Violence under the Banner of Religion:1 The Case of Laskar Jihad ...

Violence under the Banner of Religion 75
Sukidi Mulyadi
Violence under the Banner of Religion:1
The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus
Abstraksi: Gerakan kekerasan atas nama agama telah berkembang menja-
di satu fenomena penting di Indonesia belakangan ini. Kasus kerusuhan
Situbondo, Jawa Timur pada 1996, disusul kemudian kasus Tasikmalaya
dan selanjutnya Ketapang di Nusa Tenggara Timur pada 1998, merupa-
kan bukti dari kondisi demikian. Dalam rentang waktu yang tidak lama,
sejumlah organisasi sosial-keagamaan tampil dengan agenda pemikiran dan
gerakan yang mengambil cara-cara yang bisa disebut radikal. Perkembang-
an ini berlangsung makin kuat menyusul perubahan sistem sosial-politik
yang mendasar di Indonesia. Suasana politik tidak menentu menyusul
jatuhnya rezim Orde Baru pada 1999 telah memberi ruang makin lebar
bagi gerakan-gerakan keagamaan radikal untuk berkembang di Indonesia.
Artikel ini menghadirkan kajian tentang dua contoh kasus tindakan
kekerasan yang mengatasnamakan agama. Kedua contoh kasus tersebut
adalah Laskar Jihad dan Laskar Kristus. Di samping mewakili kekerasan
atas nama agama, kedua laskar tersebut sama-sama terlibat konflik di Ambon,
Maluku. Atas nama agama, Islam dan Kristen, angota kedua laskar terse-
but bahkan terlibat dalam tragedi kemanusiaan yang menewaskan ratusan
bahkan ribuan umat manusia di Ambon. Meski bukan satu-satunya fak-
tor, melalui kedua laskar tersebut agama telah tampil memberi sumbangan
untuk memperbesar volume dan akselerasi kekerasan dan konflik sosial di
Indonesia.
Laskar Jihad beridiri pada 30 Januari 2000, sebagai respon terhadap
konflik yang melibatkan Muslim dan Kristen di Ambon sejak 1999. Laskar
Jihad merupakan bagian atau sayap paramiliter dari Forum Komunikasi
Ahlusunnah Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ), yang telah berdiri sejak 1998. Ja’far
Umar Thalib, ketua FKAWJ, sengaja mendirikan Laskar Jihad sebagai wujud
kepedulian terhadap nasib umat Islam yang menghadapi kekerasan oleh
kaum Kristen di Ambon. Ja’far Umar Thalib juga sekaligus bertindak se-
bagai komandan Laskar Jihad yang memimpin perjuangan para anggota-
nya di medan konflik. Didorong sentimen keagamaan sesama Muslim,
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
75 Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

