P R E P R I N T N O T I C E
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I N F O R M A T I O N
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miriam.taverniers@ugent.be
Interpersonal grammatical metaphor
as double scoping and double grounding
Miriam Taverniers
Ghent University ABSTRACT
This article focusses on the notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as
understood in Halliday’s model of systemic functional linguistics (SFL). First, the
concept of grammatical metaphor as developed in SFL is reviewed and its
relation to comparable concepts developed in other linguistic schools is specified.
On the basis of a general semiotic-functional characterization of the interpersonal
sign in terms of scoping and grounding, I will then define interpersonal
grammatical metaphor as involving a doubling of semiosis, viz. a doubling of
scoping in its structural-realizational dimension, and a doubling of grounding in
its semantic-functional dimension.
KEYWORDS: metaphor; grammatical metaphor; systemic functional linguistics;
cognitive grammar; semiotics; interpersonal meaning; grounding, instantiation;
parentheticals.
1. Introduction: ‘Grammatical metaphor’?1
Of the various expressions that have recently received a lot of attention in
approaches to interpersonal grammar, including the studies presented in this
volume, a large group would be considered as instances of what Halliday has
called interpersonal ‘grammatical metaphor’. This group includes expressions
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Miriam Taverniers: Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as double scoping and double grounding (2004)
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Word such as those underlined in the non-italicized sentences in the following
examples:
(1) a. However, if you imagine you can now buy them back I would advise you
to forget all about it. [BNC: HGD, 4186]2
b. It is advised that the choice of issue should reflect the choice of the two
key questions as indicated above i.e. relate either to the problem of
evil/suffering in the world and/ or the topic of the value of human life.
[BNC: J27, 443]
c. The exercises are detailed below; it is advisable to practise each exercise
individually before attempting the whole routine. [BNC: A0W, 189]
d. In order to achieve satisfactory returns from such investments, it is
necessary to move ‘downstream’. [BNC: HB1, 128]
e. Kyle, can you open your mouth so we can shove this in? [BNC: KDV,
4236]
f.
Open your mouth, please, so that we can shove this in. (2) a. Yes, I, yes I think Andrea’s put her finger on it. [BNC: HIJ, 220]
b. It might perhaps be assumed that families sending girls to be compositors
would be those where there was some interest in books, but the evidence
is quite fragmentary. [BNC: EVJ, 1149]
c. Indeed, it is arguable that the different speeds of financial liberalisation
are a prime cause of world trade and savings imbalances. [BNC: AAA,
125]
d. Since the report is expected to form the basis for an investigation and
possible action by the Serious Fraud Office, it is highly unlikely that it will
be published in full. [BNC: A1S, 465]
e.
It will certainly be held next year. [BNC: HD1, 364]
As can be gathered from these examples, it is such types of expressions, amongst
others, that have been taken up in appraisal theory (see the second part of this
issue), especially under the heading of ‘engagement’ (Martin 1997). This
approach offers a detailed lexical-semantic categorization of such expressions as
evaluations (‘appraisals’) of propositions and proposals (see especially Martin’s
approach to appraisal theory), or it focusses on the role such expressions have in
negotiating inter-subjective positions in a speech exchange (see especially White’s
elaboration of appraisal theory). Expressions such as the examples given above
also play a central role in McGregor’s semiotic approach to interpersonal
grammar, which is centred around the notions of scoping and framing, and which
explores such types of expressions in terms of the interclausal interpersonal
relationship of ‘conjugation’ they construe.
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Miriam Taverniers: Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as double scoping and double grounding (2004)
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Word However, although it is especially such expressions – expressions that
Halliday has brought to attention under the heading of ‘interpersonal
grammatical metaphor’ (or ‘interpersonal metaphor’) in the early 1980s – that
form the focus of the study of appraisal and the study of scoping in language, the
notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’ is only rarely mentioned, and does not play
any significant role in these more recent studies of interpersonal meanings and
constructions. The very concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ itself is even looked
upon with scepticism by the proponent of the semiotic theory of scoping and
framing (see McGregor 1990: 41).
A possible explanation for this relative neglect of grammatical metaphor in
the two frameworks mentioned above, is that, even though grammatical
metaphor has been interpreted as one of the most significant innovations in
systemic functional linguistics (SFL) in the past two decades (Butler 1989: 5,
Martin 1992: 490), the specific nature of its internal organisation as a construction
type – i.e. a linguistic sign seen as a coupling of form and meaning – has never
been characterized in precise terms. This paper is intended as first step towards
such a semiotic-functional characterization of interpersonal grammatical
metaphor.
