Like and Language Ideology

LIKE AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY:
DISENTANGLING FACT
FROM FICTION
ALEXANDRA D'ARCY
University of Canterbury
abstract: The selective attention paid to the language of adolescents has led to the en-
during belief that young people are ruining the language and that, as a consequence,
the language is degenerating. One feature of contemporary vernaculars that is often
held up as exemplification of these ideological principles is like, the "much-deplored
interjection . . . that peppers the talk of so many of the unpliant young these days"
(Wilson 1987, 92). There is, in fact, an intricate lore surrounding like. It includes
the idea that like is meaningless, that women say it more than men do, and that it is
an Americanism, introduced by the Valley Girls. This article systematically addresses
ideologically driven myths about the uses and users of like. Drawing on empirical
data, it seeks to disentangle the facts from the fiction that has been cultivated in the
general social consciousness. It is argued that most beliefs about like are either false
(e.g., meaninglessness, Valley Girl creationism) or too broad to reflect any coherent
reality (e.g., the role of women). However, in examining individual beliefs about like,
it becomes clear that each contributes to the perpetuation of others in important
and nontrivial ways.
Throughout the inhabited world, in all times and under every circumstance,
the myths of man have flourished. [Campbell 1949, 13]
Campbell was referring to traditional mythology, yet there is a link
here to language ideology, since it is likely that myths about language have
flourished for as long as language has functioned in social contexts, that is,
from the beginning. Modern examples include the belief that right-handed
people are more proficient linguistically than left-handed people, that double
negatives are illogical, that women talk too much, that King Arthur spoke
English, and most notably, that the media/America/teenagers are ruining
the language. This final grouping belongs to the overarching and timeless
gestalt that the language is degenerating.1 Ideologies such as these are wide-
spread, virtually intractable, and so deeply ingrained as part of one's cultural
heritage that they often cease to be recognized for the myths they are (see
also Bauer and Trudgill 1998, xvi). As a result, they tend to be accepted,
generally unquestioningly, as fact.
American Speech, Vol. 82, No. 4, Winter 2007 doi 10.1215/00031283-2007-025
Copyright 2007 by the American Dialect Society
386

---

Like and Language Ideology
387
From a linguistic perspective, the veracity of individual language myths
is often dubious if not fictional. But like traditional myths, language myths
reflect the society that produces them, and for this reason they offer important
insights into cultural attitudes and mores. For example, ongoing language
change is often met with derision. This may reflect a general unease with
change in any form, but when considering language, it typically results in
the characterization of new forms as sloppy, lazy, ignorant, or vulgar. These
are, of course, social rather than linguistic notions, but the recurrence of
such comments underlies the poignancy of the sentiment. A particularly
interesting aspect of the social context of language change is that from a
diachronic perspective, the cumulative effects of change are unexceptional,
yet in synchronic time individual changes are synonymous with degradation.
As Ogden Nash writes in "Laments for a Dying Language" (cited in Aitchison
1981, 17): "Farewell, farewell to my beloved language / Once English, now
a vile orangutanguage."
Inevitably, language change is always most advanced among younger
speakers. A peak in the progress of change among adolescent cohorts is a
recurrent finding of apparent-time studies (Labov 2001, 454; Chambers
2003, 223; Tagiamonte and D'Arcy 2007b) and has come to be seen as a
criterial feature of ongoing change (Labov 2001, 455). Because this peak
typically occurs among speakers between the ages of 13 and 17, it is not a
coincidence that children and adolescents are singled out as the primary
offenders in the linguistic arena. The proposed solution to the "language
misuse" of younger generations is often more rigid teaching standards, a
suggestion that undoubtedly draws on another folk belief: that children
learn the fundamentals of the spoken language at school. As James Milroy
(1998, 63) points out, since children have already acquired the basic spoken
grammar by the time they arrive at school, complaints about the way young
people speak are not about language ability; they are about language vari-
ety. And as just discussed, it is adolescent varieties that are at the forefront
of ongoing linguistic changes.
One feature of contemporary vernaculars currently subject to widespread
condemnation is like when used in the ways highlighted in (1).
1. a. He was like, "Yeah so I'm going out with Clara now." And then she sounded
really disappointed; she was like, "Yeah she's really smart." So then he
was like, "I kind of feel bad, but then again, I don't." [N/f/18]2
b. He looks like he's like twelve or like eight. [2/f/16]
c. Like if you're doing your undergrad, no big deal. Like it's not that bad, but
like I'm in a professional school. I want to be a professional. [N/f/26]
d. Like the first hour I was like totally fine, like I wasn't like drunk. [3/
m/18]

