Urban water pollution, communities and the State in Southeast Asia

Urban water pollution, communities and the State in Southeast Asia


Donovan Storey, Massey University
Paper presented to the workshop on Water in Mainland Southeast Asia, Siem Reap,
30 November to 2 December 2005.


Abstract

Southeast Asian cities are confronted with a range of environmental challenges
with few success stories. State-driven and top-down solutions have been unsuccessful
while communities struggle with developing and implementing alternative strategies
which are both affordable and relevant. As a result water pollution is becoming a
more serious social and political flashpoint. In part this has been because current and
past approaches, which often involve cleaning/beautifying waterways and 'relocating'
the urban poor, have proven prohibitively expensive, unsustainable and have invited
conflict. Still, there are innovative approaches led by communities and NGOs,
sometimes in partnership with government but at other times in opposition to official
projects. I examine examples of these, drawing from fieldwork in Thailand. I examine
the possibilities for a more positive nexus between local government
and
communities
which lead to cleaner urban waterways and sustainable
communities. Some conclusions on alternative strategies are then drawn.


Introduction

Urban water pollution has emerged as one of the more critical forms of environmental
degradation in Asia. Whether it is China (Economy, 2004), Vietnam (O’Rourke,
2004), or East Asia (Rock, 2002), water pollution is clearly now on the environmental
and political agenda. On the surface water pollution is an environmental issue and is
often framed in terms of an inevitable stage of economic development. The
contentious environmental Kuznets curve, where the environment initially suffers
through economic growth only to recover when the benefits of development ‘trickle
down’, is an example of this thinking (Borghesi, 2002). Solutions are subsequently
presented in technical guises, such as waste water treatment plants. However the
water pollution which now characterises almost all Asian urban areas is far from a
temporary phase in the region’s (urban) development and the conflict which is now
escalating around environmental issues (see Fahn, 2003) has clearly put pollution on
the political agenda.

On the one hand conflict is resulting from the environmental impacts of urban growth,
the failure of regulation, and the increase of informal settlements, many of which are
un-serviced and lack basic sewerage and sanitation systems. These consequences of
unchecked industrialisation have been notoriously difficult to resolve, and few
governments anywhere in Asia have managed to seriously address pollution in a
sustained manner. Partly this is a result of the failure of State institutions, of the
weakness of central and local authorities and the historical lack of importance of
environmental issues in the region’s desire for prosperity. Where authorities have
acted this has usually been in the form of eviction (ACHR, 2003). Grandiose aid-

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driven schemes have made limited impact (Storey, 2005) or, worse, have resulted in
conflict. The region’s urban rivers continue to act as open, and increasingly toxic
sewers with few remedies in sight. This is aggravated by the lack of consensus
between the State, civil society and business over the sources of pollution, what needs
to be done, and by whom.

Part of the problem in identifying paths out of this impasse has been in the
identification of the source of the problem and where responsibility lies. Despite the
obvious centrality of environmental degradation, conflict is often played out over
issues which, for those involved, often transcend the environment. For the urban poor,
who are often the target of blame for pollution (despite mixed evidence),
environmental issues are also about tenure, rights, livelihoods, responsibilities and
citizenship. This challenges institutions that prefer, or choose, to frame the problem in
terms of infrastructure, illegality and the lack of resources. In this way, the State often
seeks to limit the discourse to the environment, partly for fear of opening up a
veritable Pandora’s Box of claims and debates which are unresolved in most Asian
cities. Subsequently, environmental pollution has increasingly encapsulated and
further politicised already existing tensions around the right to shelter, a decent
standard of living and human rights. It is often because of these disjunctures, between
key players in urban development, that water pollution has most often become a
source of conflict rather than an opportunity for partnership.

Framing the problem of water pollution and its causes is essentially a political act
representing the relative power of those involved. Even data on pollution is contested,
contradicted and massaged to validate a host of conclusions and policy responses.
This variance can even occur within government agencies assigned a role in
environmental policy leading to often contradictory and uncoordinated responses.

