Managerial Discretion and the Capital Structure Dynamics
Ayla Kayhan*
Louisiana State University
November 18, 2007
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of managerial discretion on capital structure
dynamics. Analyses of financing decisions indicate that managers with more
discretion prefer issuing equity over debt and repurchasing debt over equity.
Examination of leverage changes suggests that increases in debt ratios due to
positive and negative financial deficits are greater for managers with high discretion,
where the effect of negative financial deficit on leverage changes is twice as strong
as that of positive financial deficit. Finally, building on the documented market
timing effect on capital structure I find that decreases in leverage due to equity
issuance following increases in stock prices are greater when managers have
discretion.
* Department of Finance, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, e‐mail: akayhan@lsu.edu,
phone: (225) 578‐6236. This paper is previously titled as Managerial Entrenchment and the Debt‐Equity
Choice.
Add the thanks.
Managerial Discretion and the Capital Structure Dynamics
November 18, 2007
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of managerial discretion on capital structure
dynamics. Analyses of financing decisions indicate that managers with more
discretion prefer issuing equity over debt and repurchasing debt over equity.
Examination of leverage changes suggests that increases in debt ratios due to
positive and negative financial deficits are greater for managers with high discretion,
where the effect of negative financial deficit on leverage changes is twice as strong
as that of positive financial deficit. Finally, building on the documented market
timing effect on capital structure I find that decreases in leverage due to equity
issuance following increases in stock prices are greater when managers have
discretion.
Managerial Discretion and the Capital Structure Dynamics
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), the influence of managerial incentives on
capital structure choices has attracted considerable attention. Theories have posited
that managers prefer to keep debt ratios low to reduce risk and protect their
undiversified human capital, to alleviate the pressure that comes with interest payment
commitments, or to benefit from opportunities associated with running a less levered
firm where investment capital can be easily raised.1 Others have argued the contrary,
pointing out that managers prefer higher leverage to reduce the probability of a
takeover either by reducing the acquirers’ interest due to transfer of value from
shareholders to debt holders or by inflating their voting power.2 Furthermore,
managers may choose higher leverage to convince investors of their ability to generate
sufficient earnings to repay their debt.3 Finally, recent survey evidence of Graham and
Harvey (2001) indicate that managers regard financial flexibility as the most important
factor in their capital structure decisions.
Empirical research on this issue provides some evidence that suggests that managers
with discretion, i.e., managers who are capable of acting in their self‐interest, prefer
lower leverage ratios. Friend and Lang (1988) and Mehran (1992) find that managers
with discretion tend to make capital structure decisions that are more conservative, i.e.,
they favor lower leverage. Consistent with this, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) show
that leverage levels are lower when managers do not face pressure from disciplining
1 Fama (1980) argues that it is in managers’ best interest to avoid their firms’ failure, as the future rental
rate on their undiversified human capital depends on their firms’ success. In Jensen (1986)’s free cash
flow argument, payouts (in the form of interest payments) reduce the resources under the management,
thereby reducing managers’ power and increasing the likelihood of monitoring by the capital markets.
Hart and Moore (1995) and Zwiebel (1996) argue that debt limits managers’ ability to finance future
investment.
2 Israel (1992) argues that by issuing risky debt the current management in the target firm transfers some
of the value from equity holders to the debt holders in exchange for private benefits of control, which
lowers the acquirer’s premium. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) argue that managers increase
their leverage to defend takeover challenges by increasing the concentration of their shareholdings,
which enables them to have greater control in their firms.
3 For example, Ross (1977) argues that when managers possess inside information, their choice of
financial structure signals information to the market, and in competitive equilibrium, firm values will rise
with leverage since increasing leverage increases the market’s perception of value.
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mechanisms such as market for corporate control.4 However, given the opposing
theoretical views on the relation between managerial discretion and the choice of
capital structure, the empirical evidence supporting these views is hard to generalize,5
and we know little about how high‐discretion managers achieve their desired capital
structure.
