US Senator Joe Biden: A Year on Iraq

U.S. Senator Joe Biden
A Year on Iraq

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TABLE OF CONTENTS


Background on the Biden-Gelb Plan For a Decentralized Iraq ……………. -4-

Iraq: A Way Forward…………………………………………………………………………….-5-







Biden-Gelb Plan for Iraq: What It Is – and What It Is Not………………………. -8-



Commentary: Biden-Gelb Plan Emerges as Leading Option for Moving
Forward in Iraq…………………………………………………………………………………… -10-



In His Own Words ……………………………………………………………………………………. -18-

Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq, The New York Times
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Leslie H. Gelb
May 1, 2006…………………………………………………..…………………………………….-19-

A Plan to Hold Iraq Together, The Washington Post
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
August 24, 2006.………………………………………………………………………………… -22-

Bipartisan Redeployment, The Wall Street Journal
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and Leslie H. Gelb
October 24, 2006.……………………………………………………………………………….. -24-

The Minimum Necessary, The Washington Post
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
November 19, 2006…………………………………………………………………............... -26-

Iraq Study Group Report: Necessary, but not sufficient, USA Today
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
December 7, 2006……………………………………………………………………………….. -28-

Adding Troops Will Fail Again, The Delaware News Journal
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
January 7, 2007………………………………………………………………………………….. -30-

A First Step in Iraq, USA Today
By Joseph Biden R. Biden, Jr. and Chuck Hagel
January 24, 2007………………………………………………………………………………… -32-

Congress Should Repeal its Authorization to Use Force in Iraq, Boston Globe
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
February 27, 2007 ………………………………………………………………………………. -34-

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Mideast Needs More, Not Less, Diplomacy, The Miami Herald
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
March 25, 2007…………………………………………………………………………………… -36-

The Real Surge Story, The Washington Post
By Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
April 12, 2007……………………………………………………………………………………… -39-


From The Podium …………………………………………………………………………………….. -41-

The Way Forward in Iraq: Avoiding Partition, Preserving Unity,
Protecting America’s Interests
World Affairs Council of Philadelphia
May 1, 2006………………………………………………………………………………………… -42-

Five Years After 9/11: Rethinking America’s Future Security
The National Press Club
September 7, 2006.……………………………………………………………………………… -48-

Salvaging American Interests in a United Iraq
Council on Foreign Relations
September 20, 2006……………………………………………………………………………..-55-

Manatt-Phelps Lecture in Political Science
Iowa State University
October 31, 2006………………………………………………………………………………….-60-

Iraq’s Future and America’s Interests
The Brookings Institution
February 15, 2007……………………………………………………………………………….. -67-


On the Senate Floor …………………………………………………………………….................-72-

Don’t send more American troops into the middle of a civil war.
Floor of the United States Senate
February 1, 2007…………………………………………………………………………………. -73-

Mr. President, you are leading us off a cliff. Stop.
Floor of the United States Senate
March 14, 2007…………………………………………………………………………………….-77-

Protecting our Troops is a Moral Imperative
Floor of the United States Senate
March 28, 2007…………………………………………………………………………………… -80-

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The President's Double-Talk on Iraq is Reaching New Heights of Hypocrisy.
Floor of the United States Senate
April 24, 2007………………………………………………………………………………………-85-


Biography …………………………………………………………………………………………………..-89-






U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr…………………………………………………………… -90-








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BACKGROUND
on
The Biden-Gelb Plan for Iraq

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Iraq—A Way Forward
Fact Sheet: Biden-Gelb Plan for Iraq

President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. His strategy is to prevent
defeat and to hand the problem off to his successor. As a result, more and more
Americans understandably want a rapid withdrawal, even at the risk of trading a
dictator for chaos and a civil war that could become a regional war. Both are bad
alternatives.

There is a third way that can achieve the two objectives most Americans share: to bring
our troops home without leaving chaos behind. The idea is to maintain a unified Iraq by
federalizing it and giving Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis control over their daily lives in their
own regions.

The central government would be responsible for common interests, like border security
and the distribution of oil revenues. The plan would bind the Sunnis – who have no oil –
by guaranteeing them a proportionate share of oil revenues. It would convene an
international conference to secure support for the power sharing arrangement and
produce a regional nonaggression pact, enforced by an Oversight Group of the U.N. and
major powers. It would call on the U.S. military to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq
by 2008, with a residual force to take on terrorists and train Iraqis. It would increase
economic aid but tie it to the protection of minority rights and the creation of a jobs
program and seek funding from the oil-rich Gulf Arab states.

The central reality in Iraq is deep and growing sectarian violence between the Shiites
and Sunnis. Ethnic militias increasingly are the law in Iraq. They have infiltrated the
official security forces. Massive unemployment is feeding the sectarian militia. Sectarian
cleansing has forced more than 2 million Iraqis to flee their homes. At the same time, Al
Qaeda is now so firmly entrenched in Western Iraq that it has morphed into an
indigenous jihadist threat. As a result, Iraq risks becoming what it was not before the
war: a haven for radical fundamentalists.

