disturbing book titled A Problem from Hell: America and
Dubinsky (2005, p. 112) reports a news story from The
the Age of Genocide, journalist Samantha Power docu-
Gazette ( Montreal; 29 April 1994, at p. A8):
ments in meticulous detail many of the numerous geno-
cides that occurred during the past century, beginning
On April 28, 1994: the Associated Press (AP)
with the slaughter of two million Armenians by the Turks
bureau in Nairobi received a frantic call from
in 1915 (Power, 2003, see Table 1). In every instance,
a man in Kigali who described horri?c scenes
American response was inadequate. She concludes, “No
of concerted slaughter that had been unfold-
U.S. president has ever made genocide prevention a pri-
ing in the Rwandan capital “every day, ev-
ority, and no U.S. president has ever suffered politically
erywhere” for three weeks.
“I saw people
for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no coin-
hacked to death, even babies, month-old ba-
cidence that genocide rages on” (Power, 2003; p. xxi).
bies.. . . Anybody who tried to ?ee was killed in
the streets, and people who were hiding were
found and massacred.”
Table 1. A century of genocide.
Armenia (1915)
Dubinsky (2005, p. 113) further notes that:
Ukraine (1932–1933)
Nazi Germany/Holocaust (World War II)
The caller’s story was dispatched on the AP
newswire for the planet to read, and comple-
Bangladesh (1971)
mented an OXFAM statement from the same
Cambodia (1975–1979)
day declaring that the slaughter — the toll
Countries in the former Yugoslavia (1990s)
of which had already reached 200,000 —
Rwanda (1994)
’amounts to genocide.’ The following day, UN
Zimbabwe (2000)
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali ac-
knowledged the massacres and requested that
Congo (Today)
the Security Council deploy a signi?cant force,
Darfur (Today)
a week after the council had reduced the num-
? (Tomorrow)
ber of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda from 2,500
to 270.
A second lesson to emerge from the study of genocide
Yet the killings continued for another two and
is that media news coverage is similarly inadequate. The
a half months. By mid-July, when the govern-
past century has witnessed a remarkable transformation
ment was ?nally routed by exiled Tutsi rebels,
in the ability of the news media to learn about, and re-
the slaughter had been quelled, and 800,000
port on, world events. The vivid, dramatic coverage of
were dead, reinforcements from the United Na-
the December 2004 Tsunami in South Asia and the simi-
tions were only just arriving.
larly intimate and exhaustive reporting of the destruction
of lives and property by Hurricane Katrina in September
In his review of the book Conspiracy to Murder: The
2005 demonstrate how thorough and how powerful news
Rwandan Genocide (Melvern, 2004), Dubinsky (2005, p.
coverage of humanitarian disasters can be. But the in-
113) draws an ominous lesson from what happened in
tense coverage of recent natural disasters stands in sharp
Rwanda:
contrast to the lack of reporting on the ongoing genocides

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
82
in Darfur and other regions in Africa, in which hundreds
3.1 Affect, attention, information, and
of thousands of people have been murdered and mil-
meaning
lions forced to ?ee their burning villages and relocate in
refugee camps. According to the Tyndall Report, which
My search to identify a fundamental de?ciency in hu-
monitors American television coverage, ABC news al-
man psychology that causes us to ignore mass murder and
lotted a total of 18 minutes on the Darfur genocide in
genocide has led to a theoretical framework that describes
its nightly newscasts in 2004, NBC had only ?ve min-
the importance of emotions and feelings in guiding deci-
utes, and CBS only three minutes. Martha Stewart and
sion making and behavior. Perhaps the most basic form
Michael Jackson received vastly greater coverage, as did
of feeling is affect, the sense (not necessarily conscious)
Natalee Holloway, the American girl missing in Aruba.
that something is good or bad. Affective responses oc-
With the exception of the relentless reporting by New
cur rapidly and automatically — note how quickly you
York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, the print media
sense the feelings associated with the word “treasure” or
have done little better in covering Darfur.