This paper contributes to the literature by addressing how managerial discretion
affects capital structure dynamics. First, I examine the effect of managerial discretion
on firms’ financing decisions such as equity issues, debt issues, and the accumulation of
retained earnings, all of which could be used as means to reach a desired capital
structure. In order to provide a more explicit test, I also examine the effect of
managerial discretion on the choice between debt versus equity in issuance and
repurchase decisions where a financing decision is qualified as a repurchase or an
issuance decision if the net amount issued (or repurchased) is at least 5 percent or more
of the total assets.
I further investigate how discretion considerations influence the way debt ratios
respond to firms’ histories of financial deficits, stock price performances, and their
tendencies to maintain a target capital structure. With this analysis, I provide a set of
mechanisms through which high‐discretion managers achieve a personally favored
capital structure while responding to firms’ external capital needs and changes in
market conditions.
I define managerial discretion as the extent to which managers are able to pursue
their self‐interest. To capture this characteristic I consider the level of beneficial
ownership, board size, director age, CEO‐Chairman duality, board independence and
4 In a more specific context, Garvey and Hanka (1999) show that managers who receive negative shocks to
their entrenchment (a hostile takeover threat) tend to take on more debt. Safieddine and Titman (1999)
find that managers increase their leverage when they become takeover targets not to entrench
themselves but to commit to making improvements.
5 Friend and Lang (1988) examine the effect of managerial ownership on capital structure using 984 firms
from 1979 to 1983. Mehran (1992) study investigates the relationship between the firms’ capital
structure and executive incentive plans, managerial equity investment, and monitoring by the major
shareholders using 124 randomly selected manufacturing firms during 1979‐1980. Berger, Ofek and
Yermack (1997) use a dataset of 452 firms between 1984 and 1991 that are drawn from Forbes magazine
rankings of the 500 largest U.S. public corporations.
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CEO age. Compared to the existing literature, these proxies that are used to measure
managerial discretion are compiled from a more recent sample (from 1988 to 2005),
larger spectrum of firms (about 5,835 firm clusters), and a wider range of governance
variables.
To address how discretion affects managers’ use of their financing decisions as
means to reach their desired capital structure, I examine the relation between the
discretion proxies and the changes in retained earnings, the amount of net equity issued
and the amount of net debt issued, and how these proxies relate to the choice between
debt versus equity in the issuance and repurchase decisions. First, I investigate whether
discretion enhances managers’ tendency to accumulate their earnings (rather than
paying them out) in order to achieve a conservative capital structure, which improves
their job security and their ability to raise additional funds for their investments.6
Next, I examine how managerial discretion influences the amount of net debt and
net equity issued by the firm and the choice between these two forms of financing in
the issuance and repurchase decisions. When firms need external financing, managers’
preference for raising debt versus equity is likely to depend on the difficulty of
convincing the board and the shareholders to raise capital and the consequences of the
financing decisions on their control over the firm. For example, when there is a
possibility of a takeover challenge, managers may prefer to issue debt and increase their
debt ratios if they need external capital, even though they personally favor lower
leverage ratios (Zwiebel (1996)). On the other hand, if managers’ job security is not
threatened by a takeover pressure, they may prefer to issue equity which would allow
them to raise capital for their investments while reducing their debt ratios. However,
equity issues result in greater market scrutiny.7 Since the market scrutiny costs are
likely to be greater for high‐discretion managers, issuing debt may be more appealing,
leading these managers to choose debt over equity to finance their external capital
needs.
6 Donaldson (1961) was the first to observe that firms prefer internal capital over external financing.
7 Almazan, Suarez and Titman (2006) show that managers may decide not to issue equity to avoid scrutiny
that comes with greater exposure to equity markets.
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An alternative exercise to understand how discretion affects managers’ ability to
reach their desired capital structure is to isolate different mechanisms that they may
engage in. I do so by examining how leverage ratios respond to firms’ external financing
needs, changes in market conditions, and their tendencies to maintain a target capital
structure in high‐ and low‐discretion regimes where the observations are endogenously
selected into the two regimes based on the latent discretion characteristic.8 As argued
above, high‐discretion managers may respond differently to firms’ financial deficits (i.e.,
external financing needs) because they are concerned about their job security, the
flexibility of undertaking new investments, and the market scrutiny.9
To examine the effect of managerial discretion on the extent to which firms’ capital
structures respond to changes in market conditions (i.e., their recent stock price
performance), I examine two related factors. First, I investigate how high‐discretion
managers respond to changes in leverage ratios that arise purely from changes in their
stock prices.10 I argue that low leverage ratios following increases in stock prices is
perhaps due to high‐discretion managers’ unwillingness to undo the stock price induced
changes in their leverage ratio because of their personal taste for lower leverage ratios.
