Speech act theory and the analysis of conversations.

Speech act theory and the analysis of conversations.
Sequencing and interpretation in pragmatic theory
Jacques Moeschler
Department of Linguistics
University of Geneva
1.
Introduction
Conversation has recently become a focus of interest for speech act theory and
several proposals have been formulated concerning the possible extension of
speech act theory to the analysis of conversation. This debate (cf. Searle et al.
1992) has to be interpreted as a reactive move rather than as a natural extension
of the domain of speech act theory. Nevertheless, this reaction, either sceptical
(cf. Searle 1992) or optimistic (cf. Dascal 1992, Vanderveken 1992 and 1994),
has brought interesting issues which contrast with the various attempts by
linguists at extending speech act theory to the domain of discourse1. The first
purpose of this paper is to explicit the divergence between philosophers and
linguists about the possible extension of speech act theory to discourse analysis.
This paper has another purpose : it also deals with the possible domain of
pragmatic theory with respect to discourse analysis. I shall argue that the main
purpose of discourse analysis is the definition of necessary and sufficient

---

2
MOESCHLER
conditions for sequencing and interpretating utterances in discourse. I claim that
these two aspects of discourse (sequencing and interpretation) are intrinsically
related and cannot be accounted for independently from each other. I claim
furthermore that speech act theory cannot give any insight into the sequencing
and interpretation problems, because speech act theory is neither a theory of
interpretation (it is a theory of meaning) nor a global theory of action. Finally I
show how a radical pragmatic theory (in the Gricean sense) accounts for the
sequencing and interpretation problems.2
2. Speech act theory and conversation
There is a common sense argument shared by philosophers and linguists in
favour of the possible extension of speech act theory to discourse analysis. This
argument is the following :
Speech acts are not isolated moves in communication : they appear in more
global units of communication, defined as conversations or discourses.
Vanderveken (1994, 53) gives an explicit version of this thesis when asserting
that
speakers perform their illocutionary acts within entire conversations where
they are most often in verbal interaction with other speakers who reply to
them and perform in turn their own speech acts with the same collective
intention to pursue with success a certain type of discourse. Thus, above all,
the use of language is a social form of linguistic behavior. It consists, in
general, of ordered sequences of utterances made by several speakers who
tend by their verbal interactions to achieve common discursive goals such as
discussing a question, deciding together how to react to a certain situation,
negociating, consulting or more simply to exchange greetings and talk for its
own sake. For terminological convenience, I will call such ordered sequences
of speech acts conversations.

---

SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATION
3
The basis of this argument is that conversation is made of sequences of speech
acts. This certainly is a plausible theoretical claim3, but gives rise to a certain
number of objections, raised mainly by Searle (1992) in his skeptical argument.
These objections concern essentially the possible relations between questions
and answers in conversation, and can be stated as follows.
First of all, questions are defined in speech acts theory as requests for
information, and as such impose representative acts as replies. But this cannot be
correct, since a reply may have another illocutionary point (as a promise) if the
question is a request for a promise.
Secondly, certain questions require a directive as a reply, and not a
representative, when the question contains a modal auxiliary verb (cf. the
exchange : “Shall I marry Sally ?” - “Yes, do”/ “No, don’t” / “*Yes, you
shall” / “*No, you shall not”).
The third counter-example is given by indirect reponses, which do not
satisfy syntactic conditions, although the answer is pragmatically appropriate.
To these three arguments, we could add an even more embarrassing one :
answer is not a specific illocutionary force, which could be analysed by the seven
components of illocutionary force (cf. Searle & Vanderveken 1985). Answer is a
functional discursive qualification, but certainly not the semantic definition of a
speech act type.
These objections make explicit an important difference between the structure
of illocutionary acts and the structure of conversation. In speech act theory, and
more precisely in illocutionary logic, illocutionary force is decomposed into
seven components, which are all necessary conditions for the successful and non
defective accomplishment of illocutionary acts. These components (cf. Searle &
Vanderveken 1985, 12-20) are the illocutionary point, the degree of strength of
the illocutionary point, the mode of achievement of the illocutionary point, the
propositional content conditions of the illocutionary act, the preparatory
conditions of the illocutionary act, the sincerity conditions of the illocutionary act,
and finally the degree of strength of the sincerity conditions. That predictions