the word “hate.” A large research literature in psychology
Despite lack of attention by the news media, U.S. gov-
documents the importance of affect in conveying mean-
ernment of?cials have known of the mass murders and
ing upon information and motivating behavior (Barrett
genocides that took place during the past century. Power
& Salovey, 2002; Clark & Fiske, 1982; Forgas, 2000;
(2003, p. 505) attempts to explain the failure to act on that
Le Doux, 1996; Mowrer, 1960; Tomkins, 1962, 1963;
knowledge as follows:
Zajonc, 1980). Without affect, information lacks mean-
ing and won’t be used in judgment and decision making
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Fin-
. . . the atrocities that were known remained ab-
ucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002).
stract and remote.. . . Because the savagery of
Affect plays a central role in what have come to be
genocide so de?es our everyday experience,
known as “dual-process theories” of thinking. As Sey-
many of us failed to wrap our minds around
mour Epstein (1994) has observed: “There is no dearth of
it.. . . Bystanders were thus able to retreat to the
evidence in every day life that people apprehend reality in
“twilight between knowing and not knowing.”
two fundamentally different ways, one variously labeled
[italics added]
intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and
experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal,
I shall argue below that the disengagement exempli?ed
and rational” (p. 710).
by failing to “wrap our minds” around genocide and re-
Table 2, adapted from Epstein, further compares these
treating to the “twilight between knowing and not know-
two systems, which Stanovich and West (2000) labeled
ing” is at the heart of our failure to act against genocide.
System 1 and System 2. One of the characteristics of
Samantha Power’s insightful explanation is supported by
the experiential system is its affective basis. Although
the research literature in cognitive and social psychology,
analysis is certainly important in many decision-making
as described in the sections to follow.
circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is gener-
ally a quicker, easier, and more ef?cient way to navigate
in a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous world.
3 Lessons from psychological re- Many theorists have given affect a direct and primary role
in motivating behavior. Epstein’s (1994) view on this is
search
as follows:
The experiential system is assumed to be intimately
In 1994, Roméo Dallaire, the commander of the tiny U.N.
associated with the experience of affect, . . . which
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, was forced to watch
refer[s] to subtle feelings of which people are often un-
helplessly as the slaughter he had foreseen and warned
aware. When a person responds to an emotionally sig-
about began to unfold. Writing of this massive humani-
ni?cant event . . . The experiential system automati-
tarian disaster a decade later he encouraged scholars “to
cally searches its memory banks for related events, in-
study this human tragedy and to contribute to our growing
cluding their emotional accompaniments. . . . If the
understanding of the genocide. If we do not understand
activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions and
what happened, how will we ever ensure it does not hap-
thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If the feel-
pen again?” Dallaire (2005, p.548).
ings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts
Researchers in psychology, economics, and a multidis-
anticipated to avoid the feelings. (p. 716)
ciplinary ?eld called behavioral decision theory have de-
Underlying the role of affect in the experiential system
veloped theories and ?ndings that, in part, begin to ex-
is the importance of images, to which positive or nega-
plain the pervasive neglect of genocide.
tive feelings become attached. Images in this system in-

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
83
clude not only visual images, important as these may be,
event and one instantly feels approval or dis-
but words, sounds, smells, memories, and products of our
approval.
imagination.
In his Nobel Prize Address, Daniel Kahneman notes
that the operating characteristics of System 1 are simi-
Imagery
lar to those of human perceptual processes (Kahneman,
2003). He points out that one of the functions of System
2 is to monitor the quality of the intuitive impressions
Feeling
Helping
formed by System 1. Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
suggest that this monitoring is typically rather lax and
Attention
allows many intuitive judgments to be expressed in be-
havior, including some that are erroneous. This point has
Figure 1: Imagery and attention produce feelings that mo-
important implications that will be discussed later.
tivate helping behavior.