Second, I investigate firms’ financing decisions made in response to recent stock
price performance when managers have discretion. The increase in stock price makes it
more likely that the high‐discretion managers get approval from the board for issuing
equity or face lower scrutiny costs.11 Therefore, managers with more discretion in their
financing choices and who desire lower debt ratios are more likely to issue equity after
superior stock price performance – an activity generally referred to as market timing.12
8 See Maddala (1986). This estimation technique, which is called the endogenous switching model with
unknown sample separation, endogenously selects the observations into different regimes based on
observed characteristics that are correlated with the latent characteristic.
9 Shyam‐Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) examine the extent to which firms’ capital
structure change as a results of their external financing needs.
10 Welch (2004) shows that when firms experience large stock returns they tend to have lower debt
ratios.
11 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that board independence declines with better performance.
12 Past literature generally attribute this tendency to time the market by issuing equity during high market
valuations to the investor irrationality where rational managers take advantage of the investor
exuberance by issuing equity when (they think) their stock is overvalued (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
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My analysis examines whether firms with high‐discretion managers are likely to
experience greater changes in their debt ratios as a result of the market timing activity.
The findings on net debt issues, net equity issues, and changes in retained earnings
largely suggest that when managers have more discretion, they tend to decrease the
amount of net debt issued, increase the amount of net equity issued and they retain
more of their internally generated cash flows. Generally, managerial discretion proxies
are either associated with raising more external capital regardless of the type (e.g.,
board size, CEO‐chairman duality, and percentage of outsiders on the board), or using
internally generated capital (e.g., director age and CEO age) both resulting in enhancing
resources available for investment projects. Taken together, these results suggest that
high‐discretion managers tend to become less leveraged because they grow more by
retaining more earnings, issuing more equity, and issuing less debt.
The results on the issuance regressions consistently predict preference for equity
over debt when firms have higher levels of managerial discretion. In the case of
repurchase decisions proxies measuring higher levels of managerial seem to be
associated with a stronger preference for repurchasing debt over equity. One
exception, board size, which predicts a preference for repurchasing equity over debt
seem to reflect the tendencies of firms with large boards to prefer outside financing
(with greater emphasis on equity compared to debt) over raising capital internally.
The analyses of changes in leverage indicate that the increase in leverage ratio in
response to positive and negative financial deficits is higher when managers have
greater levels of discretion. Furthermore, I find that high‐discretion managers who are
subject to less effective monitoring are more likely to issue shares than to repurchase
issue equity, perhaps due to their desire to achieve lower debt ratios.
Yearly timing effect on leverage is highly influenced by managerial discretion and
results are robust in both book and market leverage regressions. While there is either
weak or insignificant yearly timing effect on capital structure for firms with low
discretion managers, in the high‐discretion regime leverage ratio tends to decrease in
Early studies on firms’ equity issuance behavior include Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982) and Asquith and
Mullins (1986). See Ritter (2002) for a detailed list of papers.
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considerable amounts as a result of yearly timing – the difference between two regimes
is statistically significant in both book and market leverage regressions. The results on
the long‐term timing are quite similar to those of yearly timing measure, while the
statistical significance of the difference between the two regimes for the long‐term
timing is relatively lower. These results indicate that managers with more discretion in
their financing choices and who desire to achieve lower debt ratios tend to issue equity
after favorable stock price performance, i.e. time the equity markets. This systematic
activity leads to lower leverage ratios for the group of firms that have high‐discretion
managers.
Finally, there is strong evidence that firms tend to rebalance their capital structures
over time regardless of the level of managerial discretion. However, the speed at which
firms move towards their capital structure is much lower in the high‐discretion regime.
