The Dangers of Overreacting to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster

No. 1 • June 2010
The Dangers of Overreacting to the Deepwater
Horizon Disaster
By Kenneth P. Green and Steven F. Hayward
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile, semisubmersible deep-sea oil-drilling rig leased by British
Petroleum (BP), was completing a newly drilled well forty-one miles off the Louisiana coastline in the Gulf of
Mexico when it exploded and sank, killing eleven oil-rig workers, injuring seventeen, and triggering the largest
offshore oil spill in U.S. territory in American history. It will likely be one of the top ten in world history if it is
not stopped soon. The spill is clearly an ecological disaster, but overreaction to it could cause more environmental
and economic harm than good. It should be viewed in perspective historically and environmentally, and policy-
makers should wait to make changes until the full effects of the spill can be understood.
New estimates of the amount of oil leaking
consequences from the spreading oil are still
from Deepwater Horizon have superseded
highly uncertain. Gulf currents could spread the
the initial estimate of 5,000 barrels per day; now,
oil to the coastlines of Mississippi, Alabama,
according to the Department of the Interior, oil is
Florida, Louisiana, and potentially points farther
leaking at a rate of 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day,
north. Large fisheries are closed already, crippling
though some estimates run as high as 60,000 barrels
the Gulf coast’s fishing industry and delivering a
per day.1 Using a midpoint range of 30,000 barrels
blow to its tourist industry, although this is just
per day, by June 1 about 172,000 tons2 had leaked
the beginning of the economic damage. Many
from the well under Deepwater Horizon. By com-
people are aghast at the prospect of ecological
parison, the Exxon Valdez spilled 37,000 tons, and
devastation presented by the spill. A variety of
the 1969 Santa Barbara platform spill released
news articles and blog posts, including an article
12,000 tons. Numerous efforts to stop the spill
have failed, and stemming the flow may ultimately
Key points in this Outlook:
require the installation of a relief well (or wells),
which may not be completed until August. If the
• The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is clearly
spill continues at its current rate until August 1, it
an ecological disaster, but overreaction to
will be the second-largest offshore platform spill in
the oil spill risks causing more environ-
mental and economic harm than good.
history (excluding spills caused by acts of war),
and the spill will have released between 165,000
• To be understood properly, the Deepwater
and 400,000 tons of oil. (For a comprehensive list
Horizon oil spill must be viewed in per-
spective, particularly compared with other
of major oil spills over the last sixty years, includ-
sources of oil in the oceans (from natural
ing volume of oil spilled, see appendix.)
seeps and tankers) and the environmental
While the public is now beginning to under-
effects of alternative fuels.
• Despite the economic and environmental
Energy and Environment Outlook
stand the magnitude of the spill, the environmental
Kenneth P. Green (kgreen@aei.org) is a resident
damage, there is room for hope: oceans are
scholar at AEI. Steven F. Hayward (shayward@aei.org)
more resilient ecosystems than land.
is the F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI.
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
202.862.5800
www.aei.org

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in Newsweek, have asked whether the Deepwater Horizon
waters. On the surface, this is understandable: a tanker
spill is the “Three Mile Island” moment for the oil indus-
spill is bounded by the quantity of oil on board, while an
try.3 Not to be outdone, Carl Pope, former chairman of
undersea blowout is indeterminate, and indeed some
the Sierra Club, asks if the Deepwater spill is not really
have lasted for months before the leak could be sealed
“America’s Chernobyl,” while Melinda Henneberger of
off at the ocean floor. It took Mexico’s famously inept
Politics Daily says it is our “environmental 9/11.”4
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) nearly nine months to
Apocalyptic pronouncements aside, people should be
stop the Ixtoc I platform spill in 1979—the largest oil
concerned about the damage Deepwater Horizon will
spill on record excluding Saddam Hussein’s deliberate
inflict. Evidence suggests that the effects of the Deep-
fouling of the Persian Gulf in 1991—during which time
water Horizon spill will be severe and long lasting. A
more than 10,000 barrels leaked into the Gulf of Mexico
study in Science examining the effects of the Exxon Valdez
each day. Whatever amount of oil is leaking into the
oil spill showed ecosystem damages that persisted for
ocean from the Deepwater Horizon well, proximity to
fourteen years.5 The widespread use of chemical disper-
shore and the open-ended amount of oil that can be
sants and the large amount of oil apparently suspended
spilled from an offshore oil-drilling incident make such
below the ocean surface are raising important questions
spills generate more existential dread than tanker spills.
that will take some time to study and answer. At present,
the majority of the oil seems to be suspended in mile-
The relative risks of offshore oil exploration
long plumes of tiny bubbles in the deeper ocean. Despite
the risks of large environmental and economic damages,
and production relative to onshore
the policy response to the Deepwater Horizon spill should
production and other forms of energy
be cautious: given the scale of everything related to
energy, ham-handed interventions in energy markets
are not receiving much attention.