In essence the environmental crisis of the region’s urban waterways is bound up in the
unresolved struggle of control over resources and space, political control and
influence, and the governance of cities. As such the urban environment should be seen
as part of the contested space, and the contest for space, inherent in Third World cities
(Peet and Watts, 1996). But while Douglass has felt pessimistic of solutions emerging
because of the continued drive for growth in the face of continued debt, and because
governments have shown little ability in dealing with poverty and marginalisation, or
moving away from top-down structures (Douglass, 1992:15), the crisis of the region’s
urban waterways does offer opportunity of sorts. Given that States have had a limited
impact on pollution, opportunities have arisen for non-State actors to play a greater
role – if only out of necessity.

In Asia these responses have ranged between those hostile to the State to those which
seek partnership. Consequently while the political context of free market capitalism
has weakened the ability and authority of the State to reign in multifarious sources of
pollution (even it wished to), concurrent processes of democracy are opening up
opportunities to address environmental change through a reconfiguring of
relationships. These are occurring around the environment but also around other
unmet physical needs, and arguably are leading to a deepening of social democracy
and empowerment. Hence, much of the argument and direction of activity has gone
beyond the environment itself, and into issues of citizenship, rights and participation.
It is in these domains, I argue, where alternative forms of sustainability lie.

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Thailand is an interesting example of these struggles and makes for an important case
study for several reasons. Firstly, it is one of the most urbanised regions in mainland
Asia and parallel to this urban growth has emerged quite severe environmental
degradation, including water pollution. Secondly, Thailand has clearly demonstrated
the limited success of dealing with pollution through formal institutions, which often
have as their main concern maintaining economic growth. Traditional regulatory
means, such as command and control, have also failed to adequately contain the
environmental impacts of industrialisation. However a third, and perhaps more
salutatory reason is that most recently Thailand has attempted, through quite
innovative partnerships, to address environmental issues through the empowerment of
marginalised groups. As such, we can assess both the promise and limitations of these
more holistic approaches which herald an alternative, and more sustainable, urban
future.


Thailand’s urban environmental crisis

Thailand has undergone an urban revolution in the post war period and now more than
one-third of its citizens live and work in urban areas. In the case of Bangkok, this
transformation has additionally been characterised by an outward spread into
adjoining regions, which has created an Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) of
7758sq.km. In the period 1987 to 2000 the inner city population density of Bangkok
actually decreased from 3.25 to 2.36 thousand/sq.km whereas the outer ring
population density increased from 0.67 to 1.12 sq.km (UNEP, 2001:14).

The growth and spread of Bangkok has had significant implications for the ecology of
the region. Water, air, and solid waste pollution have reached extreme levels. The
city’s 1300+ klongs contain a complex mix of both domestic and industrial waste.
The growing ‘footprint’ of Bangkok has been accompanied by a loss in ground cover,
deforestation of uplands around cities, contamination of aquifers, and seepage of
seawater into water supply sources (Marcotullio, 2001:464).

Setchell (1995:12) states that approximately 1.5 million cubic metres of untreated
domestic and industrial pollutants are discharged directly into Bangkok’s waterways
on a daily basis. In large part, this is a consequence of the inadequate infrastructure
and services provided to poor and informal (illegal) settlements, which are
characteristic of the larger Thai cities of Bangkok and Chiang Mai. In one detailed
survey Daniere and Takahashi found that around 50% of those living in the city’s
informal settlements relied upon a septic tank, and 85% did not have garbage picked
up from their residence. Twenty percent of the remainder did not have any access to a
bin and dumped their waste anywhere (Daniere and Takahashi, 1999:534). As a
consequence Daniere (1996) estimates 20% of solid waste goes uncollected, but this
rate is much higher in informal settlements (cited in Marcotullio, 2001:471). Pollution
of the city’s ubiquitous waterways also results in significant, and underreported,
threats to health. Annez and Friendly (1996) estimate that 6% of annual deaths in
Bangkok are due to such water-borne plagues as typhus, dysentery, and encephalitis
(cited in Marcotullio, 2001:471).


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The shift of demographic growth outwards from the centre of Bangkok reflects
industrial relocation. More migrants now go to the five regions around Bangkok than
the city itself, as this is where an increasing number of the jobs are. In 1997, the
Eastern Seaboard region accounted for the largest shares of Board of Investment
(BOI) approved projects (66 per cent), investment (75 per cent), and foreign-
registered capital (82 per cent) in the country (Kittiprapas, 2001:371). The industrial
shift into Bangkok’s hinterlands, especially into the provinces of Samut Prakan and
Pathum Thani, has had a significant impact on the metropolitan region’s environment.
There are some 21,026 factories in the BMR employing 608,088 workers. Most of
these industries are small scale and difficult to effectively regulate. Greenberg (cited
in Hirsch, 1996:173) found that in the mid-1990s of 3,351 factories in Samut Prakan
2,180 were found to be failing to comply with pollution standards and regulations
stated in the National Factory Law of 1992. Some 75% of the nation’s chemical
producing factories are in the BMR (Kittiprapas, 2001:391).