Furthermore, the asymmetry between the leverage increasing and leverage decreasing
adjustments towards a target ratio seem to be less relevant for this high‐discretion
regime. The results suggest that high‐discretion managers not very concerned about
decreasing (increasing) their leverage to maintain their target leverage ratio and that
the speed of adjustment is about the same for decreases and increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes
measurement, data, and the sample. Section 2 reports the empirical results from the
analyses of financing decisions under the influence of managerial discretion. Section 3
reports the analysis of the effect of managerial discretion on the changes in capital
structure due to firms’ histories of financing decisions and market conditions. Section 4
concludes.
I. Measurement, data, and sample
A. Measurement of managerial discretion:
In this paper managerial discretion is defined as a latent characteristic representing
multiple dimensions of corporate governance that affect managers’ ability to act in their
self interest. I identify various proxies including managerial attributes, board structure,
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and blockholder ownership, and hypothesize how they contribute to managers’
discretion levels. These proxies, which include chairman CEO duality, managers’ age,
percentage of ownership by beneficial shareholders, board size, board composition, and
directors’ age are discussed below with their predicted associations with managerial
discretion.
1. CEO‐Chairman duality
Chairman CEOs are likely to have high discretion because their unique position is
likely to yield greater latitude to them when they make financing and capital structure
decisions. Specifically, Chairman CEOs are likely to be empowered to act with
determination and have far more influence over other directors which will result in their
ability to withstand pressure better ‐ especially when short‐term changes do not pay off
‐ than non‐chairman CEOs, resulting in greater discretion.13 Chairman CEOs are
identified with an indicator variable that takes the value 1 when the CEO carries both
titles and zero otherwise.
2. CEO age
Older CEOs are likely to have increased control over internal monitoring mechanisms
due to their accumulated experience and reputation. Consequently, CEO age, which
could also be thought of an alternate measure of CEO tenure, is associated with higher
discretion levels. For example, in the context of CEO tenure Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998)’s model show that CEOs with long tenure, who have proved themselves to be
considerably better than the expected value of replacements, will have greater
bargaining power against the board and hence will be subject to less scrutiny.14 One
13 Note that the chairman CEO duality is likely to bring advantages to information sharing costs between
the CEO and the chairman and that the board is likely to focus less on constant watchdog evaluation of
the CEO than making him or her successful. However, this allows for little transparency into the CEO’s
acts, and as such their actions can go unmonitored, it paves the way for scandal and corruption. Goyal
and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when
the CEOs are also the chairman. Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) document that firms combining the CEO
and chairman duties perform no worse than those that do not combine them.
14 Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) document that as CEOs approach their retirement they tend to appoint
insiders to the board which will result in less scrutiny. They also find that when firms perform poorly they
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could also argue that long period of service in office may indicate greater misalignment
in managerial incentives due to their greater job security (i.e., low probability of losing
the position), and hence higher levels of managerial discretion. I include CEO age in my
analysis in logarithm form because its effect accumulates over time at a decreasing rate.
3. Board composition
A large number of outside directors on the board and the board committees could
indicate that the management is likely to be challenged with active monitoring (i.e., they
have less discretion).15 For a director, however, having a reputation for not making any
trouble for CEOs is potentially valuable. As a result, an outside director, with limited
access to valuable specific information about the organization’s activities, might side
with the management enhancing the level of its discretion (Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003)).16 Board composition is defined as the percentage of outside directors on the
board.
4. Board size
A large board is indicative of less effective monitoring of the management (i.e.,
managers have high discretion) due to agency problems (such as director free‐riding),
which results in the board to be less involved in the management process.17 I include
the logarithm of the board size its effect increases a decreasing rate.
tend to replace inside directors with the outside directors which is likely to decrease the level of their
power.
15 Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasize the fact that directors have incentives to build
reputations as expert monitors. Weisbach (1988) provide evidence that firms with outsider‐dominated
board tend to have stronger association between prior performance and the probability of CEO turnover
compared to firms with insider‐dominated boards. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find that on average
stock market reaction to poison pill announcements is positive when the board has a majority of outside
directors and negative when it does not.
16 Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a negative relation between the percentage of outsiders on the board
and firm performance. Klein (1998) finds a positive relation between the percentage of inside directors
on finance and investment committees and accounting and stock market performance.
17 Jensen (1993) suggests that large boards can be less effective than small boards. Yermack (1996)
documents that smaller boards are associated with higher firm values.
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