have the potential to do more harm than good, both
economically and environmentally. Environmental
issues have everything to do with tradeoffs; there is no
Offshore-rig accidents occur frequently (the British
such thing as a risk-free world. Furthermore, the magni-
website “Oil Rig Disasters” lists more than 150 offshore-
tude of the energy sector makes it difficult to foresee the
rig mishaps, not all drilling-related, over the last fifty
consequences of actions taken in haste.
years),6 but the blowout-prevention technologies that
The Obama administration, reacting to environmen-
failed on the Deepwater Horizon have kept most off-
talist pressure, has declared a moratorium on new off-
shore oil rigs from releasing more than a trivial amount
shore deepwater drilling pending the outcome of an
of oil. Everyone from the U.S. federal government to BP
investigation into the causes of the Deepwater Horizon
has been criticized for being unprepared to respond to
spill. Many environmentalists wish to go much further;
this spill, but how prepared should they have been? The
the Sierra Club proposes phasing out all offshore explo-
Deepwater Horizon and the Montara platform accident
ration and production permanently.
in the Timor Sea last year were the first major offshore-
platform blowouts in more than twenty years. The Oil
The Gulf Spill in Perspective
Pollution Control Act of 1990,7 which prescribed proto-
cols for responding to oil spills, was written in the after-
In the midst of the fulminating, handwringing, and
math of the Exxon Valdez spill and with the expectation
opportunistic policy promotion that currently dominate
that tanker spills were the main risk to be managed.
media coverage of the Deepwater Horizon incident, the
From an economic perspective, it is difficult to argue
relative risks of offshore oil exploration and production
that one has to maintain the infrastructure to prevent or
relative to onshore production and other forms of energy
remediate events that can reasonably be expected to
are not receiving much attention. The key point omit-
happen once in forty years: the costs of maintaining
ted from current discussions is this: major spills from off-
largely idle equipment and trained workers become pro-
shore drilling rigs are much rarer, and typically account
hibitive over decades. (The last major U.S. offshore spill
for smaller amounts of spilled oil, than tanker accidents.
was the Santa Barbara spill of 1969.) Even with the high
Yet oil-rig blowouts, far more than tanker spills, typically
costs of cleaning up a spill after the fact, it can be hard
generate media frenzy—at least when they occur in U.S.
to argue that one would have spent less keeping more

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clean-up equipment in place over the last
FIGURE 1
forty years. The same situation is true of
SOURCE OF OIL SPILLS, 1957–2010
things like wastewater-treatment plants
that experience overflows in particularly
4,500,000
heavy storms, running sewage out to sea.
4,000,000
Even governments cannot face the eco-
nomic cost of maintaining the massive sur-
3,500,000
plus capacity that would prevent overflow
3,000,000
situations, and they simply plan to warn
ons
people away from contaminated waters
2,500,000
when overflows happen.
2,000,000
Metric T
Over the last sixty years, there have
been ten offshore-drilling accidents that
1,500,000
released more than 5,000 tons of oil into
1,000,000
ocean waters. During this same period,
500,000
there have been seventy-two oil spills
from tanker accidents that released 5,000
0
tons of oil or more—usually a lot more. In
Oil Spilled from
Oil Spilled from
Tanker Accidents
Offshore-Drilling Accidents
other words, for every offshore-drilling
accident, there are seven major tanker
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from data in the appendix.
spills and numerous tanker accidents of
smaller size. (Almost unnoticed by the
media, a tanker collision in the last week
FIGURE 2
of May near Singapore released about
WORLDWIDE AMOUNT OF OIL SPILLED FROM TANKERS
2,000 tons of oil.)8 As the appendix
AND OFFSHORE–DRILLING ACCIDENTS BY DECADE
shows, most tanker spills are larger in
3,000,000
magnitude than offshore-drilling acci-
dents, and in aggregate, they account for
more than four times as much oil released
2,500,000
into the ocean or coastal waters as
offshore-drilling accidents (see figure 1).
2,000,000
(Offshore-platform spills are denoted in
the appendix by an asterisk.) The Exxon
ons
1,500,000
Valdez, the most famous tanker-related oil
spill in the United States, ranks as the
Metric T
forty-sixth largest tanker spill in the
1,000,000
world since the late 1950s (bold in the
appendix). The Exxon Valdez was not
500,000
even the largest tanker spill of 1989;
the Khark 5 tanker wreck in Morocco—
0
twenty-second on this list—spilled nearly
1960–69
1970–79
1980–89
1990–99
2000–2009
twice as much oil. Since the Exxon Valdez
spill, seven larger tanker spills have
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from data in the appendix.
occurred worldwide.
