Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness: Are they conscious and does it matter?

Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 28–41.
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness: Are they
conscious and does it matter?
Mark C. Price?
Elisabeth Norman
Psychology Faculty
University of Bergen and
University of Bergen
Haukeland University Hospital
Abstract
Decision making research often dichotomises between more deliberative, cognitive processes and more heuristic,
intuitive and emotional processes. We argue that within this two-systems framework (e.g., Kahneman, 2002) there is
ambiguity over how to map the System 1/System 2 axis, and the notion of intuitive processing, onto the distinction
between conscious and non-conscious processes. However the convergent concepts of experience-based metacognitive
judgements (Koriat, 2007) and of fringe consciousness (Mangan, 1993) can clarify intuitive processing as an informative
conscious feeling without conscious access to the antecedents of the feeling. We stress that these intuitive feelings can
be used to guide behaviour in a controlled and contextually sensitive manner that would not be permitted by purely
non-conscious in?uences on behaviour. An outline is provided for how to empirically recognise these intuitive feelings.
This is illustrated with an example from research on implicit learning where intuitive feelings may play an important role
in peoples’ decisions and judgements. Finally we suggest that our approach to understanding intuitive feelings softens
rather than reinforces the two-systems dichotomy.
Key words: intuition, feeling, fringe consciousness, metacognition, two-systems model, decision making, judgment.
1 Introduction
(1994) seminal paper, there is considerable ambiguity
over how to map the System 1/System 2 axis and the no-
The in?uential two-systems framework, within decision
tion of intuitive processing onto the distinction between
making and judgement research, dichotomises between
conscious and non-conscious processes. Our aim in this
processes that are characterised as heuristic, affective,
paper is to outline this ambiguity, to argue why clari?-
and intuitive, versus those that are seen as more delib-
cation is important, to describe how the clari?cation can
erative, cognitive, and rational. Following Stanovich and
be made both theoretically and empirically, and to sug-
West (2000) we refer to these supposedly separable sys-
gest how consideration of the consciousness dimension
tems as System 1 (S1) and System 2 (S2) respectively.
can soften the two-systems dichotomy.
Kahneman (2002) declares there is considerable agree-
ment over the properties of these systems which for S1
include being fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and
dif?cult to control or modify, and which for S2 include
2 Consciousness in the two-systems
being slower, serial, effortful, deliberately controlled, and
framework
relatively ?exible. (For a detailed recent review of sug-
gested S1 and S2 properties across the literature, see
Evans, 2008.) Despite a tendency to associate S1 with
Kahneman (2002, p. 449) describes S1 as an intuitive
non-conscious processing and S2 with conscious process-
mode of processing that leads to people having an intu-
ing, we suggest that within representative formulations of
ition, de?ned as “thoughts and preferences that come to
this two-systems framework, such as Kahneman’s (2002)
mind quickly and without much re?ection”. Is the la-
summary of his Nobel Prize winning work and Epstein’s
bel of intuition being used here to refer stipulatively to a
family grouping of information processing characteristics
?Correspondence should be addressed to Mark C. Price, Psychology
that includes lack of consciousness? Or is it referring to
Faculty, University of Bergen, Christiesgt. 12, 5015 Bergen, Norway.
a genre of subjective experience — which might be taken
Email: mark.price@psysp.uib.no. This research was partly supported
to imply an association with the conscious S2? Or does it
by a postdoctoral grant (911274) to Elisabeth Norman from the Western
Norway Regional Health Authority (Helse Vest). We thank our review-
depend? Or is there a sense in which intuitions are a bit
ers for their helpful suggestions.
of both?
28

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
29
2.1 Option 1: Intuitions as non-conscious
2.2 Option 2: Intuitions as conscious im-
behavioural dispositions
pressions
In apparent contrast with the above argument, Kahneman
One possibility is that the in?uences of S1 processes are
(2002) also refers to the notion that the intuitive processes
mere behavioural dispositions which do not directly carve
of S1 generate impressions. The fact that Kahneman con-
their mark on conscious experience. This would be like
siders the impressions to be generated involuntarily is not
the way in which non-conscious perception, for example
in itself a barrier to the impressions being taken as con-
of a word, can only be measured indirectly in terms of its
scious experiences. Even quite automatic processes can
in?uence on other more conscious processes — for ex-
yield representational outcomes of which we are con-
ample as a semantic priming effect on responses to a con-
sciously aware; within the domain of perception this is
sciously presented probe word. Some aspects of Kahne-
common, for example when so-called pre-attentional pro-
man’s (2002) two-systems framework are consistent with
cessing yields conscious representations of basic aspects
this interpretation.
of a visual scene.
Kahneman’s concept of information accessibility lies
Given that verbalization is a common operational crite-
at the core of his analysis of intuitive judgements and
rion for consciousness, Kahneman’s view that the impres-
preferences. Accessibility is the ease with which partic-
sions need not be verbally explicit might also be taken
ular mental contents come to mind. It is grounded in
to imply we are not talking here about conscious im-
the relative activation level of representations that com-
pressions. However, failure to be verbally explicit might
pete with each other to determine the result of response
merely imply dif?culty in communicating the qualitative
competition at some decision node in the information-
character or even presence of the impressions, despite the
processing system. The idea is then that a collection of
occurrence of a genuine phenomenology.
empirically observable heuristic principles guide the ac-
So perhaps we can become directly conscious of the
tivation level of response tendencies generated within the
products of processes in S1. But if so, where is the con-
intuitive S1. Often these win the competition with the
scious process? Is it in S1, which challenges the idea of
output of S2, in a process labeled attribute substitution:
S1 as a non-conscious system? Or is it in S2, which begs
“A judgement is said to be mediated by a heuristic when
the question of how consciousness associated with pro-
the individual assesses a speci?ed target attribute of a
cessing in one system would manifest in another system?
judgement object by substituting a related heuristic at-
tribute that comes more readily to mind.” (ibid. p. 466).