I will propose to define interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling
of semiosis: a
doubling of scoping in structural terms, and a
doubling of grounding in
semantic terms. This characterization builds on a refined definition of the
interpersonal sign as such, in which the concepts of ‘scoping’ and ‘grounding’
play a fundamental role as structural and semantic notions, respectively.
The argument will be built up in three steps. In a first move, the initial
motivation for introducing the concept of ‘interpersonal grammatical metaphor’
into SFL will be reconsidered (Section 2), and on the basis of this, I will justify the
need for a semiotic characterization and specify the approach to such a
characterization that will be taken in this paper (Section 3). As a second step, the
nature of the interpersonal sign in general – whether metaphorical or not – will be
looked into (Section 4). The final move will then focus on defining ‘interpersonal
grammatical metaphor’ and its various sub-types (Section 5).
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Word 2. Whence interpersonal grammatical metaphor?
The aim of this section is twofold. [1] First, it serves to explain the introduction of
a concept such as interpersonal grammatical metaphor into SFL against the
background of the design of SFL as a functional model of language. As such, this
section also forms an appraisal of the notion of grammatical metaphor – a
linguistic concept which is unique to the SFL framework. [2] Although the
concept of grammatical metaphor itself hardly has any equivalents in other
theories, distinct linguistic phenomena covered by this concept have received
extensive treatment in other frameworks, albeit never in the integrative sense
offered by the notion of grammatical metaphor. A second aim of this section is
thus to contextualize the systemic functional concept into a wider theoretical and
descriptive background.
2.1. The interpersonal component in SFL Before turning to the introduction of interpersonal grammatical metaphor into
SFL, I will consider the theoretical context, i.e. the systemic functional
conception of the interpersonal component of language, into which Halliday
incorporated the notion of interpersonal metaphor.
In Halliday’s (1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) version of SFL, the
interpersonal organisation of an utterance is structured in terms of a Mood +
Residue pattern. The Mood comprises the Subject of the clause, the Finite (which
encodes grammatical number, primary tense and modality), polarity markers, and
modal adverbs (if present). In this conception, it is the Mood element which is
seen as carrying the burden of the utterance as an interactive event, and hence, it
is through different options available for the Mood element that the interpersonal
component is manifested in language.
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Word Figure
1: Primary interpersonal systems in Halliday’s model,
and the location of two types of grammatical metaphor in these systems
The different systems pertaining to options that are realized in the Mood
element are specified on two different levels: the level of SPEECH FUNCTION on the
one hand, and the level of MOOD and MODALITY on the other hand (see
Figure 1).3 The system of SPEECH FUNCTION deals with the negotiation of
meaning in discourse, it focusses on an utterance as a linguistic exchange, i.e. on
the way in which an utterance is (to be) taken in a speech interaction. It is
organized around two primary dimensions, as shown in Figure 1. First,
what is
being negotiated in a speech interaction is either information or ‘goods-&-
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Word services’, i.e. the accomplishment of an extra-linguistic task (see Halliday 1994).
For example:
(3) a. Where is John?
b. Come here immediately!
(3a) illustrates an exchange of [information]: I ask information, whereas (3b) is an
exchange of [goods-&-services]: I ask for a service to be done. Thibault (1995:
81ff.) speaks of a contrast between a “semiotic-discursive” versus a “physical-
material” negotiation (However, we will return to the interaction between a
semiotic-discursive and a physical-material encoding in discussing grammatical
metaphor below; see Section 5.). Davidse (1998: 152) views language as being
exchanged either on an “informational axis” or on a “volitional axis”. I will refer
to this dimension as the TYPE OF EXCHANGE.
The second dimension of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION focusses on
dialogue as a ‘give-and-take’ interaction. This is formalized in the system of
DIRECTION and its options [give] and [demand]:
Where is John? illustrates a
demand for information, in
John is in London, information is given. The
combination of the options in the systems of TYPE OF EXCHANGE and DIRECTION
leads to four primary categories of speech function: ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘offer’
and ‘command’, as shown in Figure 1.
The systems of MOOD and MODALITY deal with the lexicogrammatical
setup of an utterance. MOOD is based on the traditional distinction between
clause-types in terms of, for example, declarative, indicative, interrogative,
imperative moods. The system of MODALITY (see Figure 1) comprises further
options which are available for expressions with [indicative] ([interrogative] or
[declarative]) mood. It comprises three major sub-systems. The TYPE OF
MODALITY can be [modalization] or [modulation], which more or less correspond
to the traditional notions of epistemic modality and deontic modality. The modal
VALUE is [high], [low], or [median]. For example,
She might come by train realizes
a low probability,
You must come! realizes a high obligation. The third system, viz.