Not reflected in the appendix is that when viewed
technology (see figure 2). There are about 3,500 off-
over time, the amount of oil spilled from both tankers
shore rigs active in the Gulf of Mexico and more than
and offshore-drilling accidents is down, reflecting
6,500 worldwide. As the National Academy of Sciences
changes in shipping (especially double-hulled tankers
(NAS) report brief for the 2003 book Oil in the Sea III
after the Exxon Valdez spill) and offshore-drilling
notes, “Spillage from vessels in North American waters

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from 1990 to 1999 was less than one-third of the
and killed more than 2,000 birds, Pemex refused to pay
spillage during the prior decade, and, despite increased
damages to the United States, citing sovereign immu-
production, reductions in releases during oil and gas
nity.) Both Venezuela and Brazil are expanding their
production have been dramatic as well.”9
offshore exploration and production in deep water and
The United States produces over 1 million barrels
are likely to expand to the Gulf of Mexico if the United
per day from offshore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico—
States scales back.
nearly one-quarter of total domestic oil production. If
Second, replacing offshore production with alterna-
this production is restricted, the United States has three
tive energy sources can cause a different kind of environ-
options for replacing the oil that would no longer be
mental harm. While the Deepwater Horizon accident
produced from the Gulf, each with its own mixture of
represents an acute short-term shock to Gulf waters and
benefits and drawbacks as well as regulatory and legisla-
the Gulf coast, the chronic seasonal hypoxic area or
tive hurdles. One: it can expand onshore production in
“dead zone” in the Gulf (which occurs near the Missis-
areas such as the Bakken field in North Dakota or in the
sippi Delta where nutrient-rich freshwater from the river
currently closed Alaska Natural Wildlife Refuge. Two:
leads to decreased oxygen levels in the water) may be
the United States can begin developing the oil shale
aggravated by one policy response that has been sug-
found in western states; these states may hold up to
gested in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon: increased
1 trillion barrels of oil. For this option to be economi-
ethanol production. The Nebraska Corn Growers Asso-
cally viable, however, market prices for oil would need
ciation seems especially enthusiastic, offering a series of
to be consistently higher than they have been in the last
tweets such as “Offshore oil drilling far from fail safe.
few years. Further, this option would involve disrupting
The spill will boost the appeal of renewable energy,
the land surface and would require a large amount of
such as ethanol. . . . There is a fuel option that doesn’t
water, which is not in abundant supply in western
result in oil spills in the ocean. It’s known as ethanol. . . .
states.10 Three: the United States can import more oil
When was the last time you saw a headline for an
from overseas, but this option would increase the risk of
ethanol spill in the ocean?”12 Hypoxia in the Gulf fluc-
oil spills from tankers. In 2008, a tanker collision on the
tuates from year to year depending on a range of vari-
Mississippi River in New Orleans released 8,000 tons of
ables, but over the long term, hypoxia has gotten worse.
oil into the Mississippi Delta; the National Oceanic and
A major contributor to this adverse trend is dissolved
Atmospheric Administration has a video of the spill’s
inorganic nitrogen (DIN) runoff from the Mississippi
effects on its website.11
River; the amount of DIN in the Gulf will increase with
additional ethanol production. A 2008 study published
by the NAS observed that “Nitrogen leaching from fer-
When viewed over time, the amount
tilized corn fields to the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River
of oil spilled from both tankers and
system is a primary cause of the bottom-water hypoxia
that develops on the continental shelf of the northern
offshore-drilling accidents is down,
Gulf of Mexico each summer.”13 The study concluded
reflecting changes in shipping and
that current ethanol production goals will increase
DIN flowing into the Gulf by as much as 34 percent
offshore-drilling technology.
and could make it impossible to achieve the federal
targets for reducing Gulf hypoxia.14
Further, curtailing offshore production in the Gulf
may not reduce the ecological risk to the Gulf coast of
Ecosystem Resiliency and Recovery
the United States for two reasons. First, other countries
are unlikely to curtail their own offshore exploration in
The amount of oil-based products entering the water
the Gulf. Indeed, Cuba is drilling for oil within one
each year from offshore production pales in comparison
hundred miles of the U.S. shoreline in south Florida,
to the amount released through natural seeps or due to
and, as mentioned before, Mexico caused the largest
human consumption, disposal, and leakage of petroleum
single spill in history in 1979; oil from the Ixtoc I spill
products. The NAS 2003 report brief Oil in the Sea III
reached Texas beaches. (Although oil from the Ixtoc 1
notes that “releases from extraction and transportation of
spill reached 125 miles of U.S. coastline in south Texas
petroleum represent less than 10 percent of inputs from

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human activity. Chronic releases during
FIGURE 3
consumption of petroleum, which include
PERCENTAGE OF OIL IN NORTH AMERICAN MARINE WATERS BY SOURCE
urban runoff, polluted rivers, and discharges
from commercial and recreational marine
1.2%
vessels, contribute up to 85 percent of the
3.6%
anthropogenic load to North American
waters.”15 (See figure 3.) Some estimate
that the amount of oil-based products
Extraction
Americans pour down their household
drains exceeds 300 million gallons (or
Transportation
about 1 million tons—much more oil than
32.8%
the Deepwater Horizon’s upper spill esti-
62.5%
mate) each year. The NAS report brief esti-
Consumption
mates that natural oil seepage into the
northern Gulf of Mexico (the area closest
Natural seeps
to the U.S. coastline) ranged from a low of
4,000 tons per year to as much as 17,000
tons per year; for the entire Gulf of Mexico,
the range is estimated to be 80,000 to
200,000 tons per year.16
SOURCE: Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research Council, “Report Brief from Oil in the Sea III: Inputs,
The NAS report brief notes that “the
Fates, and Effects” (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002), 1, available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/oil_in_the_sea/reportbrief.pdf (accessed June 8, 2010).