Kahneman has made an important contribution to psy-
2.3 Option 3: Sometimes S1 processes gen-
chology by identifying many of these heuristic principles
erate conscious impressions and some-
and by observing that the most accessible features are not
times they don’t
always the most relevant ones for optimal decision mak-
ing.
A compromise solution is that options 1 and 2 are not mu-
tually exclusive. This is supported by the variety of exam-
However, within this framework, the coming-to-mind
ples of everyday behaviour that the two-systems frame-
of highly accessible attributes from S1 is not described as
work attempts to explain.
a conscious process. Rather, it is silent and effortless. So,
In some of Kahneman’s (2002) examples of the in?u-
for example, “Respondents who substitute one attribute
ence of S1 on problem solving, people think they are re-
for another are not confused about the question that they
sponding on the basis of one set of rational criteria while
are trying to answer – they simply fail to notice that they
in fact they are being biased by other criteria that are more
are answering a different one.” (ibid. p. 469). Similarly,
accessible (the so-called accessibility heuristic). Here the
Epstein (1994, p.716) describes his experiential system
workings of S1 may indeed be silent. The person would
— which shares the basic properties used to delineate S1
not feel as if he or she were having an intuition and the
and is contrasted with a rational system — as “intimately
notion of non-conscious biases would seem more appro-
associated with the experience of affect, including vibes,
priate than that of intuition.
which refer to subtle feelings of which people are often
However there are other situations where the kinds of
unaware.”
heuristically-based biases subsumed under S1 have a less
According to this view, S1 does not give rise directly
hidden in?uence on both our behaviour and experience.
to conscious signals that we can be directly aware of as
For example, when making a rather arbitrary preference
discrete entities. If S1 is to in?uence the contents of con-
judgement, the rational S2 might fail to deliver any highly
sciousness, it does so furtively and indirectly by modulat-
activated choice criteria. Now the murmurings of S1,
ing whatever conscious awareness we have of processes,
pulling us in one direction or another for reasons we can-
or products of processes, within S2.
not introspect, may be felt consciously. As Kahneman

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
30
claims, these conscious impressions may even be imbued
thing that gives rise to these information processing qual-
with a feeling of high con?dence. Now, to use a favourite
ities, not something that arises from them – those func-
cliché from philosophy of mind (Nagel, 1986), there is
tional qualities are what consciousness is. To use the cur-
something it is like to be having the intuition. Now we
rent metaphor from Dennett’s philosophical take on con-
are aware of the products of the heuristically-driven pro-
sciousness, consciousness is “fame in the brain” (e.g., see
cesses, even if unaware of the processes themselves.
Dennett, 2005).
The upshot is that there may be considerable varia-
Both Kahneman (2002) and Epstein (1994) stress the
tion in the extent to which the kinds of processes associ-
lack of control that people have over the in?uences of
ated with S1 make their products available to conscious-
the intuitive system, and the lack of ?exibility or sophis-
ness. What is missing in the two-systems framework is
ticated contextual sensitivity of that system. For exam-
an analysis of this variation in terms of (1) why the con-
ple, in discussing why he considers that the experiential
scious variable is functionally important, (2) how to con-
system is usually dominant, Epstein (ibid., p. 716) also
ceptually understand the relation between conscious and
writes that it operates outside of awareness and there-
non-conscious processes in situations where we do have
fore that “the rational system fails to control it because
a conscious impression, or feeling, or intuition, and (3)
the person does not know there is anything to control”.
how to distinguish methodologically between the various
By denying that the intuitive system possesses these cen-
scenarios outlined above.
tral functional qualities of consciousness, these authors
We take these issues in turn.
appear to be reinforcing a tacit assumption that the intu-
itions generated by S1 are largely non-conscious beasts of
the mental jungle. If instead we conferred these qualities
3 Question 1: The functional im- to intuitions, the intuitions would gain a crucial functional
portance of the consciousness advantage. Indeed Epstein directly alludes to this func-
tional advantage when he observes that knowing there is
variable
something to control is needed before one can control it.
This is why the consciousness of S1 processes, intuitions,
It is important to clarify the precise manner in which in-
or whatever one wishes to call them, is such an important
tuitive processes are conscious because conscious pro-
variable.
cesses have qualitatively different properties than non-
conscious ones. The functional hallmark of conscious-
4 Question 2: The relationship be-
ness is control over the behavioural in?uence of infor-
mation, and the ability to integrate the information in a
tween conscious feelings and non-
?exible manner with changing contextual demands and
conscious antecedents
executive goals. This quality is supported by consider-
able convergent empirical data (Jacoby, Toth, & Yoneli-
nas, 1993; Merikle & Daneman, 1998), and lies at the
heart of the concept of global accessibility to information
4.1 Intuitive feelings as experience-based
within Baars’ (1988) Global Workspace model of con-
metacognitive feelings
sciousness.
In this model, which has been one of the most in?uen-
How exactly might an intuition be a conscious represen-
tial in the ?eld of consciousness research, access does not
tation rather than a mere behavioural disposition?
refer to the simple notion of activation level, as in Kah-
Koriat (2000, 2007) offers an insightful analysis
neman’s (2002) account of attribute substitution. Instead
in terms of his distinction between experience-based
it refers to the ability to broadcast information globally
and information-based (or theory-based) metacognitive
among the many information-processing subsystems of
judgements.