Increasingly the mix of population, pollution and unchecked ‘development’ is leading
to conflict. Where industrial and domestic pollution threatens waterways and where
aquifers and watersheds have been eroded leading to salinity and drought, questions
are been raised about the ultimate sustainability of the Bangkok region. Increasingly,
this is also leading to questions about governance.


The limits of top-down solutions

Managing and evaluating sources of pollution, assigning responsibility for addressing
its impact, and enforcing relations have been relatively absent actions in the
governance of Thai urban areas. What is clearly evident is that traditional top-down
and government-centred regulation and control has been overwhelmed by the growth
and spread of Thai cities (see Askew, 2002: chapter two). In this vacuum private
interests have predominated and the needs of citizens, especially the poor and those
with limited political influence, have not been central to the
development/environment debate. New forms of governance are needed to more
adequately deal with water pollution and allow all voices to be heard.

At present pollution control and environmental enforcement is spread across a number
of central and local authorities. In the absence of effective treatment technologies, the
use of which is poorly enforced, the ‘polluter pays’ principle is seldom applied. Even
where penalties exist they are a muted 10 or 20,000 baht fine (USD240-480), making
it cheaper to pay fines than to install and run pollution-control technology. Even if
technology were to adequately keep pace with demand the Pollution Control
Department (PCD) has noted that wastewater plants in themselves will not solve the
problem of pollution without a change in the sources, or behaviour, of pollution
(PCD, 2001:8).

There are not enough human resources for effective regulation and monitoring of
pollution or pollution sources and departments involved in environmental
management often have limited power or influence. In addition, environmental
regulation and monitoring are rarely effective in terms of institutional coordination or
spatial reach. In the case of the BMR effective planning and management of the urban
area and its hinterland would have to address an urban environment spread over

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hundreds of kilometres and involve dozens of authorities. However, as Sham has
noted ‘the institutional and legal structures of local governments in many developing
countries of South-East Asia are generally not equipped for such purposes’ (Sham,
1993:355).

While the government is often seen as the most important actor in the environment
debate, in the case of Thailand it has often appeared detached or disinterested in
environmental debates (especially those which are critical of or seek to check patterns
of economic policy). Even where government has attempted to address pollution its
resources are overwhelmed by the scale of the problem. Approximately 7m baht per
year was spent on pollution management activities through the 1990s, accounting for
a mere 0.3%-1.2% of the country’s expenditure (PCD, 2001:65). The annual budget
for water pollution management was significantly higher (4 or 5 times) than other
pollution controls (at about 67%), though even the PCD admit that ‘the solving of
pollution problems has not been as successful as was anticipated’ (PCD, 2001:66).
The recent shift towards the building of large waste treatment plants (WTPs), while
important, is unlikely to significantly address problems of water pollution
representing just another government attempt to deliver a solution. One estimate has
suggested that even if all six WTPs that are planned for the BMR come into operation
than they would only deal with 40% of solid waste treatment. Only new factories have
modern treatment systems (at source) in place. Older factories may have no system at
all – nor be required to install one. Even then, it has been widely acknowledged that
factories, in order to save money, regularly shut down treatment systems overnight.
Arguably, the State will never have enough WTPs, financial capital and human
resources to deal with the problem, and government spending on such needs is
decreasing if anything. One answer is to build the capacity of State agencies. While
this is an important response, building state capacity is ‘difficult, time consuming, and
expensive’ (O’Rourke, 2004:10). Even when capacities are built environmental
agencies rarely exercise as much power as Ministries which promote foreign
investment, industrialisation or other politically more relevant outcomes. In Vietnam,
as elsewhere in Asia, ‘the state and in particular local environmental agencies, even
when they have training and equipment, are rarely autonomous or powerful enough to
implement tough regulations on industry’ (O’Rourke, 2004:10).

