Title: Ethnic identity, language shift and The Amazigh voice in

Title: Ethnic identity, language shift and The Amazigh voice in
Morocco and Algeria
Published in Race, Gender & Class. An Interdisciplinary and Multicultural Journal, 8(3), 57-69
(2001).

Abderrahman El Aissati is assistant professor in linguistics at the department of language and
minorities, where he teaches Arabic and Berber linguistics and languages. His book Language Loss
among Native speakers of Moroccan Arabic in the Netherlands is published by the Tilburg University
Press. His coursebook for learning Tarifit is in Press (Amsterdam: Bulaaq). Address: Department of
Language and Minorities, Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg. Tel:+31-13-4662 668.
Fax: +31-13-4663 110. For an e-mail address fol ow this link

Although Berber is known to be the indigenous language of the populations of North
Africa for over thirty centuries, it has never been promoted to the status of a standard
language, let alone that of an official language of any of the states where it is
traditional y spoken as a mother tongue. Since the late 1960’s a revival movement
has been striving for official recognition of Berber. Some recent events in Morocco
and Algeria give proof of a limited success of this movement, but as a result of
growing urbanization, education (mainly in Arabic and French), and emigration inside
and outside Morocco, the threat of a massive language shift is greater than ever.
This paper explores into the paradoxical constructs of ethnic identity and linguistic
identity in Morocco and Algeria, and highlights their role in the revival movement. In
the light of these constructs, it deals with (i) the factors that energize the revival
movement, (i ) the factors that impede the official recognition of Berber and its
standardization, and final y (i i) the prospects for the survival of Berber.

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to analyze the situation of Berber in Morocco and Algeria,
with particular emphasis on the construct of a Berber identity, its goals, claims,
philosophy, and prospects. The issue whether the Berber identity is founded on
purely linguistic claims or also on extralinguistic ones, like ethnicity and culture, wil
be explored. The paper addresses the fol owing questions: 1)Why is there an

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increase in the revival movement for a Berber identity in the recent years? What is
the nature of the relationship between Berber, Arabic and Islam? What are the
chances for the official recognition of Berber? The attribute ‘Berber’ wil be
substituted by ‘Amazigh’ when referring to the language in general, disregarding the
regional variants. These wil be termed as is customary in the relevant literature, e.g.
using attributes like ‘Tarifit’, ‘Kabyle’, and Tashelhit. When referring to the people
themselves, the plural form ‘imazighen’ wil be used.

This change in attributes is an attempt to meet the demands of Amazigh audiences
who insist on using the indigenous terminology, i nstead of the external appelations
‘Berber’. The common reasoning one hears, mostly during public meetings, is that
the term ‘Berber’ was initial y used by the Greeks, then by the romans, as a
derogatory term to refer to people who were considered as ‘barbarians’. Although
dictionary entries of Romance language, in particular French -in which so much has
been written on Amazigh- simply state that ‘Berber’ is the indigenous language of
north-Africans, and reserves two different entries for ‘Berber’ and ‘Barbare’. In Arabic,
a language which is in intense contact with Amazigh, the same entry is used for
‘Berber’ and ‘Barbarian’, with derivations like ‘barbara’ “to babel” (see, for example,
‘al-munjid fi l-lughati wa l-‘a’lâm’, dar al-Mashriq, Beirut). This can perhaps explain in
part the irritation that many Imazighen show when addressed as Beerbers. Moreover,
the term ‘Berber’ is not used in any of the Amazigh varieties to refer to an Amazigh.

Language and ethnic identity

Before dealing with revival movements, it is necessary to define what is meant here
by a linguistic and ethnic identity. In the case of Amazigh, there is some indication
that the actors conceive of themselves as a different ethnic group than the dominant
one, the Arabs. However, the most prominent index to ethnicity is linguistic. People
define themselves as Imazighen once they speak the Amazigh language. This is not
surprising since language does in general constitute a very strong factor in group
identity, as Fishman (1989:27 explains that a distinct language “is more likely than
most symbols of ethnicity to become the symbol of ethnicity. Language is the
recorder of paternity, the expresser of patrimony and the carrier of phenomenology.”
Other symbols can function as indices ao an Amazigh identity, like dress, jewelry,

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and ancestry. In this last case, even people who do not speak the language can
claim an Amazigh identity, on the basis of their parents own identity (see below under
discussion of language shift).

