Landscape Ecology vol. 6 no. 4 pp 239-250 (1992)
SPB Academic Publishing bv, The Hague
The appearance of ecological systems as a matter of policy
Joan Iverson Nassauer
Department of Landscape Architecture, 212 North Hall, 2005 Buford Avenue, University of Minnesota,
Paul, U.S.A. 55108
Abstract
Environmental policy should explicitly address the appearance of the landscape because people make infer-
ences about ecological quality from the look of the land. Where appearances are misleading, failing to portray
ecological degradation or ecological health, public opinion may be ill-informed, with consequences for
environmental policy. This paper argues that while ecology is a scientific concept, landscape perception is
a social process. If we do not recognize this difference, we have problems with the appearance of ecological
systems. Three influential problems are discussed: 1) the problem of the false identity of ecological systems,
2) the problem of design and planning as deceit about ecological systems, and 3) the problem of invisible eco-
logical systems. These problems for environmental policy may be resolved in part if landscape planners and
policy-makers use socially-recognized signs to display human intentions for ecological systems. Specifically,
planning and policy can include socially-recognized signs of beauty and stewardship to display human care
for ecological systems. An example in United States federal agricultural policy is described.
Environmental policy should explicitly address the
sion of our perception of landscapes and suggests
look of the land, not because aesthetic quality is
how that social dimension could inform environ-
coequal with biotic and physical quality of the land-
mental policy.
scape, though some have made this argument, but
because the look of the land communicates. Kevin
Lynch (1971) called the environment ‘an enormous
The social dimension of perception
communications device’. What people see, and par-
ticularly our affective response to landscape, in-
The way things look is not always the way things
fluences what we think belongs in the landscape.
are. This fact should be cause for consternation
Policy can intentionally use this enormous commu-
among those who are interested in the management
nications device to suggest that patterns that sup-
of ecological systems. A highly functional land-
port the ecological function of the landscape belong
scape structure may go unnoticed - even by people
there, or policy can fail to address human interpre-
who depend upon its function. People may change
tation of ecological patterns. Both the broadened
the landscape, destroy its ecological function,
concept of ecology that landscape ecology repre-
without even knowing what they have done. If we
sents and the realities of the politics behind policy
assume that people want to live in healthy ecologi-
suggest that to ignore what the landscape communi-
cal systems, the problem is that the way the land-
cates is naive. This paper explores the social dimen-
scape looks might not tell us whether the landscape
is healthy or not. If we can see that the landscape
not even be ecologically healthy. Furthermore,
is not healthy, we might do something about it. We
landscapes that are ecologically healthy may not
might manage the landscape to improve its health.
look natural, at least not in the beautiful way that
But we are unlikely to do that if we can’t see it.
our social interpretation of nature demands. Nor
Why would we perceive a landscape as healthy
are all healthy ecosystems pristine in the sense of
when it is not? Or conversely, why would we per-
being untouched by human action.
ceive a landscape as unhealthy when it is not? One
However, our identification of ecology with our
problem could be that we have a mistaken notion of
social conception of nature leads us to expect
what landscape health looks like; we have given
healthy ecological systems to be beautiful. Some
ecological systems a false identity. Another
are, and luckily so, for the beauty of nature as artic-
problem could be that we are being deceived; we
ulated by Frederick Law Olmsted was a primary ra-
know what healthy ecological systems look like, but
tionale for establishing the national park system
their true appearance is being masked by a mislead-
(Nash 1967; Laurie 1979); in this case, beauty
ing facade. Finally, ecological systems may be in-
served ecology. But if we generalize from such
visible; they exhibit no particular appearance for us
prominent examples as the national parks to the
to see.
landscape as a whole, we confuse our perceptions
Why should we have any of these problems with
of natural beauty with ecological function.
the appearance of ecological systems? Usually the
Our identification of ecology with a particular in-
way things look is the way things are. What we see
terpretation of natural beauty, that is pristine na-
is usually self-evident and it is interpreted with a
ture, obscures the possibility that healthy ecological
shared social understanding. We might have
systems can display natural beauty without being
problems with the appearance of ecological systems
pristine. When he proclaimed The End of Nature
because their appearance is inconsistent with our
Bill McKibben failed to see this possibility.
shared social understanding of the way landscapes
McKibben repeatedly points to threatened changes
are supposed to look; healthy ecosystems might not
in human perception of nature to support his
match our social understanding of the desirable ap-
philosophical stance against human intervention
pearance of landscape. If we accept the fundamen-
in nature. Though much of his book surveys evi-
tally social nature of perception, we can learn some-
dence and opinion about the inevitable biological
thing about the way we see ecological systems and
and physical consequences of global warming,
about how we might manage the appearance of eco-
McKibben seems most profoundly affected by the
logical systems.
way in which global warming and biotechnology
have changed his perception of nature. The end of
nature as he discusses it is not the end of ecological
The problem of the false identity of ecological
function, it is the end of a particular perception of
systems
natural beauty that depends upon the illusion that
nature is distinct from humanity.