Information-based metacognitive judge-
the brain, as opposed to isolating the information within
ments are based on explicit inferential processes. These
local non-conscious neural networks that have automatic
are deliberate, analytic, slow, effortful, largely conscious,
in?uences on behaviour. This communication and cog-
and draw on the contents of declarative information in
nitive integration is what gives conscious representations
long term memory. They therefore have some of the
their qualitative advantages. At the implementation level,
central characteristics of S2. For example, judgements
cognitive neuroscience is showing that this cognitive in-
of learning are in?uenced by our conscious expectations
tegration appears to be mediated by coherent neural ac-
as to which types of learning strategy (e.g., generating a
tivity distributed throughout the brain (Baars, 2002; De-
word versus just reading it) lead to the best memory.
haene and Naccache, 2001). Note that we would con-
By contrast, experience-based metacognitive judge-
cur with the view that consciousness is neither some-
ments are based on rapid automatic inferences that are in

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
31
one sense conscious and in another sense non-conscious.
sciously retrieved from memory (Bowers, Regehr, Balt-
For example, we might have a Feeling of Knowing that
hazard, & Parker, 1990). In a variation of this task, in
we would be able to recognise the correct answer to a
which participants are required to indicate whether they
question that we cannot currently recall (Koriat, 1993;
have a feeling of coherence to single triads, Bolte and
Metcalfe, 2000). The feeling is non-conscious in the
Goschke (2005) propose these feelings as a paradigmatic
sense that we do not have detailed conscious access to its
example of what we mean by an intuition.
information processing antecedents, variously suggested
Even if there is ongoing debate over the precise na-
(Metcalfe, 2000) to be the searched-for information itself
ture of the heuristic cues that drive some of these subjec-
(cf. trace-access accounts), the relative accessibility of
tively experienced feelings (e.g., Koriat & Levy Sadot,
relevant partial information (cf. accessibility accounts),
2001), what these examples of feelings have in common
or the familiarity of memory cues (cf. cue familiarity
is their metacognitive informational content, and the lack
accounts). It is nevertheless conscious in that there is a
of conscious access to the antecedents of the feelings.
distinct phenomenology — something it feels like to have
Crucially, they also share the empirical observation that
the feeling. And it is metacognitive since it conveys infor-
subjective ratings of the feelings can be veridical. That
mation about our past, current or future mental processes
is, the ratings can under the right conditions predict past
that permit two basic functions of on-line metacognition
or future mental states with above chance accuracy, even
— namely the ability to monitor and then regulate those
if it is sometimes possible to arti?cially distort the feel-
processes (Koriat, 1998; Nelson, 2001). Koriat (2007, p.
ings. For example, in the so-called Remember-Know
314) is clear that this type of “fast, unconscious, auto-
paradigm, Feeling of Knowing ratings that a given let-
matic inference results in a sheer subjective experience,
ter string has been presented to you previously are above
and that subjective experience can then serve as the ba-
chance, even if you cannot explicitly remember the learn-
sis for noetic judgements”. Experience-based judgements
ing episode (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). However,
are like “immediate, direct impressions” which have “the
even if you have never seen a particular non-word letter
phenomenal quality of a direct, self-evident intuition”
string before, this Feeling of Knowing can be mislead-
(ibid.).
ingly enhanced by increasing its orthographic regularity
Koriat’s theoretical framework can help us to under-
(Whittlesea & Williams, 2001).
stand various classes of experiential judgement that have
In addition, there are well known examples of situ-
been the focus of considerable empirical investigation
ations in which it seems to be advantageous to make
and which are examples of the kinds of hunches, gut feel-
intuitive decisions based on rapid feelings, rather than
ings or intuitions that are often felt to guide our daily be-
deliberating analytically on our decisions, or attempting
haviour. In addition to Feelings of Knowing, these in-
to introspectively access the antecedents of these feel-
clude Feelings of Familiarity that we have encountered
ings. Wilson and Schooler (1991) showed that prefer-
a certain object or situation before, even if there is no
ence ratings of novice jam tasters are more in line with
longer any explicit episodic memory of the encounter
those of experts if the ratings are made quickly and intu-
(Dunn, 2004), warmth feelings that we are approaching
itively. Similarly, people are more likely to be satis?ed
the solution to a problem (Metcalfe, 1986; Metcalfe &
with their choice of wall-posters if they are chosen in a
Wiebe, 1987), the Tip of the Tongue state (which might
non-deliberative manner (Wilson et al., 1993).
be considered a variety of Feeling of Knowing) (Brown,
An explicit distinction between the consciousness of
1991), and Feelings of Preference for one item or decision
feelings and the non-consciousness of their antecedents is
path without having reasoned grounds for the preference.
also found beyond the kinds of metacognitive feeling out-
For example, we may show higher preference ratings for
lined above. In the context of attitude research, Gawron-
an abstract shape that we have been pre-exposed to, even
ski, Hofman and Wilbur (2006) make a similar distinc-
if we are unable to guess whether we have encountered
tion between conscious awareness of an attitude — which
it before. This mere exposure effect, which is at the heart
they refer to as content awareness — and awareness of
of commercial advertising, has even been claimed when
the origin of an attitude — referred to as source aware-
the visual pre-exposure of random shapes is performed
ness. They also propose the additional category of im-
at near subliminal durations (Bornstein, 1992; Kunst-
pact awareness which refers to our awareness, or lack of
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980).
awareness, of the in?uence of an attitude on other psycho-
To take another example, in the dyads of triads task
logical processes. The usefulness of this last category for
where participants are shown two sets of three visually
characterising the relation between conscious and non-
displayed words on each trial, people can experience a
conscious processes is not con?ned to attitude research.
conscious Feeling of Coherence for which of the two tri-
We can be aware of wearing a heavy back-pack, but not
ads contains words that share a common semantic as-
of how the conscious sensation of weight in?uences our
sociate, even if the common associate cannot be con-
judgement of the gradient of a hill (Prof?tt, 2006).