At least some government agencies are coming to this conclusion themselves – if only
through pragmatism rather than an ideological shift towards sustainable development.
The Pollution Control Department in Thailand has recently argued for greater
community involvement as ‘more focussed and less costly options are much more
preferable, compared with the capital intensive options previously chosen’ (PCD,
2001:66).

However, such an inclusive response requires more than simply passing over
responsibility to communities. It requires a shift toward a greater and more
meaningful form of democracy and participation. In Thailand, as in Asia, it is often
the poor and informal settlements which are portrayed as the enemy of the
environment. From this position, governments resist extending services and
infrastructure to settlements which are deemed to be ‘illegal’ on the shaky assertion
that they do not see a future for such settlements – an act which simply reinforces
marginality and subordination. Yet Furedy (1992), and others, have shown that the

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poor, as scavengers and recyclers, account for most of the solid waste management of
ASEAN cities:
in many instances it is the poor who actually are the de facto caretakers of the
environment through the types of jobs generated by environmental disregard
on the part of the affluent. Whether it is street cleaning for the government, rag
picking for large-scale paper makers, or scavenging for materials to use for
their own housing construction, much of the economy of the poor is derived
from improving environmental conditions in the cities (ESCAP 1993:5-4).

The regulatory ‘command-and-control’ approach based on fixed standards has not
worked in the rapidly growing cities of Asia and this is unlikely to change. As the
United Nations has noted ‘the rigidity of this approach and the expense, both
administrative and financial, of carrying it out doom it to at best partial
implementation, even in industrialized countries’ (ESCAP, 1993:5-39). Such a
conclusion is important given the continuing demographic transition of the region,
and the lessons of these failures need to be heeded in countries where urban growth
continues to accelerate. There is a need then to reconceptualise both the problem and
search for more viable solutions. As ESCAP has argued:

The problem, therefore, is not one of how to “control” or get rid of the poor,
but is more importantly one of how to provide positive support to them both in
terms of heightening access to environmental resources and improving their
efforts to cope with the environmental conditions of their households and
communities (ESCAP 1993:5-4).

It is to these efforts then that we now turn.


Alternative approaches

Two recent initiatives indicate some movement towards alternative forms of
governance in Thailand which should be of interest to policymakers, donors and civil
society throughout the region. Whether these reflect a significant shift towards
creating sustainable communities and effectively address the issue of water pollution
is inconclusive to date. However they do represent more political space as well as
greater opportunities for decentralised governance through the empowerment of
communities. Firstly I will outline recent policy initiatives and Thailand and their
initial impact. Following this I then outline the experiences of one urban poor klong
community in Bangkok. This example demonstrates the opportunities available to
organised communities but also the significant challenges that still confront them.
How far such innovations will go though towards the full empowerment of
communities and addressing the sources and caused of pollution remains to be seen.
Some early conclusions are then drawn.


CODI and the UCEA Programme

In recent years Thailand has experimented with a decentralised approach to urban
poor communities and their environments. While such initiatives remain exceptions to

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the macro policies of private sector led industrialisation they do indicate avenues
which are available to both States and civil society.

A key agency in the moves toward more holistic and community-based actions around
the environment is CODI, the Community Organizations Development Institute
(CODI). CODI, in essence, acts as a forum between local government, government
departments, the municipality and the poor. It was initiated by the Thai government in
1992 to more effectively support community organisations with small loans for
upgrading but has since evolved into an important instigator of community
development and a ‘meeting ground’ between the State and the urban/rural poor (see
CODI, 2003a).

CODI’s initial foray into water pollution and urban informal settlements was through
the UCEA (Urban Community Environment Activities) project, which ran from 1996-
2002. With funding from DANCED (Danish Cooperation for Environment and
Development), communities were organised to identify needs and encouraged to take
greater control over their environment and development (see Boonyabancha, 1999).
Through small loans of a few thousand US dollars CODI supported hundreds of poor
communities to become involved in identifying environmental threats, develop low-
cost community-driven responses to these needs, and organise themselves into viable
collectives to manage funds and projects and network with other communities facing
similar challenges. This often acted as a catalyst for canal cleaning projects and in
some cases involved communities to ‘scale-up’ their actions to focus on tenure,
livelihoods and wider recognition over their rights and existence. As an example, one
community along Klong Hualampung in Bangkok repainted the community, created
an easement for safer access to and around the community, and cleaned the canal.
This involved five-six communities along the Klong working together for the first
time.