It is right to assume that language shift among Imazighen is the ultimate threat for an
identity claim: once the speaker ceases to speak Amazigh, there remains little about
him which would indicate his ‘Amazighness’. This is largely due to centuries of
coexisting between Arabs andImazighen, which have shaped the culture of North-
Africa. If couscous was once an indigenous North African cookery masterpiece, it is
now prepared and enjoyed by virtual y every family in the area. Similar observations
can be made about the djel aba. The Amazigh jewelry, which is very distinctive, is
almost never worn in urban contexts, and is being replaced by modern dress in rural
areas as wel . Physiological traits are also not that reliable in identifying in-group and
out-group members, partly as a result of the wide practice of intermarriages, and also
because of the nature of the population of North-Africa in general. A wide spectrum is
available when comparing a Rifian (from the north of Morocco, to a Soussi (from the
south of Morocco) and to a Touareg (from the South of Algeria).

The observation that Amazigh traits, outside of language, either disappear (traditional
jewelry) or become generalized in use (cookery) does not mean that these traits or
other new ones cannot strengthen the ethnic identity of an Amazigh individual. There
is a recourse to traditional jewelry among some female Amazigh activists, and there
are ongoing debates on the indigenous North African cookery (e.g. on the Amazigh-
Net, a mailing group created to promote the Amazigh language and culture). An
extremely important cultural, and possibly political, new sign is the Amazigh flag:
horizontal strips of blue (the Mediterranean sea as the Northern border of
Tamazgha), green (the Northern fertile area) and yel ow (the Saharan area, home of
the Touareg populations), centered with the letter ‘z’ in Tifinagh (The indigenous
North African alphabet, which stands for the center letter in the root ‘mz ’); the letter
is in red “the color of struggle, of combat, and of blood” (source: message diffused
by Tamazgha, an Amazigh cultural association in Paris on the Amazigh-Net on
October 30th 1998 <Tamazgha@wanadoo.fr>).


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Amazigh revival movements

Although it is widely believed that Amazigh revival movements are a recent
trend, this should not eclipse the fact that already by the beginning of the 20th
century, manifestations of an Amazigh identity claim had seen the light. These are
exemplified by the pioneering work of Amar ou Saïd Boulifa (1897;1909, etc), and
the work of Jean Amrouche “Les chants berbères de kabylie” (1939) (cited in
Chaker 1997). In Morocco, writings in Berber go as back as 1580, and are more than
a couple hundred in number (N.van den Boogert and H. Stroomer (1993). Older
manuscripts have been traced in Al-Andalus, or Muslim Spain, which date back to the
10th century. One of these is an Arabic-Amazigh dictionary by Ibn Tunart (1154)
(N.van den Boogert and M. Kossmann 1998). These are exclusively written in the
Arabic script, and have religious themes. The nature of the Moroccan texts is clearly
different from that of the Algerian ones. The former ones were written with the goal of
making Islam easily accessible to native speakers of Amazigh (here, of Tashelhit),
whereas the latter were produced as an act de presence: to tel both the French and
the Arabs that there is an identity which has preceded both, and which has every
right to claim supremacy on its own territory.

This being said, there remains the question why only in the second half of the
twentieth century did the Amazigh revival movement become a central issue in
political and cultural debates. By resorting to the concept of ‘cognitive alternative’
(Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 1977) we can easily understand why only recently did the
claim for an Amazigh identity become so widespread. The developments in linguistic
theory did provide an alternative to the idea that some languages are ‘better’ than
others. A case in point is the widely taught dogma at school naming Arabic as the
most eloquent language. When examining linguistic facts, anyone can see how
complex the structure of Amazigh is, and what its capacities are: just like any other
natural language. The French academic institutions did open doors to the Amazigh
investigator, bringing forth advances in anthropological studies, showing how
complex any so-cal ed ‘primitive’ culture can be. The French institution did then
benefit the Amazigh student, transforming him into an avid defender of his own
language and culture, confronting the colonial institution itself (Chaker 1997).