---

388
american speech 82.4 (2007)
As with all forms involved in change, like is associated in popular culture with
adolescents and young adults, and perceptual investigations by Dailey-O'Cain
(2000) and Buchstaller (2006b) have documented the strength of this belief.
Older speakers seldom claim to use like themselves, characterizing its occur-
rence in their vernaculars as rare or nonexistent, while younger age groups
stipulate to its regularity in their own speech (Dailey-O'Cain 2000, 69).
There is an intricate and multifaceted lore surrounding like. The belief
that younger speakers alone are responsible for the propagation of like con-
stitutes just one part of the complex. This conglomerate of beliefs is the focus
of the current analysis. As with other language ideologies, those surrounding
like have been cultivated by popular consensus, but such consensus is not
necessarily informed by empirical truth(s). Thus, in examining beliefs about
like, my intention is to disentangle fact from fiction. Many of the commonly
held beliefs about like will be shown to be false, while others are simply too
broad to reflect any coherent reality. In such cases, certain aspects of the
myth may bear merit, though as encapsulated the belief itself remains un-
motivated. However, in examining individual beliefs about like, it becomes
clear that each contributes to the perpetuation of others in important and
nontrivial ways to create a unified whole.
THE LIKE LANGUAGE MYTH
Entwined with the multitude of beliefs about like are a number of subjective
reactions to the use of this form. These include the feeling that it is an exas-
perating tic and that it makes those who use it seem less educated, intelligent,
or interesting (Dailey-O'Cain 2000, 73; Buchstaller 2006b, 371). Indeed,
general attitudes toward like are overtly negative (De Quincey 1840-41, 224;
Jespersen 1942, 417; Schourup 1983, 29; Dailey-O'Cain 2000, 69-70). It is
not the aim of this article to address or to change such attitudes, though such
consequences may inadvertently result from the discussion. Rather, the focus
is centered on those aspects of the myth that can be dispelled objectively,
drawing on empirical data. Thus, the beliefs to be examined are those listed
here, for which there is evidence of the ways in which the folklore either
reflects or obscures actual usage:
Like is just like, that is, there is one like that is recycled repeatedly.
Like is meaningless; it simply signals a lack of articulacy.
Women say like more than men do.
Like began with the Valley Girls.
Only young people, and adolescents in particular, use like.
Like can be used anywhere in a sentence.

---

Like and Language Ideology
389
METHOD
The primary body of evidence brought to bear here on the issues encom-
passed by the like myth consists of corpus data from a large archive of spoken
contemporary English. The materials were collected in Toronto, Canada,
in the period between 2002 and 2004, using a combination of quota-based
random sampling and social networking.3 The full Toronto English Archive
comprises over 350 hours of casual conversational data with speakers between
the ages of 9 and 92, all of whom were born and raised in the city; the sample
used for the current analysis is outlined in table 1.
With the largest metropolitan population in Canada, Toronto presents
an ideal context in which to examine urban vernacular usage. Toronto is also
the fourth largest city in English-speaking North America; only New York,
Los Angeles, and Chicago have larger populations (WorldAtlas.com 2006).
Although General Canadian English differs from General American English
in a number of respects, the uses of like exemplified in (1) are shared by both
varieties. Consequently, Toronto English is taken here to represent North
American English more generally, an assumption that is further supported
by two factors. First, models of spatial diffusion (Trudgill 1974; Bailey et
al. 1994; Labov 2003) highlight the crucial role of cities in the spread of
linguistic features. Typically, new forms spread hierarchically from an origi-
nating center. Although some changes are seemingly arrested by national
boundaries (e.g., the Northern Cities Shift), others are not (e.g., uvular (r)
in Europe; Trudgill 1974). Second, the vast body of research investigating
quotative be like (as in 1a) has revealed regular trends across American and
table 1
The Sample
Age
Male
Female
Total
10-12
5
5
10
15-16
4
4
8
17-19
5
5
10
20-24
5
5
10
25-29
5
5
10
30-39
5
5
10
40-49
4
4
8
50-59
4
4
8
60-69
4
4
8
70-79
3
4
7
80+
4
4
8
total
48
49
97