There is no purely military solution to the sectarian civil war. The only way to break the
vicious cycle of violence – and to create the conditions for our armed forces to
responsibly withdraw – is to give Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds incentives to pursue their
interests peacefully. That requires an equitable and viable power sharing arrangement.
That's where my plan comes in. This plan is not partition—in fact, it may be the only way
to prevent violent partition and preserve a unified Iraq. This plan is consistent with
Iraq's constitution, which provides for Iraq's 18 provinces to join together in regions,
with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. This plan is the
only idea on the table for dealing with the militia, which are likely to retreat to their
respective regions. This plan is consistent with a strong central government, with clearly
defined responsibilities. Indeed, it provides an agenda for that government, whose mere
existence will not end sectarian violence.


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The example of Bosnia is illustrative. Ten years ago, Bosnia was being torn apart by
ethnic cleansing. The United States stepped in decisively with the Dayton Accords to
keep the country whole by, paradoxically, dividing it into ethnic federations. We even
allowed Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of U.S.
troops and others, Bosnians have lived a decade in peace. Now, they are strengthening
their central government, and disbanding their separate armies.

The Bush administration continues to hope that Iraqis will rally behind a strong central
government that keeps the country together and protects the rights of all citizens
equally. But that vision has been engulfed by the flames of sectarian hatred. There is no
trust within the central government, no trust of the government by the people, no
capacity by the government to deliver security and services—and no evidence that we
can build that trust and capacity any time soon. There are two other ways to govern Iraq
from the center: a foreign occupation that the United States cannot sustain or the return
of a dictator like Saddam Hussein, who is not on the horizon.

That leaves federalism as Iraq's best possible future. But unless we help make it work for
all Iraqis, it won't stop the violence. We should start with a major diplomatic offensive to
convince the major powers and Iraq's neighbors that a federal Iraq is the best possible
outcome for them, too. Then, together, we should convene a Dayton-like conference to
move all the Iraqi parties from civil war to the negotiating table. Through a combination
of pressure and reassurance, we would persuade the Sunnis to accept federalism and
press the Shiites and Kurds to give the Sunnis a bigger piece of the pie.

The course we're on leads to a terrible civil war and possibly a regional war. This plan is
designed to head that off. It offers the possibility – not the guarantee – of producing a
soft landing for Iraq. I believe it is the best way to bring our troops home, protect our
fundamental security interests, and preserve Iraq as a unified country.

The question I have for those who reject this plan is simple: What is your alternative?



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A Five-Point Plan for Iraq

1. Keep Iraq Together Through Federalism and Local Control
• Federalize Iraq in accordance with its constitution by establishing three or more
regions – Shiite, Sunni and Kurd – with a strong but limited central government
in Baghdad.
• Put the central government in charge of truly common interests: border defense,
foreign policy, oil production and revenues.
• Form regional and local governments that give Kurds, Sunni and Shiites control
over the fabric of their daily lives: security, education, marriage, social services.

2. Secure Support from the Sunnis
• Gain agreement for the federal solution from the Sunni Arabs by guaranteeing
them 20 percent of all present and future oil revenues – an amount roughly
proportional to their size – which would make their region economically viable.
• Empower the central government to set national oil policy and distribute the
revenues, to attract needed foreign investment and reinforce each community's
interest in keeping Iraq intact and protecting the oil infrastructure. Provide for an
international oversight group to guarantee a fair distribution of oil revenues.
• Allow former Baath Party members to go back to work and reintegrate Sunnis
with no blood on their hands.

3. Enlist Help from the Major Powers and Iraq’s Neighbors
• Initiate a major diplomatic offensive to secure the support of the major powers
and Iraq’s neighbors for federalism in Iraq.
• Convene with the U.N. a regional security conference where Iraq's neighbors,
including Iran, pledge to support Iraq's power sharing agreement and respect
Iraq's borders
• Engage Iraq's neighbors directly to overcome their suspicions and focus their
efforts on stabilizing Iraq, not undermining it.
• Create a standing Oversight Group, to include the major powers, that would
engage Iraq's neighbors and enforce their commitments.

4. Responsibly Drawdown US Troops
• Direct U.S. military commanders to develop a plan to withdraw and re-deploy
almost all U.S. forces from Iraq by 2008.
• Maintain in or near Iraq a small residual force – perhaps 20,000 troops – to
strike any concentration of terrorists, help keep Iraq's neighbors honest and train
its security. forces

5. Increase Reconstruction Assistance and Create a Jobs Program
• Provide more reconstruction assistance, conditioned on the protection of
minority and women's rights and the establishment of a jobs program to give
Iraqi youth an alternative to the militia and criminal gangs.
• Insist that other countries take the lead in funding reconstruction by making
good on old commitments and providing new ones – especially the oil-rich Arab
Gulf countries.

