Currents in Contemporary Islam
in Indonesia






James J. Fox*
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University











Paper originally presented at

HARVARD ASIA VISION 21
29 April – 1 May, 2004
Cambridge, Mass

*Email Address: jjf400@coombs.anu.edu.au

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Currents in Contemporary Islam in Indonesia

James J. Fox
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University

Introduction

On the 29th of February 2004, thousands of robed members of Hizbut Tahrir marched
through the streets of downtown Jakarta to mark the 80th anniversary of the fall of the
caliphate – when Kemal Ataturk in the name of Turkish nationalism, having already
abolished the Ottoman sultanate, deposed its last sultan as Caliph.

Hizbut Tahrir is a ‘new’ Islamic movement in Indonesia, one among many whose
primary roots are planted within a wider Islamic ambience outside of Indonesia1. Its call
for the restoration of a universal caliphate and its rejection of nationalism and state power
would have, in an earlier period under President Suharto, met with immediate suspicion
and probable suppression. The movement is a good exemplar of the changing Indonesian
Islamic community, pointing metaphorically in two directions: to the contemporary state
of ferment in the Islamic world and to historical developments of the past century. Thus
the present situation in Indonesia, as indeed within the Islamic world as a whole, may be
considered in all of its immediacy or as the continuation of a long and as yet unresolved
phase in Muslim history.

For those who follow current Islamic debates on the Internet, Hizbut Tahrir is also
instructive. Within days of Syaikh ‘Abdurrahman Ad Dimasqiyah’s denunciation of the
Hizbut Tahrir in a sermon given in English (and probably delivered in England), an
appropriately edited version of this sermon appeared in Indonesian on the As-Salafy
website. Thus, as has been the case for centuries, Indonesia is firmly, intimately and
inextricably linked to diverse sources of ideas and debate in the Islamic world and
consequently subject to its many internal reverberations2.

1 Hizbut Tahrir (Hizb-e Tahrir) is by no means a ‘new’ movement elsewhere. Founded in the
Middle East, it has been in existence for decades and has active branches in Europe and the
United States. Hizbut Tahrir was brought to Indonesia from Australia. See Marcia Hermansen’s
“How to put the Genie Back in the Bottle? ‘Identity’ Islam and Muslim Youth Cultures in
America” pp.313-314 in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims (2003); Elizabeth Collins,
“Dakwah and Democracy” (nd).
2 Because of its historical receptiveness, Indonesia has some of the richest and most
diverse traditions in the Islamic world. The founding traditions of Islam in Indonesia
derive from a variety of sources – the Arab world, Persia, India and, as is becoming
increasingly evident, from the Muslim trading communities of southern China. Equally
important to the historical development of Islam has been the active pursuit of Islamic
teaching by generations of Indonesian Muslims who have journeyed to study in Mecca,
Cairo and other centers of learning in the Middle East. Although Sunni by long tradition,
Indonesian Muslims have also been open – and continue to be open – to Shia religious
ideas. There is therefore hardly a development in the Muslim world that does not have its

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Historical Observations: Foundations of Mutuality and Difference

Hizbut Tahrir’s agenda is a reminder that the period of the 1920s was as tumultuous a
time in Islamic history as the present. The end of the caliphate occurred in the same year
as the conquest of the Hejaz (Mecca and Medina) by the Wahabis under al-Saud. These
two events in 1924 produced reactions throughout the Islamic world including Indonesia.

Through much of the 19th century, there was an increasing movement of Indonesian
pilgrims to Mecca, many of whom stayed on to form what was called the Jawi
community. By the late 19th century this Jawi was one of the largest communities in
Mecca with its own contingent of distinguished teachers, some of whom were granted the
privilege of teaching within the Haram.

The Jawi community in Mecca was at the center of the activities of the tarekat (tariqa),
the Sufi mystic orders, whose reach extended widely in Indonesia. Of particular
importance was Shaykh Ahmad Khatib Sambas, a teacher at Masjid al-Haram, who is
credited with founding Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqshabandiyyah, a fusion of the separate
Qadiriyyah and Nashabandiyyah orders. He initiated various Indonesian kalifah whose
authority through different pesantren perpetuated the religious teachings (tasawwuf) and
devotional practices that are an essential (and characteristic) component of Indonesian,
particularly Javanese, Islam.