In addition to positive and negative affect, more nu-
anced feelings such as empathy, sympathy, compassion,
sadness, pity, and distress have been found to be critical
for motivating people to help others (Coke, Batson, &
4 Affect, analysis, and the value of
McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). As Batson
(1990, p. 339) put it, “. . . considerable research suggests
human lives
that we are more likely to help someone in need when we
‘feel for’ that person . . . ”
How should we value the saving of human lives? If we
One last important psychological element in this story
believe that every human life is of equal value (a view
is attention. Just as feelings are necessary for motivat-
likely endorsed by System 2 thinking), the value of sav-
ing helping, attention is necessary for feelings. Research
ing N lives is N times the value of saving one life, as
shows that attention magni?es emotional responses to
represented by the linear function in Figure 2.
stimuli that are already emotionally charged (Fenske &
Raymond, 2006; Villeumier, Armony, & Dolan, 2003).
The psychological story can be summarized by the dia-
gram in Figure 1. Research to be described in this pa-
per demonstrates that imagery and feeling are lacking
o
when large losses of life are represented simply as num-
bers or statistics. Other research shows that attention
o
is greater for individuals and loses focus and intensity
when targeted at groups of people (Hamilton & Sherman,
o
1996; Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, & Sherman,
1999). The foibles of imagery and attention impact feel-
o
ings in a manner that can help explain apathy toward
Value of life saving
o
//
genocide.
1
2
4
6
N
Although the model sketched in Figure 1 could incor-
Number of lives
porate elements of System 1 thinking, System 2 thinking,
or both, a careful analysis by Haidt (2001, p. 818; see
also Hume, 1777/1960 for an earlier version of this argu-
Figure 2: A normative model for valuing the saving of
ment) gives priority to System 1. Haidt argues that moral
human lives. Every human life is of equal value.
intuitions (akin to System 1) precede moral judgments.
Speci?cally, he asserts that
An argument can also be made for a model in which
large losses of life are disproportionately more serious
. . . moral intuition can be de?ned as the sudden
because they threaten the social fabric and viability of a
appearance in consciousness of a moral judg-
community as depicted in Figure 3.
ment, including an affective valence (good-
How do we actually value humans lives? I shall present
bad, like-dislike) without any conscious aware-
evidence in support of two descriptive models linked to
ness of having gone through steps of searching,
affect and System 1 thinking that re?ect values for life-
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.
saving profoundly different from the normative models
Moral intuition is therefore . . . akin to aesthetic
shown in Figures 1 and 2. Both of these models are in-
judgment. One sees or hears about a social
structive with regard to apathy toward genocide.

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
84
Table 2. Two modes of thinking: Comparison of experiential and analytic systems (adapted from Epstein, 1994,
Copyright 1991, with permission from Guilford).
System 1: Experiential System
System 2: Analytic System
Affective: pleasure-pain oriented
Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible)
Connections by association
Connections by logical assessment
Behavior mediated by feelings from past experiences
Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
Encodes reality in images, metaphors, and narratives
Encodes reality in abstract symbols, words, and numbers
More rapid processing: oriented toward immediate action Slower processing: oriented toward delayed action
Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is believing”
Requires justi?cation via logic and evidence
tation of our affective system as she seeks to help us un-
derstand the humanity of the Chinese nation: “There are
1,198,500,000 people alive now in China. To get a feel for
what this means, simply take yourself — in all your sin-
gularity, importance, complexity, and love — and multi-
ply by 1,198,500,000. See? Nothing to it” (Dillard, 1999,
p. 47, italics added).
We quickly recognize that Dillard is joking when she
asserts “nothing to it.” We know, as she does, that we
are incapable of feeling the humanity behind the number
1,198,500,000. The circuitry in our brain is not up to
this task. This same incapacity is echoed by Nobel prize
Value of life saving
winning biochemist Albert Szent Gyorgi as he struggles
to comprehend the possible consequences of nuclear war:
“I am deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would
//
risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about the
1
2
N
possible pulverization of our big cities, with a hundred
Number of lives
million dead. I am unable to multiply one man’s suffering
by a hundred million.”