presence of these seeps, though entirely
natural, significantly alters the nature of
the local marine ecosystems around them.”17 The effect
the NAS adds, and this has certainly proven true in the
of oil spills from whatever source on coastal waters and
case of the Exxon Valdez spill, which, because $180 mil-
shoreline ecosystems is variable and highly dependent
lion of the $900 million civil settlement with Exxon
on the type of oil and local conditions. Although, as the
was set aside for scientific follow up, is the most studied
NAS report states, “no spill is entirely benign,” it adds
oil spill in history.20 With this volume of research, it is
that “there is no correlation between the size of a release
possible to find data supporting a full spectrum of con-
and its impact. Instead, as in the real estate maxim, it’s all
clusions, from significant lingering harm to full recovery
about ‘location, location, location.’”18 Sometimes small
of Prince William Sound. A 2007 study in Environmen-
spills have large effects on local wildlife, and large spills
tal Science and Technology concluded that a substantial
can have minor effects. The NAS notes that 30,000 birds
amount of Exxon Valdez oil was still present and “will
were killed in Norway after a small tanker spill in 1981,
persist for decades up to a century,”21 while a 2008 study
while the Amoco Cadiz spill in 1978—one of the largest
in the Marine Pollution Bulletin concluded that “Prince
tanker spills on record—killed about 5,000 birds. There is
William Sound has reverted to a stable environment of
a large body of scientific literature on aspects of this sub-
extremely low level contamination in which local per-
ject, but the NAS report notes that large gaps in our
turbations are easily detected.”22 Undoubtedly the envi-
knowledge “pose strategic challenges to determining the
ronmental effects of the Deepwater Horizon spill will be
impact of oil through gathering observational data, as
studied for decades.
inevitably we make assumptions about the variability in
the ecosystem and that variability can obscure large and
Learning from History: The Ixtoc 1 Spill
continuing impacts. . . . The actual impact of the oil may
be more complex than we realize if it interacts with spa-
While waiting for the full ecological impact of the cur-
tially or temporally constrained phenomena.” Oil in the
rent spill to manifest itself, it is possible to explore his-
Sea offers the understatement: “These issues are hotly
torical precedents to set some expectations. The
contested after major pollution incidents.”19
aforementioned Ixtoc 1 spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
“Assessing recovery after a pollution event is perhaps
1979–80 offers several disquieting parallels to the Deep-
even more challenging than assessing initial damage,”
water Horizon spill, but also some reasons for guarded

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optimism. Like Deepwater Horizon, the Ixtoc 1 spill
waters, although the 15,000 square kilometer area rep-
resulted from the failure of a blowout preventer, and
resented only about 2.5 percent of Mexican Gulf coast
subsequent attempts to seal the leak with a cap (“top
waters.24 Hurricane Frederick struck the Texas coast in
hat”) or by clogging the wellhead (“top kill” and “junk
September 1979 and washed away 95 percent of the oil
shot”) both failed. The leak was not stopped for nine
that had reached shoreline beaches and marshes.25
months, at which time two relief wells could be com-
This indicates that, despite current fears, the effects
pleted. The discouraging aspect of this parallel is that
of tropical storms and hurricanes in the midst of the
the Ixtoc 1 leak was in only two hundred feet of water,
Deepwater Horizon spill could cut in both directions.
while the Deepwater Horizon is a mile under the ocean.
In November 1979, the damages to the Texas Gulf
BP has a head start on the relief wells, which are
coast were aggravated when oil tanker Burmah Agate
already more than 10,000 feet under the ocean floor.
collided with another tanker at the entrance to Galve-
On the other hand, if the Deepwater Horizon spill
ston Bay. The Burmah Agate leaked nearly 35,000 tons
continues as long as the Ixtoc 1 (nine months), it will
of oil (nearly as much as the Exxon Valdez) and burned
easily eclipse Ixtoc 1 as the largest spill in history.
for nearly a month.