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
32
The same distinction has again been made in the area
ipants attempt to learn which of several card packs are as-
of implicit learning, where complex regularities in our en-
sociated with optimal rewards (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel
vironment are learned without full awareness of what has
& Damasio, 1997; Bierman, Destrebecqz & Cleeremans
been learned, or sometimes even without awareness that
2005). In this classic paradigm, which is often used to
learning has occurred at all. Children’s learning of the
study decision making in healthy people as well as af-
rules of language is a commonly cited example. Implicit
ter brain damage, it is claimed that normal participants
learning has been extensively studied in rather arti?cial
pass through a hunch phase in their learning. During this
laboratory paradigms but is probably involved in a wide
phase, they show behavioural signs of having implicitly
range of everyday decision making situations. Lieber-
learned the predictive rule at an intuitive level while still
man (2000) suggests that intuition is the subjective expe-
unable to verbalise the rule (see for example De Vries,
rience associated with implicitly learned knowledge, and
Holland, & Witteman, 2008).
argues that many processes important to social intuition
Dienes and Scott (2005) de?ne these intermediate
depend largely on implicit learning. These include the
states in implicit learning paradigms as situations where
formation of impressions on the basis of stereotypes or
we have conscious metaknowledge (or judgement knowl-
implicit attitudes, non-verbal decoding (i.e., drawing in-
edge), for example of the next move in an implicitly
ferences about the mental state or dispositions of another
learned sequence, but where we do not have any detailed
person on the basis of non-verbal cues), and certain forms
conscious structural knowledge about the patterns we
of social decision making. Ambady, Krabbenhoft and
have learned. This closely mirrors the above distinctions
Hogan (2006) propose a role for implicit learning in per-
between experience-based and information-based judge-
sonality judgement. And situations where intuitive con-
ment, or between content awareness and source aware-
sumer choice is claimed to be more advantageous than
ness.
deliberative judgements often involve appraisal of com-
What all these related distinctions argue for, rather
plex information (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren &
more clearly than Kahneman (2002) or Epstein (1994),
van Baaren, 2006; Wilson et al., 1993), making it likely
is that we can be directly conscious of the products of
that the choices are at least partly driven by implicitly
processes which have a broadly automatic information-
learned knowledge.
processing style. The end product of the perhaps heuristi-
There has been a vigorous debate over whether so-
cally driven metacognitive assessment is a conscious sig-
called implicit learning is really based on non-conscious
nal in its own right. It therefore bears the qualitative ad-
learning, or could instead be mediated by consciously
vantages of a conscious signal, and we have control over
learned fragments of the target knowledge. However
whether we heed the signal or ignore it. As Koriat (2007,
more recently there has been a move to ?nd a mid-
p. 301) points out, this means that “when people realize
dle ground between these extremes and propose that the
that their subjective experience has been contaminated,
learning is often guided by processes that are neither
they tend to change their judgements so as to correct for
fully conscious nor fully non-conscious (Cleeremans &
the assumed effects of that contamination”.
Jiménez, 2002; Dienes & Scott, 2005, Norman, Price, &
Nevertheless Koriat still appears to strongly endorse
Duff, 2006). This move has been long pre-empted by a
the two-systems framework, equating his experience-
recognition that implicit learning situations involve sub-
based versus information-based metacognitive judge-
jectively experienced intuitive feelings. For example, Re-
ments with Kahneman’s (2002) S1 and S2 respectively,
ber (1989) suggested that:
and proposing that they relate to two “components or
states of consciousness” (Koriat, 2007, p. 301). This is
It [intuition] is a cognitive state that emerges
reminiscent of the argument in implicit learning research
under speci?able conditions, and it operates to
that implicit and explicit learning are mediated by sepa-
assist an individual to make choices and to en-
rable neuro-cognitive systems (Reber, 1997).
gage in particular classes of action. To have an
intuitive sense of what is right and proper, to
have a vague feeling of the goal of an extended
4.2 Intuitive feelings as fringe conscious-
process of thought, to “get the point” without
ness
really being able to verbalize what it is that one
has gotten, is to have gone through an implicit
An alternative but overlapping framework for under-
learning experience and have built up the requi-
standing intuitive feelings is provided by Mangan’s
site representative knowledge base to allow for
(1993, 2001, 2003) revival and elaboration of the Jame-
such judgement. (p. 233)
sian concept of fringe consciousness.
This concept,
which will be less familiar to many readers, is very much
A role for intuitive feelings in implicit learning has also
driven by a phenomenological dissection of the contents
been implicated in the Iowa Gambling Task where partic-
of conscious experience. Like Koriat’s (2007) analysis,

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
33
there is much emphasis on the idea that experiences we
conscious automatic processes, is again that conscious
would call intuitive feelings are to be considered as con-
processes are more ?exible. We therefore bene?t from a
scious signals in themselves, and in many crucial aspects
much higher level of behavioural choice, for example in
the idea of fringe consciousness is very close to Koriat’s
deciding whether to follow a hunch that feels convincing
notion of experience-based judgement. But, in contrast
but could be misleading, or in deciding whether to invest
to Koriat, Kahneman (2002) or Epstein (1994), the fringe
further effort in a so-far unsuccessful memory search.
consciousness framework does not attempt to split the in-
According to Mangan (2001), fringe consciousness of-
formation processing system into a dichotomous S1 and
ten has a very transient and ?eeting nature since attempt-
S2. Instead, intuitive feelings are seen as a manifestation
ing to attend to the experience may instantly retrieve
of a vital component of consciousness that functions as an
its previously non-conscious antecedents into conscious-
interface between the non-conscious and the conscious.