Figure 3:
Another normative model:
Large losses
There is considerable evidence that our affective re-
threaten the viability of the group or society (as with
sponses and the resulting value we place on saving human
genocide).
lives may follow the same sort of “psychophysical func-
tion” that characterizes our diminished sensitivity to a
4.1 The psychophysical model
wide range of perceptual and cognitive entities — bright-
ness, loudness, heaviness, and money — as their under-
Affect is a remarkable mechanism that enabled humans
lying magnitudes increase.
to survive the long course of evolution. Before there
What psychological principles lie behind this insensi-
were sophisticated analytic tools such as probability the-
tivity? In the 19th century, E. H. Weber and Gustav Fech-
ory, scienti?c risk assessment, and cost/bene?t calculus,
ner discovered a fundamental psychophysical principle
humans used their senses, honed by experience, to deter-
that describes how we perceive changes in our environ-
mine whether the animal lurking in the bushes was safe
ment. They found that people’s ability to detect changes
to approach or the murky water in the pond was safe to
in a physical stimulus rapidly decreases as the magnitude
drink. Simply put, System 1 thinking evolved to protect
of the stimulus increases (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860).
individuals and their small family and community groups
What is known today as “Weber’s law” states that in or-
from present, visible, immediate dangers. This affective
der for a change in a stimulus to become just noticeable,
system did not evolve to help us respond to distant, mass
a ?xed percentage must be added. Thus, perceived differ-
murder. As a result, System 1 thinking responds to large-
ence is a relative matter. To a small stimulus, only a small
scale atrocities in ways that are less than desirable.
amount must be added to be noticeable. To a large stim-
Fundamental qualities of human behavior are, of
ulus, a large amount must be added. Fechner proposed a
course, recognized by others besides scientists. Ameri-
logarithmic law to model this nonlinear growth of sensa-
can writer Annie Dillard, cleverly demonstrates the limi-
tion. Numerous empirical studies by S. S. Stevens (1975)

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
85
have demonstrated that the growth of sensory magnitude
Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich
(?) is best ?t by a power function of the stimulus magni-
(1997) documented this potential for diminished sensitiv-
tude ?, ? = ??, where the exponent ? is typically less
ity to the value of life — i.e., “psychophysical numbing”
than one for measurements of phenomena such as loud-
— by evaluating people’s willingness to fund various life-
ness, brightness, and even the value of money (Galanter,
saving medical treatments. In a study involving a hy-
1962). For example, if the exponent is 0.5 as it is in some
pothetical grant funding agency, respondents were asked
studies of perceived brightness, a light that is four times
to indicate the number of lives a medical research insti-
the intensity of another light will be judged only twice as
tute would have to save to merit receipt of a $10 million
bright.
grant. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents raised their
minimum bene?t requirements to warrant funding when
there was a larger at-risk population, with a median value
of 9,000 lives needing to be saved when 15,000 were at
risk, compared to a median of 100,000 lives needing to
be saved out of 290,000 at risk. By implication, respon-
dents saw saving 9,000 lives in the “smaller” population
as more valuable than saving ten times as many lives in
the largest.
Several other studies in the domain of life-saving inter-
Value of life saving
ventions have documented similar psychophysical numb-
//
ing or proportional reasoning effects (Baron, 1997; Bar-
1
2
N
tels & Burnett, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997;
Number of lives
Friedrich et al., 1999; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Ubel
et al., 2001). For example, Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997)
Figure 4: A psychophysical model describing how the
also found that people were less willing to send aid that
saving of human lives may actually be valued.
would save 1500 lives in Rwandan refugee camps as the
size of the camps’ at-risk population increased. Friedrich
Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem to be de-
et al. (1999) found that people required more lives to be
signed to sensitize us to small changes in our environ-
saved to justify mandatory antilock brakes on new cars
ment, possibly at the expense of making us less able to
when the alleged size of the at-risk pool (annual braking-
detect and respond to large changes. As the psychophys-
related deaths) increased.
ical research indicates, constant increases in the magni-
These diverse strategies of lifesaving demonstrate that
tude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller
the proportion of lives saved often carries more weight
changes in response. Applying this principle to the valu-
than the number of lives saved when people evaluate in-
ing of human life suggests that a form of psychophys-
terventions. Thus, extrapolating from Fetherstonhaugh et
ical numbing may result from our inability to appreci-
al., one would expect that, in separate evaluations, there
ate losses of life as they become larger (see Figure 4).