---

390
american speech 82.4 (2007)
Canadian Englishes, showing that this form is consistently constrained in the
U.S. and Canada (e.g., Blyth, Recktenwald, and Wang 1990; Singler 2001;
Cukor-Avila 2002; Tagliamonte and D'Arcy 2004, 2007a). Similarly, there
is striking consistency in observations about nonquotative uses of like (as in
1b-1d) regardless of locale (e.g., Schourup 1983; Underhill 1988; Meehan
1991; Romaine and Lange 1991; Dailey-O'Cain 2000; D'Arcy 2005, 2006).
From this we can extrapolate that regardless of issues of origin, like is a feature
of North American English more generally.
The age range in table 1 signals a crucial respect in which the method
adopted here differs from previous discussions of like. While a number of
researchers have considered quotative be like (as in 1a) from a generational
perspective (Ferrara and Bell 1995; Cukor-Avila 2002; Buchstaller 2004,
2006a; Barbieri 2007; Tagliamonte and D'Arcy 2007a), examinations of
other vernacular uses of like (as in 1b-1d) have focused on specific subsec-
tions of the population: preadolescents, adolescents, or young adults (e.g.,
Underhill 1988; Miller and Weinert 1995; Andersen 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001;
Siegel 2002; Hasund 2003). With the exception of Dailey-O'Cain (2000), no
analysis of nonquotative uses has considered the full age spectrum within a
community. Even Buchstaller (2001), which provides a perspective on ver-
nacular uses of like within a single family, is limited to one college-age woman
and three middle-aged adults (late 40s to mid-50s). Consequently, the upper
edge of such uses remains unclear, yet this point bears directly on issues of
language change, stability, and age grading, as well as those surrounding the
purported genesis of like in discourse. This lack of information regarding
adult cohorts has obscured our understanding of like, and as will be shown,
in so doing it has contributed to like ideologies in a number of ways.
The current method differs from that of previous analyses in three further
ways. First, I distinguish between different discourse functions of like in ver-
nacular usage. Second, I treat each of these separately, carefully circumscrib-
ing the variable context according to structural diagnostics within functional
domains. Third, I consider not only those contexts where like does occur, but
also those where it does not. The methodology has been described in detail
in D'Arcy (2005) and is too elaborate to repeat in full here, but crucially,
the delimitation of the envelope of variation along syntactic parameters
allows for objective analysis of like following the principle of accountability
(Labov 1972, 72). Occurrences of like are contrasted with whatever form with
which they may alternate in any given function, including nothing, other
discourse makers (you know, well), other verbs of quotation (say, think), and so
on. Exemplification is provided in (2) using the clause-initial context. This
methodology offers a unique perspective on the use of like in the community
and exposes details previously unavailable for consideration.