76 Sukidi Mulyadi
Ja’far Umar Thalib berpandangan bahwa membantu Muslim di Ambon
merupakan kewajiban, dan perjuangan di sana dimaknai sebagai jihad
melawan kekuatan non-Islam.
Oleh karena itu, aspek keagamaan secara dominan mewarnai anggota
Laskar Jihad, di samping tentu saja keterampilan militer. Ja’far Umar Thalib
senantiasa menekankan bahwa keberangkatan anggota Laskar Jihad untuk
membantu Muslim di Ambon merupakan bagian dari tugas melawan
kekuatan kafir. Dalam kerangka itulah, dia kemudian meminta fatwa pada
sejumlah ulama di Timur Tengah guna memberi legitimasi keagamaan
bagi perjuangan Laskar Jihad. Dan sejumlah ulama secara tegas memang
mendukung langkah Ja’far Umar Thalib dengan Laskar Jihad-nya. Ter-
catat setidaknya tujuh orang mufti dari Timur Tengah, tepatnya Saudi
Arabia, yang telah mengeluarkan fatwa untuk berperang melawan kaum
kafir di Ambon.
Bersamaan dengan itu, dari pihak kaum Kristen juga berdiri Laskar
Kristus. Sebagaimana halnya Laskar Jihad, Laskar Kristus juga meng-
gunakan simbol-simbol keagamaan untuk perjuangan mereka berperang
melawan kaum Muslim. Laskar Kristus didirikan pada 1998, dua tahun
sebelum Laskar Jihad. Diasumsikan, Laskar Kristus memiliki hubungan
erat dengan—kalau tidak dikatakan berasal dari—Geraja Petra, tepatnya
ketika ia mengorganisir Gerakan Maluku Berdo’a (GMB). Kegiatan itu
dilakukan sebagai langkah penyelamatan terhadap nasib rakyat Maluku
yang mulai terlibat konflik dan kekerasan dengan kaum Musllim. Dengan
demikian, Laskar Kristus didirikan dalam rangka untuk membela iman
Kristiani. Seperti halnya Laskar Jihad, maka laskar Kristus juga memahami
peperangan dengan kaum Muslim sebagai memiliki makna keagamaan;
bahwa ia merupakan satu panggilan agama. Oleh karena itu, segala ben-
tuk tindak kekerasan—bahkan termasuk membunuh pihak Muslim—bu-
kan hanya diperbolehkan secara agama, tapi bahkan dipahami sebagai tu-
gas suci yang diperintahkan Tuhan.
Demikianlah, oleh beberapa kalangan, Laskar Jihad dan Laskar Kristus
dianggap sebagai salah satu bentuk paling jelas dari upaya menjadikan
agama sebagai landasan untuk tindak kekerasan. Baik para anggota Laskar
Jihad maupun Laskar Kristus mendefinisikan mereka sebagai bagian dari
komunitas keagamaan masing-masing. Begitu pula mereka pada saat yang
sama menganggap komunitas agama lain sebagai “yang lain” (the oth-
er), yang sah diperangi dan juga dibunuh. Dipahami dalam kerangka
demikian, sebagaimana ditunjukkan artikel ini, tedapat sejumlah bukti
bahwa baik Laskar Jihad maupun Laskar Kristus telah menjadikan konflik
dan kekerasan sebagai bagian tradisi yang memiliki makna keagamaan.
Yang mengkhawatirkan, tradisi kekerasan seperti itu mulai diturunkan
kepada generasi muda. Kedua laskar tersebut sama-sama melibatkan anak
kecil dalam konflik dan tindak kekerasan atas nama agama.
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

Violence under the Banner of Religion 77
Sukidi Mulyadi
Violence under the Banner of Religion:1
The Case of Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003
77 Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

78 Sukidi Mulyadi
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

Violence under the Banner of Religion 79
Brief History of Religion and Violence
In the course of its history, religion has had a dual function in
plural societies. Many scholars and religious leaders agree that
religion has had a role in fostering peace, harmony and civility.
However, other scholars see religion as a source of conflict and
violence. The latter view is supported by numerous incidents of
religious violence around the world. The work of Juergensmeyer,
for example, clearly shows how violence has occurred and spread
under the banners of all religions. In his introduction,
Juergensmeyer writes:
The first half of the book contains chapters on Christians in America
who supported abortion clinic bombings and militia actions such as the
bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building; Catholics and Protestants
who justified acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland; Muslims associated
with the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and
Hamas attacks in the Middle East; Jews who supported the assassination
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the attack on Hebron’s Tomb of the
Patriarchs; Sikhs identified with the killing of India’s prime minister Indira
Gandhi and Punjab’s chief minister Beant Singh; and the Japanese Buddhists
affiliated with the group accused of the nerve gas attack in Tokyo’s subway.2
This latest publication of the Concilium series, Religion as a Source
of Violence, also confronts the issue of violence under the banner of
religion by reference to cases of religious conflict in Rwanda, Sri
Lanka, Bosnia, and Guatemala.3 Many other scholars, such as Rene
Girard (1973),4 Bruce Lawrence (1989),5 Regina Schwartz (1997),6
have recognized the link between violence and religion.
The classic argument against violence under the banner of religion
is that all religions hold sacred doctrines of non-violence and support
for peace. Therefore, when religious violence takes place, the leaders
often rhetorically refer to religious militants as the cause of these
acts of violence. After analyzing many cases of religious violence, I
assert that these two hypotheses above should be reexamined
through violent aspects in religious doctrines and the abuse of
religious doctrines by religious militants to justify violence. Both
potentially cause violence. The first indicates a contribution of
religion to the acts of violence and the latter refers to a culture of
violence created by religious militants. To this end, and for specificity,
I will carry out an analysis of religious violence in Indonesia.
Since 1996, violence under the banner of religion has been
increasing in Indonesia. Besides small-scale religious violence, such
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