Increasingly, however, Cairo with its great teaching center, al-Azar, offered an alternative
to Mecca as a source of reforming ideas. A new generation of Indonesians were attracted
to Cairo and became deeply influenced by the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97)
interpreted initially by Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and later by his successor,
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) 3 . In particular, ‘Abduh ideas on educational reform and
technical advancement for Muslims were crucial to the founding of Muhammadiyah in
1912, which, to this day, continues as a major institution for the Islamic community of
Indonesia4.

counterpart in contemporary Indonesia. Without a doubt, the most useful starting point for an
understanding of the historical networks linking Southeast Asia to the Middle East is Azyumardi
Azra’s The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and
Middle Eastern ‘Ulama’ in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (2004). See also Peter
Riddell: Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses (2001).
3 These ideas were transmitted to Indonesia through two key literary publications: ‘Abduh and
Rida’s al-Manar (The Beacon) and its Sumatran counterpart al-Munir (The Radiant). For a period
of a few years from 1912, there was also a Malay paper, Al-Ittihahad (Unity) published in Cairo
by the small Jawi community studying there (see Laffan, 2003 pp.136-141). Also of great
importance for reformist ideas was the Malay publication, al-Imam, published in Singapore.
These and other print media sources were part of a wider national awakening that drew upon an
increasing educated population.
4Achmad Dachlan (1868-1923), the founder of Muhammadiyah, was the son of a khatib from
Yogyakarta. He studied in Mecca in the 1890s and was influenced by Achmad Khatib al-
Minangakabawi who was the leading Jawi teacher of his time. However, he was also strongly

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In Indonesia in the 1920s, amid strong nationalist stirrings, a division between self-
proclaimed ‘reformists and modernists’ and so-called ‘traditionalists’ came to the fore
over issues of the caliphate and of the conquest of Mecca by the Wahabi 5 . The
traditionalists whose links were to the learned community of Jawi teachers in Mecca were
deeply disturbed by the actions of the Wahabi and fearful of what might occur next. A
number of prominent members of the Jawi community were killed in the fighting and
many more suffered privations from the lack of supplies following the seizure of the holy
places. More importantly, however, core religious practices of the traditional Jawi –
particularly visitation (ziarah) to the tombs in Mecca and Medina, many of which were
the gathering place of the Sufi orders (tarekat) – were seen as heretical by the Wahabi
and forcibly suppressed.

Of these the most serious was the destruction of the tombs at the grave complex at
Medina. To the Kaum Tua Jawa this was seen as gross religious desecration. The
community feared that the tomb of the prophet would also be destroyed. As a result, more
than a third of the Jawi community returned to Indonesia en masse in a number of
chartered relief ships, bringing with them stories of sacrilege and atrocities.

By contrast, some reformists among the Kaum Muda saw merit in the changes that were
occurring in Mecca, which provided the opportunity to advance the reform ideas of
Muhammad ‘Abduh and others in Cairo. That Rashid Rida in Cairo proclaimed the
Wahabis to be the faction of ‘purest faith’ in Islam only increased the tension between the
two communities in Indonesia. Some of the Kaum Tua even went so far as to label the
Kaum Muda as ‘Wahabi’ – the worst possible term of derision. Having failed in an effort
to send a unified delegation from Indonesia to a conference on the Caliphate (initially to
Cairo, then later to Mecca), a group of twelve ulama, under the spiritual aegis of the
Hasyim Ashari (1875-1947) and the political guidance of Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, met
in Surabaya in January 1926 and formed the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU: The Awakening of
the Ulama) to represent and to defend their traditions of Islam6. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul
Ulama was to become the largest Islamic grouping in the country. The banner that the
NU adopted to represent itself was a globe that portrayed Indonesia within the Muslim
world7. In membership, NU was also to become the largest Muslim organization in the
Islamic world.

influenced by the ideas emanating from Cairo and is known to have subscribed to both al-Manar
and al-Munir.
5 This division was given a generational identification: the reformists who looked to Cairo were
identified as the Kaum Moeda (the Young Group); this group had a considerable Sumatran
component. By contrast, the traditionalists who had looked to Mecca were identified as the Kaum
Tua (the Old Group) and were comprised of a majority of the ulama and their followers in Java.
6 Because of what was happening in Mecca and Medina, the primary intention of the group of
ulama was to establish a “Komite Hijaz” to travel to Mecca to present their views to Ibn Sau’d;
the formation of Nahdlatul Ulama was intended to give domestic support to the Komite. Some
two years later, Wahab Chasbullah did lead a delegation from NU that met with Ibn Sau’d (see
Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relas-relasi Kuasa, Pencari Wacana Baru, 1994: 34).
7 Michael Laffan’s Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia (pp.222-231) provides an
excellent account of this period. He points out that the global representation adopted by Nahdlatul

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The late 1920s also saw the beginnings of another Muslim organization in Egypt, the
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin) under Syahid Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) that
would – some fifty years later – begin to exert influence in Indonesia. It took time and
contemporary pressures outside of Indonesia as well as conditions in Indonesia itself for
the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood to assume relevance suitable for their transmission
to Indonesia.