Conclusion
There is considerable risk that overreaction
to the Deepwater Horizon spill will have
It will be some time before we have a better idea of the
nature and extent of the environmental damage from
second-order environmental impacts that
the Deepwater Horizon spill, but while the severity of
could be cumulatively worse than the spill
the spill should not be downplayed, there are a few rea-
sons for cautious optimism. In general, ocean ecosystems
itself, both for the Gulf and for other
tend to have faster recovery times than either freshwater
or land ecosystems because the area available for the
environmental arenas.
dilution and dispersal of spilled oil droplets is so vast,
because turbulence in the ocean helps aerate the water,
The Ixtoc 1 well blew out June 3, 1979, and the
and because it is relatively easy for areas to be repopu-
leak was not stopped until March 1980. Oil from the
lated from adjacent areas once the disturbance has
spill began washing up on 125 miles of Texas coastline
stopped. A recent study of seven basic ecosystem types
by early August. It is estimated that only 4,000 tons of
and the disturbances they are most likely to experience
oil made it to U.S. shores, about 1 percent of the total
found that of ecosystems that make a recovery from vari-
amount of oil spilled. (About 30,000 tons was esti-
ous catastrophic events (and, it must be noted, not all
mated to have reached Mexican shorelines.) Both the
do), ocean ecosystems disrupted by oil spills were the
United States and Mexico deployed confinement
fastest to recover, often within a span of one to four
booms in an attempt to protect coastlines—with lim-
years. By contrast, it can take more than forty years for
ited effectiveness—and engaged in beach clean-up
forestlands to recover from deforestation or fire.26 As the
activities and wildlife triage efforts (such as relocating
New York Times noted in a 1993 story, the Persian Gulf
10,000 endangered baby Kemp Ridley turtles). As BP
recovered surprisingly faster than anticipated from the
has done with the Deepwater Horizon spill, Pemex
1.2-million-ton spill Saddam Hussein unleashed on the
made heavy use of chemical dispersants.23 According
Gulf at the end of the first Gulf War in 1991: “The vast
to a study by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
amount of oil that Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait
about half of the oil evaporated, and another 25 per-
dumped into the Persian Gulf during the 1991 war did
cent sank to the bottom of the ocean, much of it bro-
little long-term damage, international researchers say.”27
ken up by wave action and chemical dispersants. The
The Deepwater Horizon spill may not even be the most
Swedish Academy study estimated that oil from the
significant chronic environmental problem for the Mis-
Ixtoc 1 poisoned a 15,000 square kilometer area, devas-
sissippi Delta and the Gulf coastline, as one of us noted
tating crab, shrimp, and fish stocks and leading to large
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina five years ago.28
oxygen-killing plankton blooms. Overall fish landings
Another cause for optimism lies in the type of oil going
fell by up to 70 percent in Mexican and Texas coastal
into the Gulf, which, according to most reports, is light

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sweet crude oil. As the Alaska Department of Fish and
Notes
Wildlife observes, light oils are less likely to cause long-term
contamination than are either medium or heavy oils.29
1. U.S. Department of the Interior, “Flow Rate Group Pro-
Still another cause for optimism is the location of the
vides Preliminary Best Estimate of Oil Flowing from BP Oil
oil. The novel conditions of this spill have created a
Well,” news release, May 27, 2010, available at www.doi.gov/
unique and previously unforeseen situation: rather than
news/pressreleases/Flow-Rate-Group-Provides-Preliminary-Best-
mostly rising and moving to shore, most of the oil is
Estimate-Of-Oil-Flowing-from-BP-Oil-Well.cfm (accessed
remaining dispersed in solution in the ocean. While that
June 7, 2010).
oil is bound to cause significant damage to marine life,
2. All mentions to tons in this Outlook are in reference to
the damage would likely have been much worse had
metric tons. One metric ton is the equivalent of 7.33 barrels
more of the oil made landfall along Gulf-coast shores.
of oil.
Indeed, it is possible that the conditions of the Deep-
3. Matthew Phillips, “A ‘Three Mile Island’ for Offshore
water Horizon spill may cause the bulk of the oil to stay
Oil,” Newsweek, April 30, 2010.
in less vulnerable ecosystems, where resilience is highest
4. Carl Pope, “America’s Chernobyl?” Huffington Post,
and recovery is fastest.