80 Sukidi Mulyadi
as that Situbondo, East Java, (1996), Tasikmalaya, West Java (1996),
and Ketapang, Jakarta (1998), much larger-scale religious violence
between Muslims and Christians began on January 19, 1999, in
Ambon, Maluku. The original cause of this conflict was a
disagreement between a young Muslim from the village of
Batumerah and a young Christian from the village of Mardika over
the fare on a public minibus.7 However, it deteriorated into a mass
conflict between hundreds of youths from the two villages and
spread to damaging churches and mosques in the neighborhood.8
The emergence of Laskar Jihad (the Jihad Paramilitary Force)
was basically in response to the religious violence in Maluku. As I
will describe below in more specific terms, Laskar Jihad clearly
shows how Islamic paramilitary groups used religious doctrines
to justify violence against Christians in Ambon. The emergence of
Laskar Kristus (the Army of Christ in Ambon) came from the Petra
Church and held a sacred mission to fight Muslims under the
banner of Christ. Therefore, both Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus
claimed the same mission: to fight one another under the banner
of religion. It is interesting to see how Laskar Jihad, on the one
hand, and Laskar Kristus, on the other, both use and regulate
violence in the name of religious doctrines. Do religious doctrines
support violence? Who masterminds a religious decree of violence?
Do both of the Laskar Jihad and Laskar Kristus warriors actually
show the same culture of violence from different religions? This
paper will deal with these issues. I will first describe Laskar Jihad
and then explain the rise of Laskar Kristus.
Laskar Jihad
Historical Background:
The Rise of Ja’far Umar Thalib and Laskar Jihad
Laskar Jihad was formed on January 30, 2000, specifically in
response to religious violence between Muslims and Christians in
Maluku. It is the paramilitary wing of the Sunni Communication
Forum (the Forum Komunikasi Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama’ah, FKAWJ)
that was established two years earlier. The FKAWJ was formally
established by the founder of Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Thalib
(40), when he and his followers held an important religious meeting
(tabligh akbar) in Solo, Central Java, on February 14, 1998. The core
mission of the FKAWJ was essentially to purify and spread Islam
in terms of the beliefs of the first generation of followers of the
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

Violence under the Banner of Religion 81
Prophet Muhammad. Robert W. Hefner called the FKAWJ and the
Laskar Jihad movement a:
neo-fundamentalist or neo-Salafy, because it emphasizes extreme
political views not associated with earlier variants of Salafism, including
those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One such emphasis is the firm belief
that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide conspiracy to
destroy Islam and the response by Muslims to this effort must be armed
jihad.9
As I will describe below, Thalib accused the United States,
Israel, and Christians in general of being the mastermind behind
religious violence in Ambon.
As a paramilitary wing of the FKAWJ, Laskar Jihad mirrors the
formal structure of the Indonesian military, consisting of ‘brigades,
battalions, companies, platoons, and teams, and it even has its own
intelligence services.’ 10 Appointed as a commander-in-chief of
Laskar Jihad, Thalib was supported by a number of field
commanders, including Ali Fauzi and Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari.11
Ja’far Umar Thalib is a central figure in designing the strategy
of the Laskar Jihad movement. His religious background, as will
be seen, clearly supports Islamic radical movements that became
characteristic of Laskar Jihad. Born in Malang, East Java, in
December 1961, Thalib is of Arab descent. His father, Umar Thalib,
is known not only as a religious preacher from Yemen who initially
came to Indonesia for business reasons, but also as an activist in
the Islamic movement, known as the al-Irsyad movement in
Malang.12 Unlike his wife, Badriyah Saleh, Umar Thalib, a veteran
of the “November 10th War” in Surabaya, supported a strong
military education for Ja’far Umar Thalib. When recalling his
upbringing, Thalib stated, “study of the Arabic language with my
father was similar to heavy-weight boxing.”13
After finishing his formal education in Religious Teacher
Education (Pendidikan Guru Agama, PGA) in Malang, 1981, Thalib
continued his study at the Persis Islamic School in Bangil, East
Java. However, he was unhappy with the school’s direction and
decided to move to Jakarta. In 1983, he resumed his studies at the
Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), an institute funded
by the government of Saudi Arabia. While a student at LIPIA,
Thalib was a prominent activist and became a leader of the al-
Irsyad student organization, which strongly opposed the ideology
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