Modernists and Traditionalists in Indonesia

Historically, mutuality, rather than dichotomous opposition, has characterized relations
between ‘modernists’ and ‘traditionalists’ in Indonesia. The modernists, as represented by
Muhammadiyah and drawing specifically on the ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh that called
for the scientific and intellectual strengthening of the Muslim community, have had an
enormous influence through their own network of schools and universities but have also
influenced the traditionalists to adopt new methods of teaching and new subjects of study
within their own pesantren schooling system8.

In regard to the interpretation of Islamic law, most modernists (despite ‘Abhub’s
exhortations) and all traditionalists adhere to the Syafi’i mazhab. This marks a significant
defining characteristic of Islam in Southeast Asia – not just Indonesia but also Malaysia
and the Philippines9. Modernists, however, claim a degree of interpretative independence
(ijtihad) in arriving at decisions within the law whereas traditionalists insist on taqlid, an
interpretative process that relies critically on the teachings of the great ulama of the past.
This process is by no means as ‘rigid’ as the modernists claim. Indeed, some scholars
have observed that in the transition to the 21st century, traditionalist ulama show a greater
degree of flexibility in legal interpretation than modernists who still draw on a position
originally developed at the beginning of the 20th century.

It is largely in the practice of Islam that modernists differ from traditionalists. Modernists
do not participate in the tarekat, religious orders that are fundamental to NU, nor do they,

Ulama is modeled on a similar global representation on the cover of the publication, Seruan
Azhar (Call of Azhar), produced by the Kaum Muda community of students in Cairo in 1925. The
3rd al-Islam Conference in Surabaya, held in 1924 less than two years prior to the formation of
NU, was regarded as a model of Indonesian Muslim unity (see Bruinessen 1995).
8 For a basic historical study of Muhammadiyah and the development of its schooling system, see
Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under
Dutch Colonialism (1989). For an equivalent study of NU and its pesantren system, see Dhofier,
The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam on Java
(1982/1998)
9 Sunni Muslims recognize four mazhab: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Syafi’i. All are regarded as
orthodox but a Muslim should adhere to only one mazhab and not mix and choose among them.
As part of his reform agenda, Muhammad ‘Abduh called for the dissolution of the four mazhab.
Most of Egypt has continued to adhere to the Syafii mazhab. The Wahabi, in keeping with their
claim to follow the earliest forms of Islam (before any differentiation into mazhab) assert that
they belong to mazhab, yet their practice, in its literal emphasis, is aligned with the Hanbali
tradition.

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unlike the traditionalists, see Islamic mystic traditions (tasawwuf) as part of their practice
of Islam. Indeed they have little regard for the panoply of rituals that organize the lives of
most traditional Muslims10.

The most marked differences occur in regard to practices associated with the dead. These
practices for the traditionalists include a variety of ceremonies at the time of death,
visitations to the tombs of the so-called Wali Songo, the nine founders of Islam on Java
as well as to the graves of other local saints and revered ancestral personages 11 and large
commemorative gatherings, khaul, to honor deceased religious teachers (in Java known
as kyai) and their descendants. Modernists reject all of these practices, considering them
to be a sinful form of idolatry (syirk).

For traditionalists, such practices are all part of a chain of transmission, through
generations of saints and learned teachers, to the companions of the Prophet and to the
Prohet himself. As Abdurrahman Wahid is reported to have affirmed, membership in
Nahdlatul Ulama is an association that does not end with one’s death 12.

The Religious Foundations of the Nahdlatul Ulama

At the outset of his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid wrote a Foreword for the
publication of a short treatise Risalah Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah by his grandfather, the
Great Sheiyk, Hasyim Asy’ari, who was one of the founders of NU. The treatise was
originally written to define the ‘traditions’ that NU considers as central to its claim to
upholders of ‘sunnah and the Sunni community’ (alhusunnah wal jama’ah: Aswaja).