ORIENTATION, refers to the realization of modal meanings through modal
operators, which are categorized as [subjective], or through modal adverbs, which
are considered as [objective] expressions of modality.
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Word It is into this model of interpersonal grammar that Halliday introduced the
notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor. Two types of interpersonal
metaphor are distinguished, viz. metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality,
whose respective locations in the overall interpersonal system are highlighted in
Figure 1. The remainder of this section will focus on how the introduction of
grammatical metaphor into the model of interpersonal grammar was initially
motivated in SFL.
2.2. Metaphors of mood The term ‘grammatical metaphor’ is based on an earlier distinction made by
Halliday between congruent and incongruent grammar, and it is incongruent
expressions which later came to be reconceived as grammatical metaphors. The
notion of incongruence is first highlighted in Halliday’s (1984) paper called
“Language as code and language as behaviour”,4 in which he focusses on the
relationship between system (language as code, as a potential) and process
(language as actual behaviour) in the interpersonal component of language. The
general aim of this paper is to show how systems are actualized in dialogue, and
how an analysis of dialogue leads to a refinement of the system. The starting
point is the interpersonal model as described above and set out in Figure 1, and
the concentration on the relationship between system and process turns out to be
a focus on the relationship between the options that are systemically possible, in
the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and the realization of these options in the
lexicogrammar of MOOD. A congruent realization is defined as an
unmarked,
typical realization, or a realization which “will be selected in the absence of any
good reason for selecting another one” (Halliday 1984: 14).
Thus Halliday claims that a ‘statement’ is most congruently realized by
means of the [indicative:declarative] type of MOOD, and the most congruent
expression of a ‘question’ is a sentence of the [indicative:interrogative] type.
Incongruent types of expressions are especially important in the area of [goods-&-
services]. In general, Halliday notes, there is a greater tendency to incongruence
in the exchange of [goods-&-services]. According to him, this is hardly surprising:
since information is inherently linguistic, it is only natural that language has clear
categories, [declarative] and [interrogative], to express different types of exchange
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Word of [information]. The exchange of [goods-&-services], by contrast, takes place
outside the system of language, and as such, it is not dependent on an expression
in language. As a result, language does not have a clearly defined type of pattern
which is
specialized for the expression of an exchange of [goods-&-services].
This can be seen most clearly in the area of ‘offers’: there is no single type
of expression in English which can be regarded as a congruent realization of an
‘offer’. various possible verbalizations can be used, such as the following:
(4) a. Well, here you are, it’s twenty-five pounds!’; said Joe delightedly,
handing the bag to my sister. [BNC: FPU, 702]
b. Would you like a drop of tea while you’re waitin’? [BNC: CFY, 269]
c. Shall I go and put the kettle on? [BNC: KBB, 9480]
For ‘commands’, the [imperative] can be regarded as the unmarked, congruent
expression, but, Halliday argues, non-congruent forms are more often used to
express the ‘command’ function. This variety is illustrated in examples (1a)–(1f)
above.
In his 1985 overview of SFL, Halliday re-defines incongruent types of
expressions as grammatical metaphors. In contrast with another type of metaphor
which we will focus on below, examples such as sentences (1a)–(1e) and those in
(4) above are termed
metaphors of mood. From the above discussion, it is clear that
metaphors of mood, as defined by Halliday, have at least two central
characteristics, which are interdependent: (1) they are based on the relationship
between the speech functional categories of ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘command’
and ‘offer’ on the one hand, and the expression of these categories through
different MOOD types on the other hand; and (2) the distinction between an
exchange of [information] and an exchange of [goods-&-services] plays an
important role in the recognition and definition of metaphors of mood.
2.3. Metaphors of modality A second general type of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as defined by
Halliday pertains to the area of modality. Halliday claims that modal meanings
are most congruently expressed by modal elements in the clause, i.e. modal
operators and adjuncts (
certainly, probably and the like).