In themselves these moves may not avoid resettlement but they have created more
aware communities and opened the channels of communication with government
agencies, as well as NGOs. These communities have also sought to network around
the common identity and challenge of being klong communities. For a number of
years a ‘canal network’ has existed throughout Thailand, which has involved klong
communities meeting one another, sharing experiences and developing common
strategies to both improve their environments and resist eviction. Known as the
‘Liveable City’ project, klong communities were encouraged to develop community
plans and initiatives and share these with other communities, through CODI
facilitation.

There were, and are, of course obstacles to success. Though the UCEA was supported
by the government and funded through an international donor this did not guarantee a
change in government attitudes towards klong communities or the environment
(Ribeiro and Srisuwan, 2005). Secondly, while communities were encouraged to
understand their roles and participate, many initiatives folded over time as initial
energies waned and more immediate issues demanded their time. This especially has
been the case with security of tenure.




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Baan Mankong

The UCEA ‘experiment’ in community organising and planning has been somewhat
superseded by a much larger and arguably more radical initiative known as the Baan
Mankong (secure housing) project. Baan Mankong was initiated by the Thai
government in 2003. It also is being facilitated through CODI and is aimed at
channelling funds directly into poor communities to bring about improved shelter,
living standards and more secure tenure (CODI, 2003b; Boonyabancha, 2005).

While ostensibly a housing project Baan Mankong has arguably shifted the nature of
the State-urban poor relationship quite significantly. Through the programme
communities will be given access to money to develop community infrastructure, they
will have access to soft loans and will be able to use grants to employ people to work
with the community, such as architects, engineers etc. The system then is potentially
radical in terms of empowering communities, as it encourages the development of
communities through organising, identifying needs, and addressing priorities. It goes
beyond the physical need for adequate housing and seeks to empower poor
communities vis-à-vis other communities and the State, not through conflict, but
through coordination. Eventually these local-level initiatives are intended to form the
basis for city plans. The scale of the initiative is vast, having as a target improved
tenure security for ‘300,000 households 2,000 poor communities in 200 Thai cities
within five years’, a figure which represents half of all urban poor communities in
Thailand (Boonyabancha, 2005:25).

Arguably then, these twin approaches, from UCEA to Baan Mankong should provide
both the impetus and the space for poorer communities to consolidate themselves and
to develop into more sustainable communities. Though Baan Mankong is still in its
early days these issues and questions will be further explored through a case study of
one klong community in Bangkok which evolved through UCEA and is now involved
in the Bann Mankong programme.


Klong Sawan, Langsit

Klong Sawan, ‘the place to construct the boats’, is a small community of 50 houses
(approximately 250 residents) in Northern Bangkok. The community has been on its
present site for 15-20 years. Tenure is precarious, with multiple owners of the land
they live on. Originally most people settled on a field adjoining the klong which was
owned by a bank. But they were shifted off the land in 1998 for condominium
development – though the field has stood vacant since the financial crash of 1997/98.
The community was then forced to move next to the klong and now most houses are
built on stilts over the canal. To stop the community moving back on the land, walls
were erected around the rim of the canal which has meant that the community
occupies a very narrow stretch on the water bank.

As a result of this marginal existence the klong became the only available source of
water but also waste disposal, including sewerage. As pollution worsened the
community ‘turned their backs on the klong’ with living spaces facing away from the
often stagnant and polluted waterway. The spur for community response came from
the threat of eviction – from the irrigation department (which is responsible for the

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canal’s banks) and from adjoining private landowners. The community then sought
help through CODI and the UCEA programme.

The community’s initial focus was in establishing a formal organisation and
developing a community saving programme. This was to offset the threat of
homelessness and provide some cash for community initiatives. There are now 60
members in the savings group. In a matter of a few years the community has saved
70,000 baht (USD1,700) in a general account, which people can draw from (It was
most recently used to build a community centre and for environmental initiatives) and
130,360 baht (USD3,200) in a housing account, which can only be used if the
community is relocated. Savings were also driven by a desire to access seed funding
from CODI for further community development. Though the community can never
afford to purchase the land they live on, they do wish to offer enough compensation to
landowners to give them more leverage to stay. As part of the Baan Mankong
programme the community has began to invest in housing, and even used the services
of student architects to design a community re-blocking blueprint which identifies
houses to be repaired, upgraded or re-built. Though it is unlikely that formal land
ownership will ever eventuate (the cost of land is prohibitive) the municipality has
told them it will allow them to stay for ‘50 or 60 years’ and that they can be granted
‘semi-legal status’.