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The Amazigh intel ectual has obtained the tools necessary to redefine his own social
group in positive terms, a phenomenon taken as one of the assumptions of social
identity theory (Giles et al. 1977). That is, any social group strives for a positive self-
identification. One of the ways to do that is through redefining some attributes that
used to define this group as negative, like language or accent, skin color, etc. The
contact of the Amazigh reader with texts on the history of North-Africa, or old
Numedia under the Roman rule, or on the origin and native language of some
glorious Islamic imperia (Al-Mohades, Al-Morabitin, AL-Marinides, the Ziris, etc) has
brought him in contact with his own historical heritage, which continues to be a
source of pride and inspiration to many cultural and political activists. This historical
dimension constitutes a direct chal enge to the precepts of Islam, which stipulate that
the history of any Muslim begins with Islam; before Islam was the period of ignorance
and savagery (al-jâhiliyya). Of course, it is not enough to know the indigenous
history to consider it as a source of pride. To a lot of Muslim Imazighen, among
whom students of history, the period prior to Islam was simply a colonization period,
beginning with the Roman one and ending with the Ottoman one. It depends on the
conceptual frame of the interpreter of history. What is important here is the new
possibility offered to the cultural activist, namely to be connected to his own history
and to be proud of it. This is very visible in the practice of naming children: it is not
uncommon to come across children named after Amazigh kings and historical
figures, such as ‘Massine’ ‘Juba’ ‘Jugurtha’ and so forth.

Before moving to the second issue dealing with the nature of the relationship of
Amazigh to Arabic and Islam, it is important to note the fol owing two points. First, the
contact of Amazigh with the French culture and academic institution is often used by
opponents of the Amazigh movement as a piece of evidence that this movement is
inspired by colonialists. The fact that the early Amazigh writers were among the most
ardent opponents of French colonialism is simply, but not surprisingly, ignored. A
second point relevant to the historical dimension is the Berber Decree or the ‘Dahir
berbère’ issued in May 1930 by the French administration. This decree was meant to
institutionalize two different legal systems in Morocco: one for the Imazighen, deriving
its essence from the local customary laws, and one for the Arabs, based on the
Islamic law or the ‘Shariâa.’ This decree was fervently opposed by both Arabs and
Imazighen and ceased to apply a few years later. This decree was a direct

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application of the ‘divide and rule’ maxim, and a direct attack on the Muslim unity of
the Moroccans as wel as of other Muslims (mainly in the Middle East), and on the
nationalist identity of Moroccans, as wel as on the Arab-nationalism in general, which
has difficulties recognizing individual Arab states, let alone tolerating further division
of an Arab country. In the recent years, this historical episode has been used rather
systematical y by the opponents of the Amazigh movement, as a reminder that the
French colonization was ready to recognize an entity cal ed ‘Amazigh’ as an
ideological weapon to rule Morocco more efficiently. It fol ows then, according to this
view, that any one advocating any sort of separate or different identity is working in
the same direction, that is, supporting a colonial ideology.

Amazigh, Arabic and Islam

In this section I propose to explain the multifaceted relationship between Amazigh,
Arabic, and Islam. My goal is to highlight points of relevance to the Amazigh
movement, with emphasis on whether or not it is possible for a language other than
Arabic to be used for religious purposes, and how the Amazigh identity relates to
Arabic and Islam.

The languages of Islam

It is perhaps a mute point to even question whether other languages than Arabic can
be used as the main language of Islam, when we know that Muslim Arabic speakers
are a minority compared to Muslim non-Arabic speakers. The issue is important,
however, in that it highlights that what is at stake is not real y a Muslim-non-Muslim
stride, but mainly a political stride using Islam as a weapon to silence its opponents.
A first disclaimer in favor of the tolerance of Islam for multilingual and multicultural
societies is noted by Borst (1957-63, I: 325, cited in Eco 1995:352) namely that the
confusio resulting after the fal of Babel is to Islam a natural event, and not a curse.
What an advanced statement in favor of a multilingual/multicultural society. I fact, this
observation has been repeatedly made by the Moroccan scholar Mohamed Chafik
,who quotes from the Koran and the tradition alike to support this view. The Koranic
verse “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and
made into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other […]” (al-hujurat, 13) and

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“Among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in
your languages and your colors: verily in that are signs for those who know” (al-rum,
22).