We identify nature with beauty, and of course, we
‘ . . . The death of (nature) begins with concrete
identify ecological systems with nature. Conse-
changes in the reality around us - changes that
quently, we assume that healthy ecological systems
scientists can measure and enumerate. More and
are beautiful. But this syllogism misleads. Natural-
more frequently, these changes will clash with our
ness is a concept that has no specific appearance in
perceptions, until, finally, our sense of nature as
form; it is a cultural concept determined by social
eternal and separate is washed away, and we will see
process (Nash 1967; Nassauer 1979). When we
all too clearly what we have done’ (p. 8, McKibben
identify ecology with nature, we fail to recognize
1989).
the social dimension of our perception of nature as
McKibben abhors the ‘domestication’ of the
pristine beauty. Though we might see it that way,
earth because
no such thing as nature any-
not everything that looks natural is pristine; it may
more - that other world that isn’t business and art
24 1
and breakfast is now not another world, and there
humanity may conclude with McKibben that eco-
is nothing except us alone’ (p. 89). He tells how
logical systems are best left unsullied by human ac-
William
an eighteenth century naturalist,
tion. Others who identify nature as separate may
explored the southeastern region of the United
see this separation as license for unbridled use of
States and ‘found vigorous beauty’ in ‘whatever
ecosystems. Their view may lead them to intervene
direction he struck off in’, how George Catlin’s
without respect for ecological function, making for
journal descriptions of the picturesque beauty of
human purposes different from McKibben’s. While
the frontier West form a baseline in his mind, ‘a
the sound of a chain saw buzzing in the Adirondack
reminder of where we began’. McKibben’s objec-
woods intrudes upon McKibben’s feeling that he is
tion to ‘rational management’ of the wild is that it
in ‘another, separate, timeless, wild sphere’ (p.
produces something that ‘looks a lot like nature but
the person using the chain saw may very well share
isn’t’ (p. 168).
McKibben’s sense of the woods as separate from
What makes the current crisis so intransigent to
humanity - only ‘humanity’ is where the person
‘personal solutions’ and finally sounds the death
cutting timber lives. Whatever destruction may be
knell for nature says McKibben is that ‘the green-
perpetrated there will be left behind when the tim-
house effect is the first environmental problem we
ber is hauled out of the woods. Once again, out of
can’t escape by moving to the woods’ (p. 204).
sight, out of mind. McKibben may wish to escape
McKibben’s juxtaposition of the ideas of solution
to the woods, but this person will escape from the
and escape are problematic. First, what does he
woods, objecting to ecological degradation only if
mean by a personal solution? Certainly escaping to
it appears in his or her own backyard.
the woods doesn’t solve any environmental prob-
The chain saw operator and McKibben in the
lem. It only changes the perceptual evidence of the
‘separate, timeless, wild sphere’ represent equally
problem: out of sight, out of mind. Second, where
logical but philosophicaly opposed implications of
is he escaping to? Did the woods ever provide a
the problem of the false identity of ecological sys-
‘sense of nature as eternal and separate’ from
tems. It follows that once separate from nature, we
humanity? Only if one were oblivious to the shared
human beings may choose either to degrade or deify
social perception necessary for the woods to exist
what we see as distinct from ourselves.
could one escape environmental problems by
moving to the woods. In fact, McKibben’s woods,
the New York State Adirondack Park that he so
The problem of design and planning as deceit about
lovingly describes, is a social pact, an agreement to
ecological systems
manage a landscape in a particular way. The time
for escape, if there ever was one, has long since
If we walked through the woods with McKibben to
passed.
where the chain saw was buzzing and saw the timber
McKibben’s example of the woods that he ad-
harvest site, would it be beautiful? Would it look
mires as nature is a social construction. And his
natural? Probably not. If we share McKibben’s
deep affection for the nature he sees in the woods
sense of nature in the woods, we might be happier
suggests that this particular social construction is
if we hadn’t taken the walk at all. We might be hap-
not a bad thing. What he was perceived there has
pier still if the chain saw were equipped with a com-
contributed to his move to do something about eco-
pletely effective muffler. The effect would be the
logical quality, to write a book called The End
protection of our illusions. Protection of illusions
Nature. The problem is that he does not incor-
can be called deceit.