ness. This implies some divergence from Koriat’s (2000,
Mangan’s core idea is that the stream of consciousness
2007) position. Although the immediate antecedents of
contains not only a nucleus of focally-attended sensory
the feeling are non-conscious, the suggestion is that the
information but also a fringe, which acts as kind of in-
feeling can often direct us to related information that is
terface between the nucleus and a contextual background
potentially accessible, rather than permanently inaccessi-
of largely non-conscious information processing. Affec-
ble.
tive and cognitive signals within this fringe of conscious-
However, as pointed out by Norman (2002), there is a
ness provide a summary of otherwise unavailable non-
tension between this proposal that feelings in fringe con-
conscious processes that are relevant to ongoing, con-
sciousness tend to be dif?cult to attend, and all the empir-
scious, mental tasks. In particular, they summarise the
ical research showing that we can indeed hold our atten-
degree of ?t or integration between the conscious and
tion on certain feelings for long enough to rate them intro-
non-conscious levels of processing. As Mangan puts it,
spectively and assess something of their quality. Norman
“The non-sensory fringe is able to ?nesse the limited
resolves this tension by suggesting that the ability to re-
capacity of consciousness by using just a few wisps of
trieve non-conscious context information varies, and that
vague experience to represent summary facts about states
the classic examples of introspectable intuitive feelings
of non-conscious information that are otherwise far too
occur when such retrieval is not immediately successful,
complex for direct conscious representation.” (Mangan,
and where the fringe consciousness therefore has a more
2001, ¶ 5.2). Following James (1890), Mangan (2001)
“frozen” sustained quality. In situations like this, there
argues that fringe experiences are especially dominant
is actually a slight sense in which the term fringe con-
during the brief, vague, transitionary (or transitive) pe-
sciousness is misleading. This is because the experience
riods of experience that punctuate the passage between
is no longer the conscious ?ag for unattended metacogni-
the successive moments of stable, clear (or substantive)
tive signals, waving away in the background, but is now
consciousness in the everyday stream of consciousness.
a sustained part of the focus of attention. Elsewhere we
The concept of fringe consciousness is very wide rang-
have therefore suggested that the term cognitive feeling
ing. Various authors have criticised the looseness of the
may be more appropriate for this subset of fringe con-
concept and attempted to de?ne subcategories of fringe
sciousness (Price & Norman, in press).
experience more precisely (see for example Galin, 1993;
Even if the fringy nature of the phenomena subsumed
1994; McGovern 1993; Norman, 2002; Price, 2002).
under the concept of fringe consciousness is a variable
Routinely studied metacognitive and evaluative judge-
and dynamic feature, the concept enriches our under-
ments such as Feelings of Knowing, Familiarity, Pref-
standing of intuitive feelings in many ways. It places
erence, Coherence and so on, which are considered by
these feelings within the general landscape of conscious
Mangan to be important examples of fringe conscious-
experience and stresses the potential continuity of the
ness, can be taken as one of these subcategories (Price,
feelings with more ?eeting examples of the fringe. It
2002). Mangan (2001) suggests these are all manifesta-
stresses the general functional role of the feelings: They
tions of a core relational Feeling of Rightness. Although
provide summary signals such as online metacognitive
the precise phenomenology of these feelings is a matter
assessments which are automatically generated and, as
for careful empirical study, Mangan seems in agreement
Kahneman (2002) describes, may be heavily in?uenced
with Koriat (2000, 2007) that the experiences are the con-
by a host of heuristic cues. The feelings indicate the re-
scious product of processes that are (at least currently)
lationship, or the directional ?t, between ongoing con-
non-conscious. There is also agreement that the func-
scious and non-conscious processes, helping us to know
tional role of the feelings is to monitor ongoing cognition
whether we are on the right mental track. And the feel-
and thereby facilitate control of the direction of thoughts
ings can point us towards the existence of relevant infor-
and behaviour. The functional advantage of having a con-
mation waiting to be consciously retrieved from active
scious feeling to do these jobs, rather than relying on non-
but as yet non-conscious representations.

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
34
The type of information provided by fringe conscious-
tive end of the mental spectrum. However the basic ap-
ness has parallels with Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) hy-
proach could be adapted to any category of intuitive feel-
pothesis of affect-as-information, and with related pro-
ing. The de?nitions are based on (a) the above integra-
posals that nonaffective feelings provide an important
tion of Koriat’s (2000, 2007) experience-based metacog-
source of information for everyday judgements and de-
nitive judgements and Mangan’s (1993, 2001) fringe con-
cisions (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). However, fringe
sciousness, (b) currently accepted functional de?nitions
consciousness is conceptualised without reference to the
of consciousness, and (c) methods of distinguishing be-
two-systems dichotomisation of mental life. The moni-
tween conscious and non-conscious processes in the ar-
toring and control functions of fringe consciousness are
eas of implicit perception and implicit learning, where
not properties of an S2 that is separate from the S1 that
this issue has perhaps been thrashed out more than any-
generates the feelings. Rather than stressing separation
where else. There are two sides to the operationalisation.
between systems, the fringe is seen as an intermediate
One is to distinguish an intuitive feeling from a fully ex-
point on a graded dimension of consciousness. It bridges
plicit, rational mental representation that includes con-
between the more automatic processes and the more con-
scious awareness of the premises of the representation.
trolled conscious processes that play an interconnected
The second is to distinguish an intuitive feeling from an
role in driving all aspects of mental life. Mangan’s (1993,
entirely non-conscious behavioural disposition.