May 3, 2010, available at www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-pope/
The intense media and political attention on the
americas-chernobyl_b_561769.html (accessed June 7, 2010);
spill is understandable, but just as reaction to the Three
and Melinda Henneberger, “Is the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf Our
Mile Island nuclear accident of 1979 is now regarded as
Environmental 9/11?” Politics Daily, June 2, 2010, available
excessive and the cause of increased use of coal for
at www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/01/is-bp-oil-spill-our-
additional energy, there is considerable risk that over-
environmental-9-11 (accessed June 7, 2010).
reaction to the Deepwater Horizon spill will have
5. Charles H. Peterson et al., “Long-Term Ecosystem
second-order environmental impacts that could be
Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” Science 302, no. 5653
cumulatively worse than the spill itself, both for the
(December 19, 2003): 2082–86.
Gulf and for other environmental arenas. Even if the
6. See “Oil Rig Disasters: Offshore Drilling Accidents,”
costs of the spill exceed $12 billion (to be borne by
available at www.oilrigdisasters.co.uk (accessed June 7, 2010).
BP) as now seems likely, the benefits of continued off-
7. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Public Law 101-380, U.S.
shore oil production still exceed the costs by a wide
Statutes at Large 104 (1990): 848.
margin. Economist Peter Passell estimates a net eco-
8. “Oil Leaks from Tanker Collision off Singapore,” BBC
nomic benefit of nearly $1 trillion from continued off-
News, May 25, 2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
shore production.30 This will not be a popular position
hi/world/asia_pacific/10151722.stm (accessed June 7, 2010).
to hold as long as livestreaming video of the oil spill
9. Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research Coun-
continues and the media continues to cover the spill in
cil, “Report Brief from Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and
a state of near hysteria. But it is at precisely such times
Effects” (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,
that rational analysis needs to be heard.
2002), 1, available at http://books.nap.edu/html/oil_in_the_sea/
It is also understandable that policymakers would
reportbrief.pdf (accessed June 8, 2010).
want to get ahead of the issue, and, as they are already
10. A Bureau of Land Management (BLM) report estimates
doing, begin to institute restrictions on drilling, seek to
that an oil shale surface mine producing 50,000 barrels of shale
assign blame, hold hearings, instruct agency personnel
oil per day in the western United States would generate surface
to reexamine safety regulations and requirements, and
disturbance of approximately 5,760 acres (roughly 9 square
so on. But until all the information is in, the best thing
miles). The BLM report estimates that an underground mine
the government can do is to assist in containment and
producing 50,000 barrels of shale oil per day in the western
remediation, direct scientific resources to study the spill
United States would generate surface disturbance of approxi-
and its consequences, and determine the facts of what
mately 1,650 acres (roughly 2.5 square miles). The Department
led up to the Deepwater Horizon spill, both in the execu-
of Energy (DOE) estimates the water usage for new retorting
tive offices of BP and in the halls of the Department of
methods to be about one to three barrels of water per barrel of
the Interior and the Minerals Management Service.
shale oil produced. The BLM report estimates water usage for
surface mines and underground mines to be 2.6–4 barrels of
The authors would like to thank AEI research assistant Hiwa
Alaghebandian and AEI intern Eliza Gheorghe for their assist-
water per barrel of oil; in-situ processes would require 1–3 barrels
ance preparing this Outlook.
of water per barrel of shale oil produced. The BLM report

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found that two to ten gallons of wastewater are produced for
and skimmed up the oil, which they used to waterproof their
each ton of shale oil produced. See BLM, Draft Oil Shale and
boats.” See NOAA Office of Response and Restoration, “Oil
Tar Sands Resource Management Plan Amendments to Address
Spills in History,” in “Frequently Asked Questions, Oil and
Land Use Allocations in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming and Pro-
Chemical Spills,” available at http://response.restoration.noaa.
grammatic Environmental Impact Statement, vol. 2 (Washington,
gov/faq_topic.php?faq_topic_id=1#2 (accessed June 8, 2010).
DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, December 2007), avail-
17. Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research Council,
able at http://ostseis.anl.gov/documents/dpeis/volumes/
“Report Brief from Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects.”
OSTS_DPEIS_Vol_2.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010); and
18. Ibid.
DOE Office of Petroleum Reserves–Strategic Unconventional
19. Ibid.
Fuels, “Fact Sheet: Oil Shale Water Resources,” n.d., available
20. Writing for Science, Lila Guterman says, “The Valdez
at http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/npr/Oil_Shale_
studies are the largest, longest, and most expensive ever done.”
Water_Requirements.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010).
See Lila Guterman, “Conservation Biology: Exxon Valdez Turns
11. The video is available through the National Oceanic
20,” Science 323, no. 5921 (March 20, 2009): 1558.
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Office of Response
21. Jeffrey W. Short et al., “Slightly Weathered Exxon
and Restoration, “New Orleans Spill Incident: Barge DM932,”
Valdez Oil Persists in Gulf of Alaska Beach Sediments after 16
July 23, 2008, available at http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/
Years,” Environmental Science and Technology 41, no. 4 (2007):
topic_subtopic_entry.php?RECORD_KEY(entry_subtopic_
1245–50, quoted in Ibid.
topic)=entry_id,subtopic_id,topic_id&entry_id(entry_subtopic
22. James R. Payne, William B. Driskell, Jeffrey W. Short,
_topic)=749&subtopic_id(entry_subtopic_topic)=2&topic_id
and Marie L. Larsen, “Long Term Monitoring for Oil in the
(entry_subtopic_topic)=1 (accessed June 8, 2010).