---

Like and Language Ideology
391
2. a. O Nobody said a word. Like my first experience with death was this Italian
family. [N/f/82]
b. You know, like the people were very, very friendly. You know, O we'd sit
out in the park and talk with different people. [N/f/60]
c. And O my other cat always sleeps, and like we almost never see him.
[3/m/11]
DISENTANGLING FACT FROM FICTION
In discussing the beliefs surrounding like, it is important to bear in mind
that certain aspects of the myth are more general than others, which may be
somewhat restricted regionally. For example, while the association of like with
younger speakers seems to hold across the English-speaking world, there is
evidence that its associations with both women and the United States are vari-
ably salient. In North America, the frequency of like in the speech of women
and the focus on California are overtly acknowledged as key elements in the
received wisdom surrounding vernacular uses (e.g., Dailey-O'Cain 2000). In
the New Zealand context, the pivotal role of women remains fundamental,
but the Valley Girl link is more tenuous, especially among older speakers
who may not be familiar with this particular social grouping. This is not to
say that the perception of like as either an American or more specifically a
Californian feature does not persevere. Indeed, anecdotal evidence clearly
associates like with the United States. In the United Kingdom, Buchstaller
(2006b, 369-70) investigated attitudes toward quotative be like and found
that although a substantial proportion of speakers associate the form with
women (34%; N = 101), the majority (59%) are in fact noncommittal to
any gender pattern. Moreover, only 12% of responses associated be like with
America, compared to the 74% response rate for "no idea" for its regional
affiliation (N = 90; Buchstaller 2006b, 374). Thus, the details of the like lan-
guage myth clearly differ somewhat across varieties of English. That such is
the case serves as an important reminder of the culturally dependent nature
of myths in general. In what follows, however, I attempt to address each part
of the myth apart from cultural context, focusing on the content of the belief
itself rather than the social milieu that may have led to its formation in the
communal consciousness.
Like is just like (and it is meaningless). In the media there is a tendency
to talk of like as a single, monolithic entity, and metalinguistic commentary
typically involves performative speech in which most, if not all, the uses
demonstrated in (1) are modeled. There are, however, four uses that draw
attention in vernacular speech. Each is functionally distinct and can be

---

392
american speech 82.4 (2007)
distinguished from the "grammatical" and largely unremarkable uses in
(3).4
3. a. verb: I don't really like her that much. [2/f/12]
b. noun: He grew up with the likes . . . of all great fighters. [N/m/60]
c. adverb: It looks like a snail; it just is a snail. [I/f/19]
d. conjunction: It felt like everything had dropped away. [I/m/40]
e. suffix: I went, "[mumbling]" or something like stroke-like. [N/f/31]
To distinguish between the forms in (3), which have long been features
of both written and spoken English (Romaine and Lange 1991, 244), and
the forms in (1), which are largely restricted to informal discourse, I will
refer to the latter as vernacular uses/functions of like. This signals
quite clearly the existence of more than one like in discourse. The functions
included in the vernacular category are quotative complementizer (as in 4),
approximative adverb (as in 5), discourse marker (as in 6), and discourse
particle (as in 7).5
4. quotative complementizer
a. And we were like, "Yeah but you get to sleep like three-quarters of your
life." He was like, "That's an upside." [2/f/12]
b. I was like, "Where do you find these people?" [I/f/19]
5. approximative adverb
a. It could have taken you all day to go like thirty miles. [N/f/76]
b. You-know, it was like a hundred and four [degrees], but it lasted for about
two weeks. [N/m/84]
6. discourse marker
a. Nobody said a word. Like my first experience with death was this Italian
family. [N/f/82]
b. I love Carrie. Like Carrie's like a little like out-of-it but like she's the fun-
niest. Like she's a space-cadet. [3/f/18]
7. discourse particle
a. Well you just cut out like a girl figure and a boy figure and then you'd cut
out like a dress or a skirt or a coat, and like you'd color it. [N/f/75]
b. And they had like scraped her. [I/m/35]
c. She's like dumb or something. Like I love her but she's like dumb. [3/
f/18]
As a quotative, like occurs with the dummy form be to support inflection
and to satisfy the requirement that the clause have a lexical verb (see Romaine
and Lange 1991, 261-62). This collocation performs the specialized role of
introducing reported speech, thought, and nonlexicalized sounds, among a
range of other content (i.e., constructed dialogue; Tannen 1986, 315).
Since Butters's (1982) editor's note in American Speech, quotative be like has