2001, 2003) emphasis on the ubiquitous role of more
?eeting fringe feelings within moments of transitory con-
5.1.1 Intuitive feeling or fully explicit?
sciousness similarly underlines the fact that the fringe is
not a property of one system or another, but an integral
Here we need to consider the conscious informational
part of the stream of consciousness whatever type of men-
content of the mental state. Following Koriat and Man-
tal activity is being engaged in.
gan, the contents of consciousness may be regarded as
We would therefore suggest that the concept of fringe
intuitive feelings when (a) there is awareness of, for ex-
consciousness provides a useful complimentary approach
ample, some metacognitive information, and when (b) it
to understanding intuitive processes. It is regrettable that
can be shown that there is no current conscious access
there has been a mutual lack of communication between
to the information-processing antecedents of this infor-
(a) the fringe consciousness literature, (b) piecemeal em-
mation. For example, we might be aware that one of
pirical research on particular examples of intuitive feel-
two word trigrams has a common semantic associate, but
ings, and (c) Koriat’s invaluable theoretical overviews
have no access to what this common associate is or to
and the insights of the heuristics and biases tradition
why we can tell. Given the retrieval function of fringe
within decision making and judgement research.
consciousness, we may still gain conscious access to as-
pects of those information-processing antecedents after a
time delay (which may even be very short). Also note
5 Question 3:
Operationalising that it can be far from trivial to establish the absence
conscious intuitive feelings
of any conscious antecedents at all; for example, many
claims to have demonstrated implicit learning have been
So far we have suggested that there is a conceptual and
challenged by evidence that performance is based on con-
functional difference between the notion of intuitions as
scious fragmentary knowledge of the learned patterns.
non-conscious behavioural dispositions, and the notion of
intuitions as conscious impressions or feelings. We have
5.1.2 Intuitive feeling or non-conscious disposition?
then outlined convergent theoretical frameworks that help
us to understand the nature of at least some types of
Here the issue is whether information that in?uences be-
intuitive feelings. But in any given situation, how can
haviour also directly gives rise to a conscious impression
we empirically distinguish whether we are dealing with
of any sort. For example, a non-conscious orientation re-
non-conscious dispositions, conscious feelings, or men-
sponse might drive us to choose a previously seen item
tal states dominated by more rational and deliberative
over a novel one, while feeling as if we are making a ran-
thought?
dom choice. Conversely, we might have a distinct feeling
of preference for one item. Two approaches to opera-
5.1 A core de?nition
tionalising the presence of some conscious experience are
possible.
Price (2002) has proposed a set of practical operational
First, we can ask people to report their phenomenol-
de?nitions with this aim. These de?nitions are particu-
ogy. The feeling might be expressible in subjective self-
larly directed at identifying the kinds of conscious intu-
reports — for example, introspective ratings of experi-
itive feelings that fall on the more cognitive than affec-
ence along a relevant dimension – which are established

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
35
as veridical by showing they predict future performance
speci?ed as a full de?nition of an intuitive feeling. Af-
on another behavioural measure of the information’s in-
ter all, if we are conscious of the distance of an object
?uence. This method of checking that the subjective rat-
on the basis of non-conscious stereoscopic computations,
ings are veridical rather than spurious nevertheless has a
we would not ?nd it natural to refer to our judgement of
potential danger: The use of a rating scale to avoid the
distance as a feeling. There are probably several factors
methodological pitfalls of open-ended introspective re-
which play into our willingness to refer to a mental state
ports (such as conservative response bias) may just end up
with the natural language labels of intuition, feeling or
as a fancy forced-choice judgement in which experimen-
hunch. Speculatively, these may include dif?culty of ver-
tal participants guess one of several values on the scale.
bal expression, the unexpectedness of the gap between a
Since it is possible that judgements which feel like com-
conscious representation and its non-conscious informa-
pletely random guesses may themselves be automatically
tion processing antecedents (Price, 2002), and perhaps
biased by non-consciously processed information (Rein-
the level of con?dence in the information conveyed by
gold & Merikle, 1988), a positive correlation between rat-
the feeling. The way these labels are applied may also
ings and behaviour need not imply conscious representa-
vary considerably across individuals and cultures. (See
tion of the information in question. Price (2002) therefore
Price, 2002, or Price & Norman, in press, for a slightly
suggests it is prudent to record ratings on several dimen-
expanded discussion of these points).
sions to ensure that correlations are only found on rele-
vant dimensions.
5.2 An example: Intuitive feelings in im-
Since people may sometimes ?nd it dif?cult to ver-
balise or otherwise communicate very subtle feelings,
plicit learning
an alternative and more behavioural operationalisation is
There are a number of reasons why implicit learning is
possible: The feeling should also be able to guide be-
a particularly appropriate area to study intuitive feelings
haviour ?exibly in accordance with changing contextual
with these proposed operational de?nitions.
demands. As described earlier, this is an application of
First, as outlined earlier, implicitly learned information
Baars’ (1988) functionalist criterion that conscious infor-
undoubtedly contributes to everyday decision making and
mation is globally accessible to other cognitive subsys-
judgement. Second, the main debate in implicit learning
tems. This criterion is the basis of Jacoby’s Process Dis-
has been precisely about what people are, or are not, con-
sociation Procedure (PDP) which is widely used to dis-
scious of. Exploring gradations of consciousness in im-
tinguish between, and even to quantify, the relative be-
plicit learning may therefore help to resolve this debate.
havioural in?uences of conscious versus non-conscious
Third, it is possible to create relatively simple arti?cial
processes in domains such as implicit learning, implicit
implicit learning environments and to ?ne tune details of
memory and implicit perception (Jacoby & Kelly 1992;
their structure in ways that make it easier to apply the op-
Jacoby et al. 1993). Typically, the PDP involves a so-
erational de?nitions and test whether functional intuitive
called exclusion instruction which asks people to inhibit
feelings are really present. Fourth, Norman (2002) has
the usual in?uence of information on behaviour. The
argued that implicit learning experiments provide a situ-
assumption is that people can only comply with exclu-
ation where intuitive feelings are likely to be particularly
sion instructions when the information in question is con-
salient, stable over time and introspectively accessible.
sciously represented.