porate the social basis for the woods into his argu-
Perhaps in his perception of the woods,
ment for nature. Rather, he concludes that ‘the
ben is only one of the ‘gullible public’ (in the words
comfort we need is inhuman’. He has given the na-
of
Wood,
a victim of some design or
ture he perceives a false identity.
planning expert’s intention to deceive the viewer
Some who identify nature as separate from
about the real human purpose or history of the
242
woods by masking what is really there. Wood
interference of art, however expensive, by which
delivers a highly-charged critique of the federal
the scenery is improved; making the whole appear
government land-managing agencies’ visual man-
the production of nature only; and fourthly, all ob-
agement systems (USDA 1973-85, USDI 1975,
jects of mere convenience or comfort, if incapable
USDT 1976-79) as tools for severing ecological
of being made ornamental, or of becoming proper
reality from landscape appearance. He points to the
parts of the general scenery, must be removed or
visual management systems’ aim to conceal the log-
cancelled . . . ’ (Clifford 1963).
ging, grazing, mining, and resort development that
The picturesque image of nature has become part
occur on federal lands by designing such activities
of western culture to such a degree that it is fre-
so that they ‘blend’ with their natural surround-
quently mistaken for nature, making the ‘method’
ings. Such dissembling with form he terms a lie.
of the plan or design invisible but the effect of the
‘The point is not the resource use, but the lying
design expected. Robinson warns that ‘appeals to
about it, not the cutting down of trees, but the at-
the circumstantial appearance of nature as the
tempt to pretend we didn’t do it (it was the wind,
justification for a landscape aesthetic are rhetorical
it was the
it was the fire).’ Rather he sug-
gestures, not the guarantee of truth’ (p. 9, 1990).
gests that design and management should tell the
We should not expect the 20th century picturesque
truth. Doing so ‘will force us to accept responsibili-
we have received to be about truth but about rhetor-
ty for our desires’ (p. 203, Wood 1988).
ic, and shared social meaning. In fact, the visual
Though the New York State Adirondack Park
management systems that Wood so sharply criti-
would not have been managed with federal visual
cizes are clear in their statement that they are in-
management systems, it was established and has
tended to produce an ‘expected
particularly
been managed with the same picturesque conven-
for tourists, not to reveal ecological reality, which
tions that they only make explicit (Nash 1967;
may contradict social expectations
1979).
Adirondack Park Agency 1979; The Commission
The visual management systems are a form of
on the Adirondacks 1990). Since the Industrial
rhetoric. They are grounded in a social concept,
Revolution, the dominant Western landscape de-
that which constitutes an aesthetically pleasing
sign convention has been the picturesque, an ideal
environment.
articulated in the 17th century by Alexander Pope
When the United States National Environmental
as the beauty of ‘nature methodized’ (Pevsner
Policy Act (1969) dictated that federal actions
1944). The idea has been so powerful that it has
would ‘assure for all Americans . . . aesthetically
evolved and been integrated into cultural norms for
and culturally pleasing surroundings’, federal agen-
landscape appearance, not as an idea about nature
cies made the picturesque image explicit. These ex-
but as a ‘frozen’ icon, unreflectively perpetuated
plicit statements and the burgeoning ecological
(Howett 1987). Sidney Robinson explains that ‘we
awareness of the time startled landscape scholars
owe to the 19th century the confusion that a case of
into reflecting upon our assumptions. The systems
mistaken identity perpetrated by a picturesque
spelled out the desirability of hiding landscape
landscape is the same as being natural,’ where he
functions that might be perceived as unattractive
means ‘natural’ as being
. . . as na-
behind a hill, out of the viewshed. They clarified
ture’s way’ (p. 9, 1990). In fact, Humphrey
our social expectation of nature, where what clearly
ton’s description of the four key principles of his art
isn’t nature (a building or a logging pattern) has at
in his ‘Enquiry into the Changes of Taste in Land-
least been made to look like it.
scape Gardening’ (1806) spells out the means of
At the same time as the visual management sys-
confusion: ‘First, it must display the natural beau-
tems were being implemented, toxic chemicals were
ties and hide the natural defects of every situation;
being dug from school grounds in New York and
secondly, it should give the appearance of extent
animal species were becoming endangered in na-
and freedom, by carefully disguising or hiding the
tional forests managed for aesthetic quality. As
boundary; thirdly, it must studiously conceal every
social consciousness of unseen ecological systems
Add New Comment