would be more support for saving 80% of 100 lives at risk
The function in Figure 4 represents a value structure in
than for saving 20% of 1,000 lives at risk. This is consis-
which the importance of saving one life is great when it
tent with an affective (System 1) account, in which the
is the ?rst, or only, life saved, but diminishes marginally
number of lives saved conveys little affect but the propor-
as the total number of lives saved increases. Thus, psy-
tion saved carries much feeling: 80% is clearly “good”
chologically, the importance of saving one life is dimin-
and 20% is “poor.”
ished against the background of a larger threat — we will
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2004),
likely not “feel” much different, nor value the difference,
drawing upon the ?nding that proportions appear to con-
between saving 87 lives and saving 88, if these prospects
vey more feeling than do numbers of lives, predicted (and
are presented to us separately.
found) that college students, in a between-groups design,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have incorporated this
would more strongly support an airport-safety measure
psychophysical principle of decreasing sensitivity into
expected to save 98% of 150 lives at risk than a measure
prospect theory, a descriptive account of decision making
expected to save 150 lives. Saving 150 lives is diffusely
under uncertainty. A major element of prospect theory is
good, and therefore somewhat hard to evaluate, whereas
the value function, which relates subjective value to ac-
saving 98% of something is clearly very good because it
tual gains or losses. When applied to human lives, the
is so close to the upper bound on the percentage scale, and
value function implies that the subjective value of saving
hence is highly weighted in the support judgment. Subse-
a speci?c number of lives is greater for a smaller tragedy
quent reduction of the percentage of 150 lives that would
than for a larger one.
be saved to 95%, 90%, and 85% led to reduced support

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
86
the numbers. As nature writer and conservationist Rick
Bass (1996) observes in his plea to conserve the Yaak
Valley in Montana,
The numbers are important, and yet they are not every-
12
thing. For whatever reasons, images often strike us more
powerfully, more deeply than numbers. We seem unable
8
to hold the emotions aroused by numbers for nearly as
6
long as those of images. We quickly grow numb to the
4
facts and the math. (p. 87)
2
Images seem to be the key to conveying affect and
0
Mean support (out of 20)
meaning, though some imagery is more powerful than
150
98%
85%
90%
85%
others. After struggling to appreciate the mass of human-
Number and percent of 150 lives saved
ity in China, Annie Dillard turned her thoughts to April
30, 1991, when 138,000 people drowned in Bangladesh.
At dinner, she mentions to her daughter — seven years
Figure 5: Airport safety study: Saving a percentage of
old — that it is hard to imagine 138,000 people drown-
150 lives receives higher support ratings than does saving
ing. “No, it’s easy,” says her daughter. “Lots and lots of
150 lives. Note. Bars describe mean responses to the
dots in blue water” (Dillard, 1999; p.131). Again we are
question, “How much would you support the proposed
confronted with impoverished meaning associated with
measure to purchase the new equipment?” The response
large losses of life.
scale ranged from 0 (would not support at all) to 20 (very
Other images may be more effective. Organizers of
strong support; Slovic et al., 2002).
a rally designed to get Congress to do something about
38,000 deaths a year from handguns piled 38,000 pairs
of shoes in a mound in front of the Capitol (Associated
for the safety measure but each of these percentage con-
Press, 1994). Students at a middle school in Tennessee,
ditions still garnered a higher mean level of support than
struggling to comprehend the magnitude of the holocaust,
did the Save 150 Lives Condition (Figure 5).
collected 6 million paper clips as a centerpiece for a
This research on psychophysical numbing is impor-
memorial (Schroeder & Schroeder-Hildebrand, 2004).
tant because it demonstrates that feelings necessary for
Probably the most important image to represent a hu-
motivating lifesaving actions are not congruent with the
man life is that of a single human face. Journalist Paul
normative models in Figures 2 and 3. The nonlinearity
Neville writes about the need to probe beneath the statis-
displayed in Figure 4 is consistent with the disregard of
tics of joblessness, homelessness, mental illness, and
incremental loss of life against a background of a large
poverty in his home state of Oregon, in order to discover
tragedy. However it does not fully explain the utter col-
the people behind the numbers — who they are, what they
lapse of compassion represented by apathy toward geno-
look like, how they sound, what they feel, what hopes and
cide because it implies that the response to initial loss
fears they harbor. He concludes: “I don’t know when we
of life will be strong and maintained as the losses in-
became a nation of statistics. But I know that the path
crease. Evidence for a second descriptive model, one bet-
to becoming a nation — and a community — of people,
ter suited to explain the collapse of compassion, follows.