Additionally, it is often possible to experimentally ma-
nipulate the degree of conscious awareness of learned in-
5.1.3 Summary and further considerations
formation, as function of either the time course of the
experiment, task dif?culty, or time constraints on per-
This set of empirical recommendations leads to the fol-
formance. This allows comparison, in one study, of a
lowing summary operationalisation of intuitive feelings.
dynamic gradation from fully non-conscious behavioural
Intuitive feelings can be distinguished as (a) consciously
dispositions, to intuitive feelings, to fully explicit knowl-
experienced feelings which (b) provide a condensed
edge.
overview (e.g., metacognitive or affective) of information
As an example of how we can search for the role of in-
that is to some degree inaccessible to consciousness, and
tuitive feelings in implicit learning paradigms, consider a
which (c) can either be expressed as subjective ratings
recent study of ours using a modi?ed version of the serial
which are predictive of behaviour or (d) can be shown to
reaction time (SRT) procedure (Norman, Price, Duff, &
guide behaviour in a ?exible manner.
Mentzoni, 2007). In the traditional version of this task
Although this operationalisation can be applied in a
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), participants watch a small
given experimental context to distinguish between non-
circle jump between 4 linearly arranged position mark-
conscious dispositions, conscious feelings, and explicit
ers in a ?xed repeating sequence of 12 moves, and press
representations, we would admit that it remains under-
one of 4 keys to indicate each new position as fast as pos-

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
36
sible. As is typical, sequence learning during the train-
sequence knowledge, such as fragment generation tasks
ing phase of our experiment was indicated by longer key
where people try to tap out sequence fragments on the
press RTs on trials where the usual sequence was vio-
response keyboard (Perruchet & Amorim, 1992). The
lated. However, in order to move beyond previous po-
problem is that above-chance performance on these tasks
larised controversy over whether sequence learning in
might be also mediated by non-conscious automatic re-
the SRT is associated with conscious (explicit) or non-
sponse tendencies (Cohen & Curran, 1993; Goschke,
conscious (implicit) sequence knowledge, our experiment
1998). Some studies have therefore tested whether peo-
applied a novel SRT procedure which allowed us to test
ple can follow the instruction to generate a sequence of
whether learning might lead to intuitive feelings such as
movements that is different from the training sequence
feelings of rightness or anticipation for where the target
(Goschke, 1998; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). This
will occur next in the repeating visual sequence.
is an example of a so-called exclusion task. It requires
First, to rule out fully explicit knowledge, we had to
people to refrain from using learned sequence knowledge
show that participants know which position will occur
and this is assumed to require the kind of ?exible con-
next without knowing why – that is, without having con-
trol over knowledge that is only possible with conscious
scious access to sequence information which is the non-
representations. However even this logic has been chal-
conscious antecedent of the positional information. In the
lenged; for example, successful exclusion might be pos-
traditional SRT task, this is problematic since stimulus
sible via a general voluntary inhibition of the in?uence of
displays only vary on one perceptual dimension, namely
implicit sequence knowledge, and not require detailed,
target location. It is then trivial for participants to work
conscious, move-by-move knowledge of the sequence
out that any predictive regularity in upcoming target lo-
(Dienes & Scott, 2005; Norman et al., 2006). To test for
cations must be based on previous target locations. This
conscious knowledge of which sequence position comes
in turn makes it practically impossible to rule out the pos-
next, we therefore needed a more robust measure of the
sibility that participants have conscious access to the an-
ability to use sequence knowledge in a ?exible manner.
tecedents of a veridical representation of where the next
Our novel measure of cognitive ?exibility, referred
target will be. Denial of any knowledge that there was
to as the generation rotation task, also required some
a regular sequence could merely be put down to conser-
changes to the standard SRT paradigm. In the train-
vative response bias or to experimental demand. And if
ing phase of the experiment, the 4 possible target posi-
people admit they knew there was a sequence but cannot
tion markers were now arranged as the 4 corners of a
verbalise the details of the sequence, it is dif?cult to rule
square, rather than linearly. On each trial of the subse-
out conscious partial knowledge of the sequence.
quent generation rotation task, participants were then pre-
To by-pass these problems, we camou?aged the real
sented with a short sequence of target moves, and asked
antecedents of target location — that is, previous tar-
to indicate the anticipated location of the next target in an
get locations — by providing some alternative decoy an-
indirect manner. They had to indicate a location which
tecedents. These took the form of random changes in the
was rotated from the actual target position by one or two
colour and the shape of the target, and of each of the 4
positions around the square layout, in accordance with a
position markers. By adding these two additional but ir-
number presented in the centre of the screen after the end
relevant perceptual dimensions to the display, it becomes
of the presented sequence. The central number could be
rather dif?cult to tell even the general nature of the pattern
positively (+1, +2) or negatively (-1) signed, indicating
that governs target position; it could logically be patterns
clockwise or anticlockwise rotation, and varied randomly
of previous position, or colour, or shape, or any combi-
from trial to trial. Therefore to comply with instruc-
nation of these. Suppose participants are retrospectively
tions, the knowledge of the anticipated position had to be
told there was a pattern to where the targets appeared,
held in working memory and integrated ?exibly with the
and are asked to verbally express which variables pre-
context provided by the upcoming and randomly varying
dicted the target location. Verbal reports which omit any
number cue. In other words, the task now involved a com-
mention of previous target locations, and instead focus
plex stimulus-response mapping which required speci?c,
on colour or shape, can now be taken as much more con-
on-line, conscious knowledge of the next move.
vincing indicators of a lack of conscious access to the
Incorporating these methodological changes into the
antecedents of the nevertheless conscious feelings.