82 Sukidi Mulyadi
of Pancasila.14 He only studied at the LIPIA for three years, failing
to finish his program of study because of a dispute with his teacher.15
Awarded a scholarship by the Indonesian Council for Islamic
Proselytism (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), he continued
his studies at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, beginning
in 1986. After arriving in Peshawar, Thalib quickly realized that
his knowledge on Islamic Salafy up to that point was very limited.
In this region, Thalib had many friends from the younger
generation of the Salafy movement who came from Suriah.16 He
also learned of and read widely about the religious thought of
Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, and its leading figure of radical-
Salafy, Sayyid Qutb. Thalib said, “I was really very impressed
because I was an admirer of Sayyid Qutb before.”17 He did not
finish the program at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan,
again due to disagreements with his lecturer.18 He decided to fight
in the war in Afghanistan in 1987, under the financial aegis of the
Muslim World League (Rabithatul Alam al-Islami). “My struggle is
merely based on Islamic solidarity,” Thalib said of his fighting
against the Soviet Union.19 He added, “I am the only Muslim who
is concerned with their struggle in fighting against the Soviet
invasion, and thus I decided to join the fighting in the Afghanistan
war.”20 In Afghanistan, as Hefner recorded,
Thalib met briefly with Osama Bin Laden. However, Thalib opted to
join with a faction of the mujahidin with ties to a strict Salafy organization
known as the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl-I Hadith. This Saudi-
based organization is famous for, among other things, instructing its
followers that rulers who fail to implement Islamic law are apostates and
must be overthrown.21
After returning to Indonesia in 1989, Thalib received a new
religious mandate to improve the Al-Irsyad Islamic School in
Salatiga, Central Java.22 He then left in 1991 to travel through the
Middle East, where he broadened his insights on Salafy teachings
from the great Salafy teacher, Syaikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i in
Dammaz in North Yemen.23 Syaikh Muqbil is well-known “for his
connection with the conservative Islamist Islah party and the Saudi-
funded Salafy-Wahhabi movement in Yemen.24 Hasan recorded:
During the pilgrimage (hajj) months, Thalib repeatedly went to Mecca
and Medina to perfom the hajj. While performing the hajj, he sought out
and attended religious lectures held by a number of prominent Saudi
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