If Islam as a religion has never cal ed for the exclusive use of Arabic, it remains that
in practice Arabic is considered as a sacred language by Muslims, which entails that
it would be highly evaluated. This is the case in many countries like Turkey or Iran,
where the Muslim scholars and clergy master Classical Arabic, even though they
conduct their sermons and preaching in languages other than Arabic. Although
Arabic is of vital importance to religion in many Muslim countries outside the so-
cal ed Arab World, it does not pose a direct threat to any of the national languages of
these countries. On the other hand, Arabic continues to gain more territory in the
countries of the Maghreb at the expense of Amazigh, namely in Algeria and Morocco.
The authorities in these two countries are so reluctant, if not hostile, to any claims
regarding raising the status of Amazigh to that of an official language. It should be
noted here that in countries like Tunisia and Libya, once homelands of the Amazigh
language, Amazigh speakers have been reduced in number to a few thousand,
indicating the completion of the Arabicization process.

What is perhaps of crucial importance to the point being made here –highlighting the
relationship of Islam to Arabic- is the fact that since the arrival of Muslim conquerors,
al official documentation that is known to us is in Arabic. The massive campaigns of
Arab-Muslim leaders against the Western occupations in the Arab World, brought
together inhabitants of the Maghreb in unconditional support of countries with whom
they share religion and a big part of their culture, but mostly, with whom they could
communicate in the same language, i.e. Arabic.

A recent publication of the leader of the “organization for Justice and benevolence”
(jamaâat-al-‘adl wa al-ihsane) Abdessalam. has uncovered the position of his
movement and can be taken to represent, although partial y, that of other Muslim
movements. Yacine sees Islam as the top of a pyramid, supported by Arabic and
Muslim believers. For him, there is no place for Amazigh next to Arabic when it
comes to important domains. He does recognize that there is nothing wrong with
speaking a mother tongue other than Arabic, but it should never be a matter of

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discussion to have a bilingual education for example, or write on religious matters in
Amazigh, etc. He says nothing about Muslim countries where Arabic is a minority
language: should these do their best and abandon their languages in order to
become good Muslims?
The greatest impediments for the recognition of Amazigh as an official language in
Morocco and Algeria have more to do with an identity conflict than with Islam as a
religion. The majority of the populations of these two countries may view themselves
as Muslims first, and as Moroccans or Algerians second. There is reason to believe,
especial y in the case of Morocco, that many Imazighen view themselves as Arab-
Muslim-Imazighen. It is not uncommon to hear an Amazigh refer to himself as an
Arab, and expressing this in Amazigh. I have personal y witnessed many cases, and
Bentahila and Davies (1992) report on similar cases. The advantages of adopting an
Arab identity are numerous, among which having access to the privileged market.
The pride in being an Arab is sustained by the school, masses of publications and
practical y al the official media. Claiming an Amazigh identity is usual y accompanied
by arguments based on the history of North Africa, arguments based on linguistic
human rights, as wel as on linguistic arguments showing that Amazigh is capable,
like any other natural language, of dealing with complex matters and the like. These
arguments are not accessible to the wide public. The massive campaigns by
Amazigh activists aim at publicizing the type of knowledge which would make
Imazighen aware of their ‘new’ identity.

Language shift and linguistic identity

From the previous discussion we gather that there is an Amazigh revival movement
way in progress, but it is faced with serious chal enges and obstacles. In this section I
provide some data on the actual situation of the Amazigh language, in order to make
clear the extent of the threat of a shift from Amazigh to Arabic. After that, we’l move
to a consideration of the chances of succes of the Amazigh revival movement. The
emphasis on language in this context is justified by the major role that language play
in shaping ethnic identity, as said earlier.