is remembering the faces behind the numbers” (Neville,
2004). After September 11, 2001, many newspapers pub-
5 Numbers and numbness: Images lished biographical sketches of the victims, with photos,
a dozen or so each day until all had been featured.
and feeling
When it comes to eliciting compassion, the identi?ed
individual victim, with a face and a name, has no peer.
The behavioral theories and data con?rm what keen ob-
Psychological experiments demonstrate this clearly but
servers of human behavior have long known. Numerical
we all know it as well from personal experience and me-
representations of human lives do not necessarily convey
dia coverage of heroic efforts to save individual lives.
the importance of those lives. All too often the num-
One of the most publicized events occurred when an 18-
bers represent dry statistics, “human beings with the tears
month-old child, Jessica McClure, fell 22 feet into a nar-
dried off,” that lack feeling and fail to motivate action
row abandoned well shaft. The world watched tensely as
(Slovic & Slovic, 2004). How can we impart the feelings
rescuers worked for 2½ days to rescue her. Almost two
that are needed for rational action? There have been a va-
decades later, the joyous moment of Jessica’s rescue is
riety of attempts to do this that may be instructive. Most
portrayed with resurrection-like overtones on a website
of these involve highlighting the images that lie beneath
devoted to pictures of the event (see Figure 6).

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
87
the emotional response in the Netherlands to the shooting
of a sparrow that trespassed onto the site of a domino
competition and knocked over 23,000 tiles. A tribute
website was set up and attracted tens of thousands of hits.
The head of the Dutch Bird Protection Agency, appearing
on television, said that though it was a very sad incident,
it had been blown out of all proportion. “I just wish we
could channel all this energy that went into one dead spar-
row into saving the species,” he said (BBC News, 2005).
Going beyond faces, names, and other simple images,
writers and artists have long recognized the power of nar-
rative to bring feelings and meaning to tragedy. Bar-
bara Kingsolver (1996) makes this point eloquently in her
book High Tide in Tucson:
The power of ?ction is to create empathy. If
lifts you away from your chair and stuffs you
gently down inside someone else’s point of
view. . . . A newspaper could tell you that one
hundred people, say, in an airplane, or in Israel,
or in Iraq, have died today. And you can think
to yourself, “How very sad,” then turn the page
and see how the Wildcats fared. But a novel
could take just one of those hundred lives and
show you exactly how it felt to be that person
rising from bed in the morning, watching the
desert light on the tile of her doorway and on
the curve of her daughter’s cheek. You could
taste that person’s breakfast, and love her fam-
Figure
6:
The
rescue
of
baby
Jessica.
ily, and sort through her worries as your own,
Source:
“The Baby Jessica Rescue Web Page,”
and know that a death in that household will be
http://www.caver.net/j/jrescue.html,
the end of the only life that someone will ever
April 14, 2007.
have. As important as yours. As important as
mine. (p. 231)
But the face need not even be human to motivate pow-
Showing insight into the workings of our affective sys-
erful intervention. In 2001, an epidemic of foot and
tem as keen as any derived from the psychologist’s labo-
mouth disease raged throughout the United Kingdom.
ratory, Kingsolver continues:
Millions of cattle were slaughtered to stop the spread.
Confronted with knowledge of dozens of apparently
The disease waned and animal rights activists demanded
random disasters each day, what can a human heart do
an end to further killing. But the killings continued un-
but slam its doors? No mortal can grieve that much. We
til a newspaper photo of a cute 12-day-old calf named
didn’t evolve to cope with tragedy on a global scale. Our
Phoenix being targeted for slaughter led the government
defense is to pretend there’s no thread of event that con-
to change its policy. Individual canine lives are highly
nects us, and that those lives are somehow not precious
valued, too. A dog stranded aboard a tanker adrift in
and real like our own. It’s a practical strategy, to some
the Paci?c was the subject of one of the most costly
ends, but the loss of empathy is also the loss of humanity,
animal rescue efforts ever. An Associated Press article
and that’s no small tradeoff.