---

Like and Language Ideology
393
received vast attention in the sociolinguistic literature (e.g., Schourup 1983;
Blyth, Recktenwald, and Wang 1990; Meehan 1991; Romaine and Lange
1991; Ferrara and Bell 1995; Tagliamonte and Hudson 1999; Singler 2001;
Cukor-Avila 2002; Buchstaller 2004, 2006a; D'Arcy 2004; Tagliamonte and
D'Arcy 2004, 2007a); there is little more to add here. I will simply reiterate
what has been said elsewhere: be like is an innovation, representing ongoing
change.6
Use of the quotative is constrained by both language-internal (e.g.,
person, tense, and temporal reference, content of the quote) and language-
external (e.g., gender, age) factors. The relevance of the linguistic factors is
twofold: one, the operation of grammatical constraints reveals systematicity;
and two, such constraints highlight the unique function of be like, not only
within the quotative paradigm but vis-a-vis other vernacular uses of like which
do not share these same conditions on use. The relevance of the social factors
will be broached later in the discussion. Finally, the quotative is referentially
contentful, functioning as a synonym for a range of verbs within the quotative
repertoire, such as say, think, ask, and the like. This last point is demonstrated
in (8), which restates the examples from (4) using more traditional verbs of
quotation in place of be like.
8. a. And we said, "Yeah but you get to sleep like three-quarters of your life."
He said, "That's an upside."
b. I thought, "Where do you find these people?"
The second vernacular use of like denotes concise propositional content
as well. It is used to signal approximation, and it is an adverb (D'Arcy 2006).
Thus (5b), repeated here as (9a), in which like and about alternate, can be
paraphrased straightforwardly with about alone as in (9b), or simply with like,
as in (9c), without affecting the meaning.
9. a. You-know, it was like a hundred and four [degrees] but it lasted for about
two weeks. [N/m/84]
b. You-know, it was about a hundred and four [degrees] but it lasted for
about two weeks.
c. You-know, it was like a hundred and four [degrees] but it lasted for like
two weeks.
The synonymy illustrated in (9) has been noted since the earliest work
on vernacular uses of like. Schourup (1983, 30) notes that before numerical
expressions, "approximately or about or around can be substituted for like . . .
without noticeably altering their meaning or acceptability," and Underhill
(1988, 234) excludes like a priori as an approximative when it precedes
quantified phrases. That like should convey such meanings falls out from

---

394
american speech 82.4 (2007)
processes of semantic change, since it has long conveyed approximative
content in English (Meehan 1991; Romaine and Lange 1991), yet it is rarely
seen as grounds for distinguishing a distinct function in the folk linguistic
lore surrounding like. It is interesting to note, for example, that Newman
(1974, 15) illustrates "meaningless speech" with the phrase like six feet tall
(cited in Schourup 1983, 29).
The third vernacular function of like is the discourse marker. Markers fill
the syntactic adjunct slot, adjoining in English to the left periphery of CP, the
functional projection that dominates the clause (i.e., (2); see Kiparsky 1995;
Traugott 1997; D'Arcy 2005; Traugott and Dasher 2002). This position fol-
lows from their pragmatic role, which is to signal the sequential relationship
between units of discourse, whether it be one of exemplification, illustra-
tion, explanation, or the like (Fraser 1988, 1990; Brinton 1996). As such,
they operate in the textual component, marking discourse and information
structure. Consequently, markers are sometimes referred to as "discourse
deictics" (Schiffrin 1987) or "discourse connectives" (Blakemore 1987).
The examples in (6) illustrate the use of like as a discourse marker,
where it brackets elements of talk (e.g., Schiffrin 1987, 31). Although the
bracketing is local in that like links contiguous utterances, discourse mark-
ers may also link noncontiguous stretches of discourse (see Schiffrin 1992).
Other markers in English include so, then, and well, as well as parentheticals
such as I/you know, I guess, and I think (Brinton 1996; Traugott and Dasher
2002). Indeed, these last can often be felicitously substituted for like without
affecting the epistemic stance of the utterance. This is exemplified in (10).
A characteristic trait of pragmatic features in general is their lack of lexical
meaning (Ostman 1982). Nonetheless, markers are not a trivial resource
in discourse despite the difficulties inherent in trying to define them in
referential terms. Rather, they are "essential to the rhetorical shape of any
argument or narrative" (Traugott and Dasher 2002, 154).
10. a. Like one of my cats meows so much, 'cause like he's really picky and
everything. [3/m/11]