---

4
MOESCHLER
about the sequencing in conversation are difficult to come by follows from the
fact that the internal structure of illocutionary acts (and more specifically the set
of conditions for success) cannot determine the set of possible replies for any
type of illocutionary act.
By contrast, discourse analysis, while specifying sequential relations in
discourse between speech acts, does not constrain sequencing in conversation
depending on the set of possible components of illocutionary force. The
constraints are not structural, in the sense of speech act theory, they are on the
contrary functional. This means that the basic structures of conversation
(exchanges) are made of lower order conversational units (moves) which carry
functional properties. If speech act theory has been used so extensively within
this paradigm of discourse analysis4, it is because the functional properties
associated with speech acts as units of meaning have been exported to speech
acts as units of communication and discourse. This has several consequences for
the description of speech acts within discourse analysis.
The first consequence is that the structure of conversation is not only based
on a hierarchy of constituency, but is also functional. To take a classical
discourse model (cf. Sinclair & Coulthard 1975), discourse categories
(exchange, move, and act) are defined functionally. For instance, an act of
ELICITATION is part of a move of ELICITATION, which governs an exchange of
ELICITATION. Thus all discourse constituents receive a communicative function,
that is, an interactive meaning. But we are here far from the conventional and
semantic-meaning defining speech acts in speech act theory5.
As we have just noticed, discourse analysis supposes principles of
constituency which allow interpretive or functional inheritance. If we assume, as
above, that an ELICITATION is a two-place predicate relating utterance-units and
discourse-units, we must assume too that the functional properties of the smallest
discourse units (acts) are inherited by the larger constituents (moves and
exchanges). This principle is structurally identical to the projection principle in
generative grammar : a phrase is a maximal projection of a lexical head (for

---

SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATION
5
instance NP is a maximal projection of a N); in discourse, then, an exchange is
thus functionally a maximal projection of an act.
The principle of functional projection is not a necessary consequence of
discourse analysis. Another classical discourse model, the Geneva hierachical-
functional model (cf. Roulet et al. 1985, Moeschler 1985, Moeschler 1989a)
makes a different claim : functional values do not stand in a one-to-one
relationship with discourse structures. In this model, there is a basic difference
between rules of discourse formation and principles of functional interpretation.
The structural dimension is based on the following rules of formation :
R1 Units of type Exchange are made of units of type Move.
R1’ Exchanges are composed of at least two Moves.
R2 Units of type Move are made of units types Act, Move or Exchange.
R2’ Moves composed by a single Act are well-formed.
R2”Moves composed by an Act and another discourse-unit type (Move or
Exchange) are well-formed.
R2”’
Moves composed by a single Exchange are ill-formed.
Thus, the following discourse structures are well-formed :
(1)
a. <E <M1 <A>, M2 <A>>>
b. <E <M1 <A>, M2 <E <M1 <A>, M2 <A>>>, M <A, M <A, A>>>>
c. <E < M1 <E <M1 <A, A>, M2 <A>, M3 <A>>, A>, M2 <A>, M3
<A>>>
where E = exchange, M = move, A = act
The structures in (1a-c) are the hierarchical representations corresponding to the
following short exchanges in (2)-(4):
(2)
A
Are you ready ?
B
We can leave.
(3)
A
Are you ready ?
B
Why ?
A
We must leave now.

---

6
MOESCHLER
B
Okay, but when I am in a hurry, I always forget something.
(4)
A
Are you ready ? Because we must leave now.
B
Yes I am
A
Good. Let’s go
B
Let’s go
A
Okay
We can represent the bracketting structures given in (1) by the following
tree-schemata :
(5)
M1
A
Are you ready ?
(a)
E
M2
A
We can leave.
Are you ready ?
M1
A
(b)
E
Why ?
M1
A
E
We must leave now.
M2
A
Okay,
M2
A
but when I am in a hurry,
A
M
M
I always forget something.
A
M1
A
(c)
Are you ready ?
A
Because we must leave now.
E
M2
A
M1
Yes I am
M3
A
Good
A
Let's go
E
A
M2
Let’s go
A
M3
Okay
These structures mean that in (5a) the exchange is made of two moves both
composed of a single act, in (5b) the exchange is composed of two moves, the
second of which is made of an exchange with two moves, and a move composed
by an act and a move, and in (5c) the three-move exchange contains in the first
move an exchange made of three moves.

---

SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATION
7
What are the functional counterparts of the structural aspects of
conversational discourse ? There are two dimensions of functional properties
associated with the structural device : the first dimension is a restricted
inheritance principle, and the second, a general procedure for assigning
interpretation to discourse constituents.
The first principle is a principle of functional composition :
Principle of functional composition
(i)
Constituents of exchanges bear illocutionary functions.
(ii) Constituents of moves bear interactive functions.
Definitions
(i)
Illocutionary functions are of three types : initiative, reactive, and
reactive-initiative.
(ii) Interactive functions are of two types : directive, and subordinate.
The first move of an exchange (M1) is always initiative; the final move of an
exchange is always reactive. For instance M2 in the exchange <E <M1, M2>> is
the reactive move, and M1 is the initiative move. An inserted move (for example
M2 in the structure <E <M1, M2, M3>>) is a reactive-initiative move. A directive
(D) constituent is of the type move or act, and contains the act from which the
move receives its illocutionary function; a subordinate (constituent (of rank act,
move or exchange) is cancellable, and generally completes, argues for, or justifies
the main or directive constituent of the move.
We can now give the complete hierachical-functional structures given in (1)
and (5) as (6) and (6’) :
(6)
a. <E <M1 <dA>, M2 <dA>>>
b. <E <M1 <dA>, M2 <sE <M1 <dA>, M2 <dA>>>, dM <As, dM <sA,
dA>>>>
c. <E <M1 <sE <M1 <dA, sA>, M2 <dA>, M3<dA>>, dA>, M2 <dA>,
M3 <dA>>>