Exxon Valdez Spill Region,” Marine Pollution Bulletin 56, no. 12
12. Dan Mitchell, “Ethanol Fans Milk Slick Catastrophe,”
(2008): 2067.
The Big Money’s Daily Bread: The Business of Food, April 29,
23. For a good explanation of how oil dispersants work, see
2010, available at www.thebigmoney.com/blogs/daily-bread/
Katie Peek, “How Do Oil Dispersants Work?” Popular Science
2010/04/29/corn-lobbyists-latch-tragic-oil-spill?page=ful
Online, May 28, 2010, available at www.popsci.com/science/article/
(accessed June 8, 2010); and Nebraska Corn Growers Associa-
2010-05/how-do-oil-dispersants-work (accessed June 8, 2010).
tion, NeCGA Twitter, available at http://twitter.com/NeCGA
24. Arne Jernelöv and Olof Lindén, “Ixtoc I: A Case Study of
(accessed June 8, 2010).
the World’s Largest Oil Spill,” Ambio 10, no. 6 (1981): 299–306.
13. Simon D. Donner and Christopher J. Kucharik, “Corn-
25. Carlos E. Restrepo et al., “Ixtoc 1 Oil Spill Economic
Based Ethanol Production Compromises Goal of Reducing
Impact Study,” report prepared for the Bureau of Land Manage-
Nitrogen Export by the Mississippi River,” Proceedings of the
ment, Department of the Interior, 1982, 6.
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105,
26. Holly P. Jones and Oswald J. Schmitz, “Rapid Recovery
no. 11 (March 18, 2010): 4513.
of Damaged Ecosystems,” Plos One 4, no. 5 (May 2009):
14. Ibid.
e:5653, available at www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2
15. Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research
F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0005653 (accessed June 8, 2010).
Council, “Report Brief from Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates,
27. “Gulf Found to Recover from War’s Oil Spill,” New
and Effects.”
York Times, March 18, 1993.
16. NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration notes:
28. See Steven F. Hayward, “Katrina and the Environment,”
“Apart from oil spills caused by human actions, oil also is
AEI Environmental Policy Outlook (September–October 2005),
released into the environment from natural oil seeps in the
available at www.aei.org/outlook/23244.
ocean bottom. One of the best-known areas where this happens
29. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, “Effects of Oil Spills on
is Coal Oil Point along the California coast near Santa Barbara.
Wildlife and Habitat,” December 2004, available at http://alaska.
An estimated 2,000–3,000 gallons of crude oil is released natu-
fws.gov/media/unalaska/Oil%20Spill%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf
rally from the ocean bottom every day just a few miles offshore
(accessed June 11, 2010).
from this beach. . . . In the early 1500s, the Portuguese-born
30. See Ronald Bailey, “Weighing the Benefits and Costs
explorer Juan Cabrillo sailed into what is now Santa Barbara,
of Offshore Drilling,” Reason.com, May 4, 2010, available at
California, and remarked on the oil he saw bubbling out from
http://reason.com/archives/2010/05/04/weighing-the-benefits-
a natural seep. He reported that the Chumash Indians scooped
costs-of (accessed June 8, 2010).

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APPENDIX
MAJOR OIL SPILLS OF THE LAST SIXTY YEARS
Spill
Location
Size (Metric Tons)
Year
Gulf War
Persian Gulf
1,200,000
1991
Ixtoc I*
Mexico
460,000
1979
Deepwater Horizon* [High-end est.]
United States
400,000
2010
Deepwater Horizon* [Mid-point est.]
United States
300,000
2010
Atlantic Empress
Trinidad
287,000
1979
Nowruz Field Platform*†
Persian Gulf
260,000
1983
ABT Summer
Angola
260,000
1991
Castillo de Bellver
South Africa
252,000
1983
Amoco Cadiz
France
225,000
1978
Deepwater Horizon*[Low-end est.]