The Great Sheiyk defines this tradition succinctly and authoritatively: Sunnah can be
identified by an unbroken continuity with the past and by the avoidance of
innovation/deviation (bid’ah). Specifically for the Jawi, this tradition had clear
intellectual and religious foundations:


10 The best single account of the full range of these rituals can be found in the thesis/book by
Muhaimin on the Cirebon region of the north coast of Java, which was one of the earliest centers
of Islam on the island. This thesis, The Islamic Traditions of Cirebon: Adat and Ibadat among
Javanese Muslims (1995) has been published in Indonesian translation as Islam Dalam Bingkai
Budaya Lokal: Potret dari Cirebon (2001). Two other excellent studies of the practice of Islam at
the village level are theses by M. Bambang Pranowo, Creating Islamic Tradition in Rural Java
(1991) and Jamhari, Popular Voices of Islam: Discourse on Muslim Orientations in South
Central Java (2000). An illuminating study of reformism at the village level is Kim Hung-Jun,
Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Socio-
Religious Life (1996).
11 I have written a number of papers on the practice of ziarah in Java. See Fox 1991: ‘Ziarah
Visits to the Tombs of the Wali, The Founders of Islam on Java’; 1998:‘Wali: The First Preachers
of Islam in Java’; 2002: ‘Interpreting the Significance of Tombs and Chronicles in Contemporary
Java’. Another excellent paper on this topic is that by Jamhari 2000: ‘In the Centre of Meaning:
Ziarah Tradition in Java’.
12 See Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Back to Situbondo? Nahdlatul Ulama Attitudes towards
Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidency and Fall’ (nd).

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“Since the beginning, Muslims of the Jawa region have had one philosophy,
one mazhab, one source. In law (fiqh), they adhere to the great path, the
mazhab of Iman Syafi’i; in theology (ushuluddin), they follow the path of
Abu Al-Hasan Al-Asyari; and in mystic teachings (tasawwuf), they follow
the path of Imam Al-Ghazali and Imam Abi Al-Hasan As-Syadzili.” (1999:7)

He then goes on to contrast this tradition with the emergence of innovation among
Muslims in Java. He alludes to the two most important modernists of his time,
Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rasyid Ridla but instead of assigning deviation (bid’ah) to them,
he attributes it to the influence in their thinking of Ahmad bin Taimiyyah and his
students13. This carries the argument within Islam itself back from the 20th century to the
14th century. It is also a prescient perception of a continuing difference.

Virtually all Islamic ‘reformists’ – whether of the Wahabi tradition, or of the Al-
Afghani/’Abduh modernist tradition, or of the Al-Banna/Sayyid Qutb tradition of the
Muslim Brotherhoods – draw inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimiyyah. When
combined within Hanbali mazhab, which is the most emphatically literal in its
interpretation of fiqh, such reforming ideas stand in stark contrast to the traditions that
Hasyim Ashy’ari defines as sunnah. By the same token, these reformists would reject the
teachings of Al-Asyari and Al-Ghazali. These differences are therefore not peripheral
but central and fundamental.

Tauhid, Ibadah and Dakwah

Nothing is more fundamental in Islam than an understanding of tauhid, the conception of
the ‘Unity of God’. If one adopts an idea of tauhid that excludes all analogy, similarity or
quality – as do the Wahabi in their strict interpretation as true ‘Unitarians’ or as other
reformists do in keeping with Ibn Taimiyyah’s ideas – then one’s conception can only
proceed by negation. The total Otherness of God stands in opposition to, and in total
contrast with, the world as it is known.

If, on the other hand, one adopts an inclusive conception of tauhid in accordance with the
ideas of Al-Asyari and more particularly those of Al-Ghazali and other Sufi teachers,
then one’s conception is based on affirmation. God informs the world and it is possible to
strive for the Sufi ideal of union with God – something that reformists regard as
inconceivable and utterly blasphemous14.


13 It is interesting to note that Hasyim Asy’ari reserves his strongest criticism for Ibn Taimiyyah
over the issue of visitations to the Tomb of the Prophet. He cites Taimiyyah’s assertion that
however well intentioned Muslims may be in performing ziarah to the Prophet’s tomb as an act
of worship (ibadah), such actions are strictly forbidden (1999:8).
14 These differences are said to be expressed in contrasting interpretative views of the Muslim
testimony of faith (shahadah): the reformist view by negation: There is no god except Allah; and
the traditional view by affirmation: There is no god except Allah. (See Tawhid in the The
Concise Encyclopedia of Islam 1989:400.)