Environmental initiatives were among the first projects tackled by the community as
they were seen as a visible sign of a strong community which could live sustainably
beside the klong. These included the establishment of a waste segregation and
recycling centre, cleaning the klong of solid waste and ‘treating’ the canal with a
molasses mix to re-oxygenate the water. The community has also, through listening
and learning from the experiences of other canal communities, developed a grey water
treatment system using basic technology and also a treatment process for faecal waste.
Posters have been drawn showing how best to recycle.

Despite this level of activity the community received little in the way of recognition.
Invitations for local authorities or government to attend ‘demonstration fairs’,
organised to illustrate the environmental initiatives of the community, were only
moderately attended. At one meeting, in which the community outlined its
environmental programmes and activities as well as its intentions to build a more
attractive community ‘they made no comment and went away without saying
anything. We haven’t heard anything since’. For some this has lead to a feeling that
little is being achieved. This has sometimes led to community frustration, ‘why us do
it all’, when they see the markets and factories and shopping malls openly polluting
the water. However, even though they know it is a token effort it is an important first
step. As one respondent stated:

The government always says to us ‘you are dirty – look at what you have done
to the klong’. But now we can see ‘look at what we are doing – look what we
have done’.

The klong Sarwan community is demonstration of the energy and resources people
will invest into their communities given a greater sense of permanence and an
opportunity to shape their communities. Far from being unsustainable, in a few short
years Khlong Sarwan has developed a significant savings account; a basic sewerage

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and grey water system to deal with wastewater; an environmental programme; has
dredged and cleaned the canal; and established a recycling centre. The condition of
the canal has improved appreciably and as a result people feel that they have created a
sustainable riverside community.

However it is clearly evident that such initiatives and resources were only devoted to
the canal once a greater sense of security eventuated. The community dedicated time
and resources to environmental issues so long as such action was an investment to the
greater end of security. In fact, the two went hand in hand: community actions to deal
with water pollution and solid waste was in response to a greater sense of security, but
environmental activities were also employed as leverage to this end. As such, the
environment has provided an opportunity for the community to enter into negotions
with authorities over a range of unmet needs. Tackling water pollution has
consequently provided opportunities for new relationships to form and alternative
possibilities to develop and be debated. It has also provided the stimulation for
community organising and a greater sense of control over people’s lives. It should be
noted though that such enterprise is only sustained as long as it leads to dialogue
around needs that include, but also transcend, the environment and that in the absence
of this democratic space it is less likely that marginal communities would sustain
environmental activities. Arguably it is likely to be the success of the Baan Mankong
programme which is key to sustaining the environmental and mobilising initiatives
begun under the UCEA.


Conclusions: sustaining an alternative future

In megacities such as Bangkok, it is unlikely that any single authority or community
can effectively manage the environment through traditional top-down structures and
procedures. Urban development is so dynamic that no one authority determines
outcomes. Urban development plans and grand designs suppose a far more orderly set
of actors and relationships than actually exist. What is clear is that there is little real
and sustained interaction between government and communities. Even those
programmes or strategies that do exist are not integrated in any effective and
sustained way. In short there is a crisis in the governance of large cities and a clear
case that such a crisis is leading to unsustainable urban regions. While such a case can
and often is made, this ‘crisis’ also offers opportunities of sorts for what Braganza has
referred to as ‘place-based and bottom-up initiatives’. The case study of Klong
Sarwan demonstrates that when space and opportunity allow, communities can play a
much greater and more positive role in environmental management in partnership
with the State and other communities.

However there are several caveats to any approach that romanticises the role of
communities in creating alternative and sustainable cities. Communities will only
engage in dealing with, for example, water pollution, when and if this acts as an
opportunity for negotiation over other (perhaps more important) unmet needs. What is
clear is that communities which face repression and hostility rarely will use their
precious time to engage in environmental initiatives or, as one respondent put it,
‘clean up someone else’s mess for them’. One reason for community reticence to
engage with environmental issues is that ‘they perceive or have experienced that such
efforts either do not bear fruit or are beyond their capacity to influence … many

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