SRT experiment allowed us to identify a subgroup of par-
Next we had to rule out the opposite possibility that
ticipants who both:
performance in the SRT is mediated by completely non-
(a) Showed above-chance performance in the genera-
conscious behavioural dispositions to orient to particu-
tion rotation task – this implied ?exible conscious antici-
lar positions on the computer display or to pre-program
pation of individual sequence moves and ruled out purely
particular motor responses. Previous SRT studies have
non-conscious knowledge.
tried to do this using various objective tests of conscious
(b) Made no mention, in their verbal reports, that target

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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008
Intuitive decisions on the fringes of consciousness
37
position is in?uenced by previous target position — this
function and may sometimes help us to retrieve informa-
implied no awareness of the antecedents of their sequence
tion into consciousness. Functionally, they are conscious
knowledge.
in the sense that the information they convey is globally
This pattern of results supported the notion that these
accessible (Baars, 1988) and can be used to guide be-
participants were using conscious intuitive feelings to
haviour in a ?exible and contextually appropriate man-
drive their responses in the rotation task. If the learned
ner (Price, 2002). This is what gives them crucial advan-
sequence knowledge had been completely unconscious,
tages compared to processes which are completely non-
rotation performance would have been at chance, and if
conscious. The feelings may also be reportable, either
the knowledge had been fully conscious, verbal reports
verbally or in the form of predictive introspective ratings,
would have referred to the spatial sequence as the criti-
even if they are communicatively vague in the sense that
cal predictive variable. Our ?ndings support the hypothe-
they are dif?cult to describe and communicate to others
sis that learning is not always easily classi?able as either
or even to oneself. Inability to quickly retrieve the non-
purely implicit or purely explicit, but sometimes gives
conscious antecedents of feelings into consciousness will
rise to intermediate states of awareness of the learned
make them more salient and easier to introspect (Norman,
knowledge which correspond to intuitive feelings.
2002).
This concept of intuitive feelings is not dependent on
6 Conclusion:
Intuitive feelings the S1 versus S2 distinction. All we need are the ideas
that decision making and judgement, just like other do-
without a two-systems framework mains of information processing such as perception, are
a mishmash of more conscious and more non-conscious
The two-systems framework evolved to emphasise the
processes, and that our minds are full of so-called fringe
role of non-conscious and irrational processes in guiding
conscious signals which help to direct the onward ?ow
our behaviour. We have suggested that in?uential pre-
of cognition. Intuitive feelings are one subset of these
sentations of this framework have shortcomings when it
signals. The information conveyed by the feelings is con-
comes to specifying the detailed relation between con-
scious in the same way that anything else is conscious, by
sciousness and information processing.
virtue of being globally accessible to many other infor-
First, it is unclear whether and how consciousness is
mation processing sub-systems. Mangan’s (1993, 2001,
supposed to be a property of only S2, or of both S1 and
2003) fringe consciousness approach is particularly help-
S2. Second, there is a failure to discuss how we can
ful in helping us to see the feelings as an intermediate
functionally and empirically distinguish between (a) au-
point between fully conscious and fully non-conscious
tomatic and non-conscious biases on our behavioural dis-
processes, rather than as an aspect of either an intuitive
positions which have no in?uence on consciousness or
or a rational system. Implicit learning paradigms, which
which only indirectly modify the contents of conscious-
allow non-conscious behaviour, intuitive feelings, or ex-
ness, (b) automatic and non-conscious processes whose
plicitly mediated behaviour to be observed across differ-
product we are directly conscious of in the form of what
ent participants, different experimental conditions, or dif-
we might want to call an intuitive feeling, and (c) fully
ferent stages of a study, are a particularly useful way to
conscious processes where we are to a larger extent aware
illustrate and study these states as dynamic gradations of
of the antecedents of our conscious representations.
consciousness (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002; Norman,
In this paper we have focused on the concept of in-
Price & Duff, 2006).
tuitive feelings. We have argued that Koriat’s (2000,
If we do not need the two-systems framework to ex-
2007) concept of experience-based metacognitive judge-
plain phenomena such as intuitive feelings, where does
ment and Mangan’s (1993, 2001, 2003) concept of fringe
this leave the status of the two-systems framework?
consciousness offer a convergent framework to de?ne a
The very idea of a rational conscious system that rum-
class of cognitively oriented intuitive feelings. We have
bles along in semi-independence from automatic non-
stressed that these intuitive states are conscious states,
conscious processes is perhaps a conceit that hangs on
not unconscious automatisms, and have explained why
from the days when the importance of the latter was not
this is functionally important. Lastly, we have suggested
even recognized. Violation of the sanctity of the rational
how such states can be empirically distinguished and il-
does not require postulating a distinct system for the ir-
lustrated our arguments with research in implicit learn-
rational. Rather, the inter-relation between the types of
ing where intuitive feelings may play an important role in
processes subsumed under S1 and S2 is so intimate as to
guiding decision behaviour.
melt the usefulness of the dichotomy. Kahneman (2002)
Intuitive feelings can be thought of as providing a kind
often draws on analogies between intuition and aspects
of summary interface between non-conscious and con-
of perception, but nobody would argue for two distinct
scious processes. They have a monitoring and control
perceptual systems on the grounds of the distinction be-

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