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These fundamental differences in regard to the world influence the way in which Islam is
practiced and most pertinently, the way Islam is preached. For the traditionalists, all
actions depend on intention (niyat). Thus intention defines and transforms one’s actions15.
By this means, all one’s deeds, works and actions can be transformed into a kind of
worship (ibadah/ibadat).

This traditionalist view is clearly expressed by Muhaimin in his study of the Islamic
traditions of the Javanese of Cirebon. Quoting Nasr16, he writes:

“Thus…`everything is essentially sacred and nothing is profane because
everything bears within itself the fragrance of the Divine.’ Therefore, ibadat,
in this sense, may range from expressing daily courtesies to such things as
the formal and solemn invocation both in and outside of formal prescribed
prayers, and other forms of worship…Thus, the distinction between amal
[one’s work] and ibadat becomes elusive. Both ibadat and amal require niyat
(intention) which becomes the stamp that the work is for God. Another way
to ensure intention is by uttering or murmuring Basmalah (a phrase, saying
‘In the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the Merciful’). Thus doing any (good)
thing, a religious or worldly matter, become ibadat, by merely preceding it
with Basmalah.” (1995:118-119)

In this view, all that is not forbidden (haram) can be made Islamic. For a traditionalist,
‘islamizing’ the world has more to do with consecrating the world than with transforming
it. The exemplary methods cited for this process of ‘islamizing’ [mengislamkan] the
world are those of the earliest founders of Islam, the great Wali or Saints of Java17.

Dakwah, the preaching of Islam, takes on a different sense for most reformists. Among
reformists, there are degrees and gradations in how God’s otherness from the world is
conceived and in how this effects and directs one’s relation to it. For most reformists, this
requires some form of separation and distinction. Flirtation with the ways of the world is
not possible. The call for dakwah therefore requires a double transformation: a
transformation of the Muslim community (umat) with a corresponding transformation of
the world. How radical a transformation is needed depends on how alien or threatening
the ways of the world are seen to be. The most convincing models for such
transformation draw their inspiration from the actions of the Prophet and his Companions.

15 The five primary guiding principles of NU (al-qawa’id al-khams al kubra) are: 1) Each action
depends on the intention; 2) Certainty can not be removed by doubt; 3) Danger must be
eliminated; 4) Whatever has become customary is acknowledged; and 5) Difficulty brings ease.
Behind these simple seeming maxims lies a complex erudition that supports the application of
these principles. See Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Islam: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama,
1952-1967 (1998), particularly Chapter II, Religio-Political Thought, 48-78.
16 S. H. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought (1981:7)
17 A good example of this view can be found in Widji Saksono’s Mengislamkan Tanah Jawa:
Telaah atas Methode Dakwah Walisongo [Islamizing Jawa: A Study based on the Methods of
Preaching by the Nine Saints] (1995), a volume that has gone through multiple reprints.

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For some, the possibilities for a transformed and viable Muslim community require an
Islamic state.

The Tarbiyah Movement

Allegiances to different streams of Muslim orientation in Indonesia are difficult to
determine with precision. One recent survey reported that forty-two percent of
Indonesia’s Muslim population of over 200 million aligned themselves with the NU
traditions and twelve percent with the Muhammadiyah traditions18. Historically NU has
had a strong rural basis, particularly in Java, whereas Muhammidayah has been strongly
urban and distinctly middle-class in memberships. For the past two decades or more,
these distinctions have begun to blur and for many of a younger generation, different
streams of thought have merged. Reform and renewal have taken new directions outside
the bounds of previous allegiance. Even to identify the directions of various new
movements within Indonesia is problematic in that they exist in a flux of development.

The most significant of these movements is identified by different names and includes
within it a number of streams. Some observers refer to this movement as the Dakwah
movement, others refer to it as the Tarbiyah movement. At its inception, it was called the
Salman Mosque movement and became (and remains) a campus-based revival movement.
It is also the movement in which the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwanul Muslimin)
were able to take root and flourish19

The initial stirrings of this movement in Bandung during the 1970s were considered a
prelude to the beginning of the 15th century according to the Islamic calendar, a century
anticipated as a period of Islamic resurgence 20 . It also coincided with the Islamic
Revolution in Iran. The leader of the movement that began at the Salman Mosque, was an
electrical engineer, M. Imaduddin Abdulrahmin, who held a teaching position at the
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Indonesia’s most prestigious institution of higher
learning for science and technology.