Metaphors of modality diverge from the congruent pattern in that, here, a modal meaning is construed
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Word outside the proposition that is being modally assessed. This is made possible in
two types of constructions: projecting mental processes, as illustrated in examples
(1a) and (1b) above, and relational processes, as in examples (1c) and (1d). In
order to accommodate metaphorical expressions in the system of MODALITY,
Halliday introduces an additional sub-system with the options [implicit] and
[explicit] (later called MANIFESTATION by Matthiessen 1993). Thus, metaphors of
modality, in which a modal meaning is construed by means of an ‘additional’
construction outside the proposition assessed, are defined as [explicit] realizations
of modality, as shown in Figure 1. The distinction between metaphors based on
mental processes and those based on relational processes is captured by the
contrast in the simultaneous system of ORIENTATION, viz. between [objective] and
[subjective] expressions of modality:
I think she knows is defined as [subjective],
whereas
It’s very likely that she knows is [objective] (see Figure 1).
It is clear that Halliday’s notion of interpersonal metaphor of modality
provides yet another perspective on a topic that has received much attention in
various research traditions. It comes under different headings, whose names are
inspired by the meaning or function of the expressions at hand (e.g.
propositional attitudes,
epistemic qualification,
evidentiality), or motivated by the structural position
of these expressions (e.g.
parentheticals).
Criteria which Halliday adduces to define interpersonal metaphors of
modality are similar to features that have been brought up in connection with
these expressions in other frameworks. The two most important of these are the
following. First, the proposition that is being modally assessed is the major
[information] that is being negotiated in the dialogue, and not the evaluating
expression, even though it constitutes the matrix clause. This is shown by the fact
that it is the evaluated proposition which is being taken up by a question tag
(Halliday 1985: 333; see also Aijmer 1972: 47, 52; Nuyts 1990: 583).5 Compare
(5a) which illustrates a metaphorical reading to (5b), which shows a literal
interpretation.
(5) a. I think Jane knows, doesn’t she?
b. I think Jane knows, don’t I?
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Word A second feature is the possibility of transferred negation (Quirk et al. 1985: 1033;
referred to as negative-raising in formal approaches). In other words, when the
proposition assessed is negative, the negation can either be expressed in the
proposition itself (6a), or in the evaluating expression.6 In the latter case it is
regarded as being ‘transferred’ (from the subordinate clause to the evaluating
expression, i.e. the main clause, see example (6b)) (Halliday 1985: 333; see also
Bublitz 1992):
(6) a. I think Jane doesn’t know.
b. I don’t think Jane knows.
2.4. A general feature of interpersonal metaphor: Semantic tension The metaphorical nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor has been
specified in terms of a tension between a ‘literal’ and a ‘figurative’ interpretation,
i.e. a tension which is equally present in the traditional notion of (lexical)
metaphor. This feature, which has especially been pointed out by Martin (e.g.
Martin 1995: 37; 1997: 26–27), has not gone unnoticed in other frameworks (see
Aijmer 1980: 13ff). An interpersonal grammatical metaphor can have at least two
uptakes in dialogue, i.e. it can be interpreted metaphorically or literally. This can
be illustrated by means of the following examples given by Martin (1995: 39) and
quoted from well-known detective stories:
(7) Commander Dalgliesh: “You were watching her closely all the time,
Inspector? Are you absolutely sure that Miss Foley couldn’t have replaced
the keys in the box without your seeing her?”
Inspector Blakelock: “No, sir. That would have been quite impossible.”
(8) Sherlock Holmes with Dr. Watson.
“I’m inclined to think ---” said I.
“I should do so,” Sherlock Holmes remarked impatiently.
I believe that I am one of the most long-suffering of mortals; but I’ll admit
that I was annoyed by the sardonic interruption. “Really, Holmes,” said I
severely, “you are a little trying at times.”
In the first extract, Blakelock takes a metaphorical reading of
Are you absolutely sure …, and his answer thus takes up the subordinate proposition (
Miss Foley couldn’t have placed the keys in the box …) as the major move of the exchange – the
information that is being negotiated – and responds to this proposition: ‘no, that
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Document Outline
- 1. Introduction: Grammatical metaphor?
- 2. Whence interpersonal grammatical metaphor?
- 2.1. The interpersonal component in SFL
- 2.2. Metaphors of mood
- 2.3. Metaphors of modality
- 2.4. A general feature of interpersonal metaphor: Semantic tension
- 3. Interim conclusion and outlook
- 4. The nature of the interpersonal sign
- 4.1. The expression side of the linguistic sign: Scoping, prosody, operator-status
- 4.2. The content side of the linguistic sign: Grounding
- 4.3. Conclusion: Primary scoping and primary grounding
- 5. Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis
- 5.1. Metaphors in the exchange of information
- 5.2. Metaphors in the exchange of goods and services
- 5.3. Interpersonal metaphors: Their semantics and their modes of expression
- 6. Conclusion
- References
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