United States
165,500
2010
Odyssey Canada
132,000
1988
Sea Star
Oman
115,000
1972
Morris Berman
Puerto Rico
109,000
1994
Texaco Denmark
Belgium
102,000
1971
Torrey Canyon
United Kingdom
100,000
1967
Urquiola Spain
100,000
1976
Irenes Serenade
Greece
100,000
1980
Hawaiian Patriot
United States
95,000
1977
MD Independenta
Turkey
95,000
1979
Julius Schindler
Azores
92,000
1969
Jakob Maersk
Portugal
88,000
1975
Braer United
Kingdom
85,000
1993
Ekofisk*
North Sea
81,000
1977
Kkark 5
Morocco
75,000
1989
Aegean Sea
Spain
74,000
1992
Katina P
Mozambique
72,000
1992
Nova Iran
70,000
1985
Sea Empress
United Kingdom
70,000
1996
Betelgeuse Ireland
64,000
1979
Prestige Spain
63,000
2002
Epic Coloctronis
Puerto Rico
59,000
1975
Sinclair Petrolore
Brazil
57,000
1960
Othello Sweden
55,000
1970
Metula Chile
54,000
1974
Yuko Maru
Japan
51,000
1974
Assimi Oman
51,000
1983
Andros Patria
Spain
47,000
1978
World Glory
India
46,000
1968
British Ambassador
Japan
46,000
1975
Ennerdale Indian
Ocean
45,000
1970
Pericles Qatar
45,000
1983
Tadotsu Indonesia
43,000
1978
Mandoil II
United States
41,000
1968
Wafra South
Africa
40,000
1971
Juan Lavalleja
Algeria
40,000
1980
Napier Chile
38,000
1973
Trader Greece
37,000
1972
Exxon Valdez
United States
37,000
1989
NOTE: * denotes offshore-platform spills; † denotes Nowruz platform spill, an act of war, not an equipment accident.
Continued on the next page

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(continued from page 9)
Spill
Location
Size (Metric Tons)
Year
Thanassis A
China
37,000
1994
Corinthos United
States
35,700
1975
Burmah Agate
United States
34,700
1979
St. Peter
Colombia
34,000
1976
Abkatun 91*
Mexico
33,700
1986
Athenian Venture
Canada
33,000
1988
Irene’s Challenge
Pacific Ocean
32,400
1977
Venoil South
Africa
29,800
1977
Borag Taiwan
29,000
1977
Funiwa No. 5*
Nigeria
27,000
1980
Argo Merchant
United States
26,000
1976
Jiyeh Power Station
Lebanon
25,000
2006
African Queen
United States
21,000
1958
Erika France
20,000
1999
MT Haven
Italy
19,500
1991
Nakhoda Japan
19,000
1997
Montara Oil Platform*
Timor Sea
18,000
2009
Kirki
Australia
17,280
1991
Mega Borg
Mexico
16,500
1990
Seki
United Arab Emirates
15,900
1994
Tarik Ibn Ziyad
Brazil
15,000
1975
Tasman Spirit
Pakistan
15,000
2006
Tanio France
13,500
1980
Hasbah 6*
Saudi Arabia
13,500
1980
Limburg Persian
Gulf
12,200
2002
Santa Barbara Channel*
United States
12,000
1969
Nagasaki Spirit
Malacca Strait
12,000
1992
Korea
Korea
10,800
2007
Alvenus
United States
8,800
1984
New Orleans
United States
8,800
2008
Shell Platform 26*
United States
8,000
1970
YUM II/Zapoteca*
Mexico
8,000
1987
Sea Spirit
Gibraltar
6,600
1990
Citgo Refinery
United States
6,500
2006
Mobil Nigeria
Nigeria
5,500
1998
Zoe Coloctronis
Puerto Rico
5,100
1973
Trinimar Marine 327*
Venezuela
5,000
1973
Statfjord
Norway
4,000
2007
SOURCES: Authors’ compilation from the following: “List of Oil Spills,” Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_spills (accessed June 8,
2010), this list is incomplete and inaccurate but contains many useful references; International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, “Statistics,” 2010, available
at www.itopf.com/information%2Dservices/data%2Dand%2Dstatistics/statistics (accessed June 8, 2010); Dagmar Schmidt Etkin and Jeff Welch, “International Oil
Spill Database: Trends in Oil Spill Volumes and Frequency” (Oil Spill Intelligence Report, International Oil Spill Conference, Arlington, MA, 1997), available at
www.iosc.org/papers/01480.pdf (accessed June 8, 2010); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazard Materials Response and Assessment
Division, Oil Spill Case Histories, 1967–1991: Summaries of Significant U.S. and International Spills (Seattle, WA: NOAA, September 1992), available at
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/26_spilldb.pdf (accessed June 8, 2010); “Oil Rig Disasters: Offshore Drilling Accidents,” available at www.oil-
rigdisasters.co.uk (accessed June 7, 2010); and Will Wright, “The Worst Major Oil Spills in History: By Comparison to These, the Exxon Valdez Was a Minor
Spill,” Associated Content Inc., November 25, 2007, available at www.associatedcontent.com/article/454782/the_worst_major_oil_spills_in_history.html?cat=37
(accessed June 8, 2010).
NOTE: * denotes offshore-platform spills; † denotes Nowruz platform spill, an act of war, not an equipment accident.

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