18 This and other surveys of a similar kind have been conducted by the Centre for the Study of
Islam and Society in Indonesia (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat) in Jakarta and
published in Tempo. See, for example, Tempo 29 December 2001.
19 The literature on this movement provides a varied glance at its development. There is an
excellent thesis by Rifki Rosyad, A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence
Movement among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia, which focuses on the early phase of the
movement in Bandung. V. S. Naipaul happened to visit Bandung at this time and has reproduced
an interview with the movement’s founder in his book, Among the Believers. A useful recent
book, which began as a sociology thesis at the University of Indonesia, by Ali Said Damanik,
Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahu Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia covers the
movement into its political phase. There are also valuable analyses, as yet unpublished: “Dakwah
and Democracy: The Significance of Party Keadilan and Hizbut Tharir” by Elizabeth Collins and
“Creating ‘Total Muslims’: The Tarbiyah Movement and the Rise of Neo-Revivalism in
Indonesia” by Greg Fealy.
20 According to a well-known Hadith, at the turn of each new century there should occur a call for
religious renewal and a return to the basic sources of Islam. See Rifki Rosyad, 1995: 9-10.

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Imaduddin or “Bang Imad”, as he was popularly referred to, was a Sumatran whose
father had studied at Al-Azhar in Cairo and had become one of the leaders of the
Masyumi party before President Suharto banned it in his attempt to control and direct
Muslim politics during the New Order21. Imaduddin studied at ITB and then did a
Masters degree at Iowa State University. After returning to teach at ITB, he took up a
position at the University of Technology Malaysia (ITM) in Kuala Lumpur22. Throughout
his career – as a counter to what he regarded as the extreme secularization of national
universities – Imaduddin involved himself in student affairs and in a variety of Islamic
training activities.

Under the auspices of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations,
Imaduddin was able to travel widely and to establish contact with other Islamic
organizations. On his return to Bandung in the early 1970s, he transformed his Islamic
training program, originally known as the Latihan Managemen Dakwah [Dakwah
Management Training], into the Latihan Dakwah Mujahid [Dakwah Defender Training].
For his new training program, he relied upon key ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood
[Ikhwanul Muslimin] of Egypt and, to a lesser extent, those of the Jami’at Islami of
Pakistan. These included both religious and organizational ideas, focusing on small
groups (referred to as usroh) of university students who underwent intensive training that
concluded with a commitment to the group and its struggle and to an involvement in
future mentoring at different levels extending to the junior high school level. The teachers
(murabbi) for this training were not drawn from Indonesia’s ulama but were those who
had been trained in the same process. Commitment was dependent on group cohesion and
to becoming ‘complete’ or ‘total’ (kaaffah) Muslims. This invariably required a
distinctive expression of life-style such as jilbab for women and beards, if possible, for
men and a preference for alternative Muslim forms of music (nasyid). Tarbiyah refers to
the whole of the process of education or guidance that is to lead to this personal
transformation as a total Muslim23.

Although the name of his training exercises was changed and Imaduddin himself was
detained and never returned to teach at ITB, the campus movement he initiated spread
rapidly from Bandung to other national university campuses throughout Indonesia.
During the 1980s and into the 1990s there occurred a succession of national conferences
to coordinate Campus Preaching Organization (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus) activities and

21 The banning of Masyumi led Mohammed Natsir and other leaders of the party to establish the
Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching [DII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia] whose
purpose was to islamize Indonesian society. Its focus, like that of the movement that Imaduddin
initiated, was to the educated community and particularly university students. The two, though
independent, worked in tandem and in concert with one another. Natsir and his DII associates,
many of them returned graduates from the Middle East, formed the Indonesian Committee for
Solidarity with the Muslim World (KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam) that
called for militant action in the defence of Islam.
22 Imaduddin became involved in ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Muslim Youth
Movement of Malaysia) and had Anwar Ibrahim as one of his students.
23 Damanik in his book on the Tarbiyah movement, Fenomena Partai Keadilan (2002: 109-139),
provides an outline of the training process of the movement as it had taken shape in the 1990s.

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