discloses that the cost of rescue attempts had already
Art is the antidote that can call us back from the edge
reached $48,000 and the Coast Guard was prepared to
of numbness, restoring the ability to feel for another. (p.
spend more, while critics charged that the money could
231–232)
be better spent on children that go to bed hungry (Song,
Although Kingsolver is describing the power of ?ction,
2002).
non?ction narrative can be just as effective. The Diary of
In a bizarre incident that, nonetheless, demonstrates
Anne Frank and Elie Weisel’s Night certainly convey, in a
the special value of an individual life, an article in the
powerful way, the meaning of the Holocaust statistic “six
BBC News online edition of November 19, 2005, reports
million dead.”

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 2007
Psychic numbing and genocide
88
Statistical lives
• Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million children.
• In Zambia, severe rainfall de?cits have resulted in a 42% drop in maize production from 2000. As a
result, an estimated 3 million Zambians face hunger.
• Four million Angolans — one third of the population — have been forced to ?ee their homes.
• More than 11 million people in Ethiopia need immediate food assistance.
Identi?able lives
Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, is desperately poor and faces a
threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her life will be changed for the
better as a result of your ?nancial gift. With your support, and the support of
other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s family and
other members of the community to help feed her, provide her with education,
as well as basic medical care and hygiene education.
Figure 7: Donating money to save statistical and identi?ed lives. Reprinted from Small et al. (2007). Copyright (2007),
with permission from Elsevier. (Photograph has been altered.)
6 The collapse of compassion
ident outside the laboratory. People are much more will-
ing to aid identi?ed individuals than unidenti?ed or sta-
Vivid images of recent natural disasters in South Asia and
tistical victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a; Schelling, 1968;
the American Gulf Coast, and stories of individual vic-
Small & Loewenstein 2003, 2005; Jenni & Loewenstein,
tims, brought to us through relentless, courageous, and
1997). Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic (2007) gave peo-
intimate news coverage, certainly unleashed a tidal wave
ple leaving a psychological experiment the opportunity to
of compassion and humanitarian aid from all over the
contribute up to $5 of their earnings to Save the Children.
world. Private donations to the victims of the Decem-
The study consisted of three separate conditions: (1)
ber 2004 tsunami exceeded $1 billion. Charities such as
identi?able victim, (2) statistical victims, and (3) identi?-
Save the Children have long recognized that it is better
able victim with statistical information. The information
to endow a donor with a single, named child to support
provided for the identi?able and statistical conditions is
than to ask for contributions to the bigger cause. Perhaps
shown in Figure 7. Participants in each condition were
there is hope that vivid, personalized media coverage of
told that “any money donated will go toward relieving
genocide could motivate intervention.
the severe food crisis in Southern Africa and Ethiopia.”
The donations in fact went to Save the Children, but they
were earmarked speci?cally for Rokia in Conditions 1
and 3 and not speci?cally earmarked in Condition 2. The
$2.00
average donations are presented in Figure 8. Donations
in response to the identi?ed individual, Rokia, were far
greater than donations in response to the statistical por-
trayal of the food crisis. Most important, however, and
$1.00
most discouraging, was the fact that coupling the statis-
tical realities with Rokia’s story signi?cantly reduced the
Donations in dollars
$0
contributions to Rokia. Alternatively, one could say that
Identifiable
Statistical
Identifiable
using Rokia’s story to “put a face behind the statistical
life
life
with statistics
problem” did not do much to increase donations (the dif-
ference between the mean donations of $1.43 and $1.14
Figure 8: Mean donations. Reprinted from Small et al.
was not statistically reliable).
(2007), Copyright (2007), with permission from Elsevier.
Small et al. also measured feelings of sympathy toward
Perhaps. But again we should look to research to assess
the cause (Rokia or the statistical victims). These feelings
these possibilities. Numerous experiments have demon-
were most strongly correlated with donations when peo-
strated the “identi?able victim effect” which is also so ev-
ple faced an identi?able victim.

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