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BIDEN-GELB Plan for Iraq: What It Is – and What It Is Not

The Biden-Gelb plan has sparked much intellectual debate and as that debate
continues, it is important to note what the Biden-Gelb plan is, and what it is not:

The Plan IS NOT partition. In fact, it may be the only way to prevent a violent
partition—which has already started—and preserve a unified Iraq. We call for a limited
central government, with clearly defined responsibilities for truly common interests like
foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues. Indeed, the Plan provides an agenda
for that government, whose mere existence will not end sectarian violence.

The Plan IS NOT a foreign imposition. To the contrary, it flows from Iraq’s
constitution, which already provides for Iraq’s 18 provinces to join together in regions,
with their own security forces, and control over most day-to-day issues. The constitution
allocates significant powers to the regions, limited responsibility to the central
government and it provides that in the case of a conflict of laws between a region and
the central government, the region prevails. On October 11, 2006, Iraq’s parliament
approved legislation to implement the constitution’s articles on federalism. Prior to the
British colonial period and Saddam’s military dictatorship, what is now Iraq functioned
as three largely autonomous regions.

But declaring Iraq a federal system is not enough – the Iraqis must take concrete steps
to make federalism workable for and acceptable to its major groups. For example, to
ensure Sunni support, it is imperative that Iraqis also agree to an oil revenue sharing
formula that guarantees the Sunni region economic viability. The United States should
enlist the international community, including Iraq’s neighbors, to strongly promote
such an agreement. The final decisions will be up to Iraqis, but if we do not help them
arrange the necessary compromises, nothing will get done. At key junctures in the past,
we have used our influence to shape political outcomes in Iraq, notably by convincing
the Shiites and Kurds to accept a provision allowing for the constitution to be amended
following its adoption, which was necessary to secure Sunni participation in the
referendum. Using our influence is not the same as imposing our will. With 160,000
Americans at risk, we have a right and an obligation to make known our views. But the
more we make Iraq the world’s problem, not just our own – with the major powers and
Iraq’s neighbors all using their influence to advance a federal outcome – the more
effective we will be.

The Plan IS NOT an invitation to sectarian cleansing. Tragically, that invitation
has been sent, received and acted upon. Two million Iraqis are already refugees outside
their country, and nearly as many are displaced within it, largely as a result of sectarian
violence.Iraqis are fleeing their homes at a rate now approaching 15,000 people a week.
Only a political settlement, as proposed in the Plan, has a chance to stop this downward
spiral.

The Plan IS the only idea on the table for dealing with the sectarian militia.
It offers a realistic albeit interim solution. Realistic, because none of the major groups
will give up their militia voluntarily in the absence of trust and confidence and neither
we or the Iraqi government has the means to force them to do so. Once federalism is

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implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their
own and vie for power, instead of killing the members of other groups. But it is only an
interim solution, because no nation can sustain itself peacefully with private armies.
Over time, if a political settlement endures, the militia would be incorporated into
regional and national forces, as is happening in Bosnia.

The Plan IS an answer to the problem of mixed cities. Large cities with mixed
populations present a challenge under any plan now being considered. The essence of
the Plan is that mixed populations can only live together peacefully if their leadership is
truly satisfied with the overall arrangement. If so, Iraqis will have fewer reasons to do
violence to each other and their leadership will help keep the peace in the cities. We
would make Baghdad a federal city, and buttress the protection of minorities there and
in the other mixed cities with an international peacekeeping force. Right now, the
prospect for raising such a force is small. But following a political settlement, an
international conference and the establishment of a Contact Group, others are more
likely to participate, including countries like Saudi Arabia which have offered
peacekeepers in the past.

The Plan IS in the self-interest of Iran. Iran likes it exactly as it is in Iraq – with
the United States bogged down and bleeding. But the prospect of a civil war in Iraq is
not in Tehran’s interest: it could easily spill over Iraq’s borders and turn into a regional
war with neighbors intervening on opposing sides and exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite
divide at a time Shiite Iran is trying to exert leadership in the Islamic world. Iran also
would receive large refugee flows as Iraqis flee the fighting. Iran, like all of Iraq’s
neighbors, has an interest in Iraq remaining unified and not splitting into independent
states. Iran does not want to see an independent Kurdistan emerge and serve as an
example for its own restive 5 million Kurds. That’s why Iran – and all of Iraq’s
neighbors -- can and should be engaged to support a political settlement in Iraq.

The Plan IS in the self-interest of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis
increasingly understand they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of
being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites or
having the freedom to control their day-to-day lives in a Sunni region, they are likely to
choose the latter provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their
region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a
Sunni insurgency, which can bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds may dream of
independence, but fear the reaction of Turkey and Iran – their interest is to achieve as
much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together. Why would Shiites and Kurds
give up some oil revenues to the Sunnis? Because that is the price of peace and the only
way to attract the massive foreign investment needed to maximize Iraqi oil production.
The result will be to give Shiites and Kurds a smaller piece of a much larger oil pie and
give all three groups an incentive to protect the oil infrastructure.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, is the ranking member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Leslie H. Gelb is the president emeritus of the Council on
Foreign Relations.

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