b. I mean one of my cats meows so much, 'cause you know he's really picky
and everything.
The final vernacular function of like to be discussed here is the discourse
particle, which--in contrast to the marker--occurs within the clause as dem-
onstrated in (7). A number of pragmatic functions have been proposed for
this use of like, including pausal interjection (Schourup 1983), focus (Un-
derhill 1988), and nonequivalence between form and intention (Schourup
1983; Andersen 1997, 1998, 2001). Unlike quotative be like, approximative
adverb like, and discourse marker like, particle like cannot be glossed. This

---

Like and Language Ideology
395
does not mean, however, that it serves no purpose. Whereas markers func-
tion at the textual level, particles operate in the interpersonal realm, aiding
cooperative aspects of communication such as checking or expressing un-
derstanding. They may also generate a sense of sharing or intimacy between
interlocutors (Ostman 1982; Schourup 1983, 1999; Schiffrin 1987). Indeed,
the discourse saliency of particles is quite high, since interactions in which
particles do not occur can be perceived as unnatural, awkward, dogmatic,
or even unfriendly (Brinton 1996, 35). Such is also the case with like. In a
matched-guise experiment, Dailey-O'Cain (2000, 73) found that although
like guises were rated as less intelligent than non-like guises, speakers were
rated significantly more attractive, cheerful, and friendly when they used
like as opposed to when they did not. Thus, regardless of subjective attitudes
toward like more generally (i.e., whether speakers like like or not), it serves
important and palpable social functions in face-to-face interactions.
In sum, there is clearly more than one like in discourse. Even though
what is heard consistently is /laIk/, this unit of sounds is not simply recycled
in various frames as an undifferentiated entity. Rather, it is a versatile form,
performing multiple--and distinct--vernacular functions. In attending to
the belief that like is just like, we simultaneously address another part of the
myth, which is that like is a meaningless interjection. Each vernacular form of
like has a unique function. It therefore follows that each has a unique mean-
ing, whether such meaning is primarily referential or pragmatic. To suggest
that like is no more than a linguistic crutch, signaling hesitancy and a lack of
fluency or articulation (e.g., Siegel 2002, 47; see also citations in Diamond
2000, 2 and Levey 2003, 24), trivializes the complex juxtaposition of func-
tions performed by this lexeme in the spoken language (see Levey 2003).
In recognizing that numerous functions of like are operative in vernacular
usage, the myth of meaninglessness is simultaneously demystified.
women say like all the time. Another widely held belief concerning the
vernacular forms of like is that men use them less often than women do, an
ideology substantiated by Dailey-O'Cain (2000, 68-69). She gave her par-
ticipants a written questionnaire that included two sample sentences, one
demonstrating the particle and one demonstrating the quotative. Asked
whether they associate like with men or women, the overwhelming major-
ity of the participants, nearly 83% (N = 40), responded in favor of women.
Given the multiple vernacular functions of like, however, this question is not
as straightforward as it may seem. There is also the issue of quantification.
What counts as "more"? Variationist analyses of the quotative system gener-
ally follow the principle of accountability (Labov 1972, 72) and consider the
frequency of be like relative to all other verbs of quotation in some body of

---