The possibility of a complete shift from Amazigh to Arabic might seem quite remote
when we consider that there are at least 20 000 000 speakers of this language in

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Morocco and Algeria. A closer look at the situation reveals that if there is no official
protection of this language, within the next few generations, its speakers wil be
scarce to find. The immediate counterargument one hears is that a language that
survived for thousands of years cannot disappear in such a short period of time. The
answer to this objection is simple. It is only in the last few decades that technology
has al owed the mass media to reach the homes of even those in the heart of the
mountians of Kabylia or the Rif mountains. Public schooling is also a very recent
phenomenon, which was generalized only after the independence of each of these
two countries. Industrialization also contributes to the spread of the official language,
by attracting more and more people to the city, where Arabic is general y the
dominant language, except in the few cities in predominnatly Amazigh areas, like Tizi
Ouzou and Bougie in Algeria and Nador and Al Hoceima in Morocco.

Very little research has been done to investigate language shift among Amazigh
speakers. Bentahila and Davies (1992) surveyed 180 families whose members use
Amazigh, usual y next to Arabic. They report that the youngest generation in these
families has completely switched to Arabic, and that these informants do not feel
sorry about the fact they shifted from Amazigh to Arabic “probably because it is not
felt to affect identity, which is secure before and after the shift.” (pp. 209-210). In fact,
according to the same authors “In the interviews both Berber and non-Berber
speakers [i.e. those who switched completely to Arabic, A.E.] expressed little sense
of regret about the shift, and some described how their parents had actively
encouraged them to use Arabic in preference to Berber in childhood, with remarks
such as “Berber won’t help you to earn your daily bread.” […] None of those who
were not fluent in Berber reported that their parents were particularly disturbed by
this.” Another significant finding of Bentahila and Davies is that only 63% of the their
Amazigh respondents answered the question “Out of al the languages you know,
which do you consider to be your own language?” with “Amazigh” [“Berber” in the
source article], while 27% said they considered Arabic to be their own language.

Regarding self categorization, 30% of Amazigh respondents reported that they
considered themselves exclusively Amazigh, while 47% used Amazigh in
combination with Arab and/or Moroccan. The authors do not give the percentage of
respondents who indicated tht they are both Amazigh and Moroccan, an attribute that

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should raise no questions at al , unlike the one that combines Amazigh and Arab. Of
those who don’t speak Amazigh at al , 37% stil defined themselves as Amazigh. We
can see here that in fact, this group of respondents does not equate language with
identity, since they would exclude themselves from being Amazigh.


Another study that reports on the process of language shift among Amazigh speakers
is Bouhjar (1994), cited in Boukous 1995. A few investigations in Morocco
unanimously show that there are negative attitudes towards Amazigh languages,
even among students at university level. For example, Tounsi 1993 (cited in
Boukous 1995) asked 174 informants (of whom 34,48% were amazigh) to indicate
with a ‘+’ the language to which the respondent has a positive attitude, and with a ‘-‘
the language to which the respondent has a negative attitude. The languges in
question were French, amazigh (the Tashelhit variety), Moroccan Arabic, Hebrew
(Yiddish?), and Standard Arabic. Only 10,34% of the respondents indicated a
positive attitude, 32,75% a negative attitude, and the rest gave no answer. This
means that slightly less than a third of the number of Amazigh respondents indicated
a positive attitude towards Amazigh, but not necessarily al of these were Amazigh!

The results of the studies mentioned above would of course be very different if the
informants had previously been informed about the possibility of teaching Amazigh,
or if they had read about the history of North Africa, or if they knew one could earn
one’s daily bread with Amazigh. Although studies on attitudes of Imazighen toward
Amazigh are scarce, one can satipulate that the more ground the Amazigh
movement makes, the more people change their negative attitudes towards Amazigh.
In a a sense, the Amazigh revival movement and the language attitudes feed each
other and accelerate the progress towards an official status of Amazigh.. In the next
section we wil see how attitudes, among other things, are crucial to the success of
revival movements.

Reversing language shift and reinforcing an Amazigh identity

In one of his numerous contributions to the study of language shift and revival
movements, Fishman (1990) traces an itinirary for the successful reversal of

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