Violence under the Banner of Religion 83
Salafy-Wahhabi teachers, including Muhammad Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d.
1999) and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Abd Allah bin Baz (1912-1999).25
After returning to Indonesia in 1993, Thalib founded the Ihya
al-Sunnah Islamic Boarding School (Pesantren Ihya al-Sunnah),
located about 12 miles north of the Yogyakarta.26 In the school
(pesantren), he spent a lot of time teaching Salafy doctrines, such as
al-Usûl al-Thalâthah and Syarah Kitâb al-Tauhîd, written by
Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab and al-Aqîdah al-Wasî¯iyyah, written
by Imam Ibnu Taimiyah.27
Based on Thalib’s long historical background and his connection
with the Salafî-Wahhabî movement in Saudi Arabia, his position as
Salafî, or ‘Neo-Salafî’ in terms of Hefner’s category, is quite clear.
An Indonesian Islamic historian at the State Islamic University
(UIN) in Jakarta, Azyumardi Azra, called this movement a
‘radicalization of radical-Salafî.’28 Azra uses this term for those
who commit acts of violence and terrorism based on the concept
or ideology that is commonly referred to as radical-Salafî.29
As I will describe below, Laskar Jihad’s connection with the
radical-Salafî movement in Saudi Arabia contributed to the issue
of a religious decree of jihad against Christians in Maluku. This
connection can be traced to the establishment of Laskar Jihad in
response to religious violence in Maluku. As International Crisis
Group reported, ‘the massacre by Christians of over 400 Muslims
at Tobelo in North Maluku during the last week of December,
1999, had enflamed Muslim sentiment throughout Indonesia.’30
On Thursday, April 6, 2000, six representatives of Laskar Jihad,
including Ja’far Umar Thalib; vice-commander Ayip Syafrudin;
brigadier general (ret). Rustam; the Ambon war commander Ali
Fauzi; the Tidore war commander Abu Bakar al-Banjari and Tasrif
Tuasikal were received by President Abdurrahman Wahid (also
known as Gus Dur) at the Merdeka palace.31 This group conveyed
their harsh criticism of the President’s policy regarding the Maluku
crisis and the idea of revoking TAP MPRS XXV/1996.32 While Gus
Dur and the six representatives talked about the issues of the
Ambon conflict, hundreds of the Laskar Jihad warriors
demonstrated in front of the Merdeka palace.33 In mobilizing the
Laskar Jihad warriors, Greg Fealy recorded that Thalib said,
I was merely doing my duty as a Muslim, because clearly the
Abdurrahman Wahid government is unable or unwilling to protect the
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---

84 Sukidi Mulyadi
Islamic community. If the state can’t protect us (i.e. Muslims), then we must
do it ourselves. He maintains that Wahid’s government is anti-Islamic: It is
positioned to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels.
FKAWJ is committed to bringing it down.34
Laskar Jihad officials believed that Muslims in Ambon were
getting the worst treatment and Thalib then coordinated and
arranged for volunteers at a training camp near Bogor, West Java.35
The Laskar Jihad warriors trained in the camp numbered
approximately 3,000, and Thalib said in his speech that in the second
session, around 7,000 warriors would be trained to be sent to Maluku
in the future.36 Thalib explained that the Laskar Jihad warriors would
be trained by former members of the student regiment (resimen
mahasiswa) from many universities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Bogor.
He emphasized repeatedly that there was no Indonesian military
involved in this training.37 In other interviews conducted by
Budiyono, a reporter for a web site in Jakarta, Thalib added that
trainers also came from Afghanistan, Moro and Kashmir.38
In response to this plan, President Wahid prohibited paramilitary
training, ordered their camp closed and prevented the Laskar Jihad
warriors from traveling to Maluku. Unfortunately, Thalib had sent
several thousand the Laskar Jihad warriors to Maluku shortly after
April 2000.39 In his interview with The Jakarta Post, Thalib said:
Some 3,000 initial volunteers will go to Maluku (soon). Yet, our
volunteers are basically religious preachers, armed with religious
knowledge to preach to locals. An investigation team I chaired revealed
recently that Muslims in Maluku are not only subject to physical suffering
but also to spiritual suffering because of their lack of religious
understanding. Spiritually, they have no idea how to overcome their
problems. Based on this, and also because most Muslims’ solidarity
movements for Maluku are focused more on handling the physical side of
the problems, we decided to send preachers along with donations.40
Before traveling to Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors met at
the Pesantren As-Sunnah on Jalan Kaliurang Km 15, Yogyakarta.
Soon after final preparation, they traveled to Surabaya and boarded
a ship for Maluku.41 Amazingly, when The Laskar Jihad warriors
arrived at the port of Maluku, their arrival in the Jihad battlefield
were greeted friendly by military men, who provided a number
of military weapons, such as AK-47s, SS-14s, and so forth.42 The
arrival of the Laskar Jihad warriors, therefore, escalated the
religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Ambon.
Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2003

---