---

8
MOESCHLER
where E = exchange, sE = subordinate exchange, M = move, sM =
subordinate move, dM = directive move, sA = subordinate act, dA =
directive act
(6’)
M1
dA
Are you ready ?
(a)
E
M2
dA
We can leave.
Are you ready ?
M1
dA
(b)
E
Why ?
M1
dA
sE
We must leave now.
M
dA
M2
Okay,
2
sA
dM
but when I am in a hurry,
dM
sA
I always forget something.
dA
M1
dA
(c)
Are you ready ?
sA
Because we must leave now.
sE
M2
dA
M1
Yes I am
M3
dA
Good
dA
Let's go
E
dA
M2
Let’s go
dA
M3
Okay
The second functional counterpart of the stuctural device is a procedure of
interpretation assignment. It is not sufficient to have functional values assigned to
discourse constituents; required is also to have a procedure governing the
assignment of a functional interpretation to each constituent. In other words, the
types of structures given in (1), (5) or (6) are syntactic representations of
discourse; we need in addition a semantics, which can for instance assign to the
hierarchical-functional structures given in (6) the following functional
interpretations :

---

SPEECH ACTS AND CONVERSATION
9
(7)
a. <QUESTION, ANSWER>
b. <QUESTION, <<QUESTION, ANSWER> ANSWER>
c. <<QUESTION, ANSWER, EVALUATION> PROPOSITION,
ACCEPTATION, EVALUATION>
Limited to the functions of the main moves, that is, moves which are constituents
of exchange, this very elementary assignment of functions shows that discourse
analysis needs something like a procedure for the interpretation of utterance-
units and their functional mapping onto discourse-units. In other words, we need
a theory of discourse interpretation. What is specific to discourse analysis is that
the criterion for assigning a functional value to a constituent is different from the
classical procedure used in speech act theory. Within speech act theory, the
procedure is mainly conventional: besides general cooperation principles and
background information, the procedure for the interpretation of e.g. indirect
speech acts is dependent on semantic rules (the conditions of success and
accomplishment of illocutionnary acts). By contrast, discourse analysis cannot
use a conventional procedure, because what defines a conversation is the
sequencing of acts, moves and exchanges, and also the dependance between
interpretation and sequencing. In conversation, a reactive move has two properties
: (i) its sequential dependance vis-à-vis the initiative move, and (ii) its capacity to
give retroactively an interpretation to the initiative move. The dependency relation
between sequencing and interpretation is the topic of the following section.
3. Sequencing and interpretation in conversation
Let me recall briefly what the conditions for discourse analysis are. The basic
notion of discourse analysis, as I have defined it in other occasions (cf.
Moeschler 1982, chapter 3; Moeschler 1985, chapter 3; Moeschler 1986;
Moeschler 1989b; and also Moeschler & Reboul 1994, chapter 17), is
appropriateness6. I have assumed that units of communication are evaluated in

---

10
MOESCHLER
terms of their degree of appropriateness. As units of communication are units of
discourse, two types of appropriateness can be distinguished: contextual
appropriateness and cotextual appropriateness. Let us describe these notions
and introduce the topic of this section, the sequencing and interpretation
problems.
Cotextual
appropriateness
depends
on
conditions
of
cotextual
appropriateness, which can be generally defined as sequencing constraints.
Conditions of cotextual appropriateness are imposed by initiative moves, and
have scope over reactive moves. These conditions of satisfaction (thematic
condition (TC), condition of propositional content (CPC), illocutionary condition
(IC) and condition of argumentative orientation (CAO)) impose on the reactive
move to share a common theme to the initiative move (TC), to be propositionally
related to the initiative move (by implication, contradiction or paraphrase) (CPC),
to bear an illocutionary force compatible with the illocutionary force of the first
move (IC), and to have a shared argumentative orientation, that is, an argumentive
co-orientation (CAO) (cf. Anscombre & Ducrot 1983). The relation between
conditions of satisfaction and cotextual appropriateness is a comparative one : the
more conditions the reactive move satisfies, the more cotextually appropriate it is.
In (9B1-B5), the degree of cotextual appropriateness increases, together with the
degree of satisfaction of the conditions of cotextual appropriateness:
(9)
A
Can you give me the time ?
B1 I have a serious headache.
-TC
B2 The postman has just passed.
+TC, -CPC
B3 Is it not already ten o’clock ?
+TC, +CPC, -IC
B4 It is not yet ten o’clock.
+TC, +CPC, +IC, -CAO
B5 It is ten o’clock.
+TC, +CPC, +IC, +CAO
When the thematic condition, the condition of propositional content and the
illocutionary condition are satisfied, discourse is said to be coherent. If only the
thematic condition and the condition of propositional content are satisfied,

---